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Abstract 
Object-Oriented Musicology: Some Implications of Graham Harman's Philosophy for  
Music Theory, History, and Criticism 
 
by 
Eric Taxier 
Advisor: Chadwick Jenkins 
This dissertation brings the ideas of the philosopher Graham Harman (b. 1968) into a 
musicological context. His “object-oriented ontology” is widely known in continental 
philosophy, but it has not yet entered rigorous contact with musicology. Certain factors pose 
difficulties at first glance, such as Harman’s focus on metaphysical issues (originating in his 
critique of Martin Heidegger) and his rehabilitation of the widely criticized concept of aesthetic 
autonomy. But these are also sources of novelty that could make an object-oriented encounter 
with musicology fruitful. In the first chapter, I outline the main features of Harman’s thought. He 
critiques assumptions about the nature of reality that he interprets as reductive—and which are 
by no means restricted to philosophical discourse. According to him, real things are 
“withdrawn,” or irreducible to their genetic components and the outcomes of their encounters 
with other things. In short, literal knowledge cannot exhaust them. Yet an indirect approach to 
reality is still possible. Aesthetic encounters such as music epitomize indirect causation: a 
listener becomes absorbed with a musical object that is in tension with its own features and thus 
enters the interior of a new real entity like hydrogen in a water molecule.  
The next three chapters apply Harman’s ideas to specific topics in music theory, history, 
and criticism. Chapter 2 finds compelling parallels between Robert Gjerdingen’s galant schema 
theory and Harman’s philosophy. Still, an object-oriented schema theory requires that certain 
persistent reductionist tendencies are avoided. It also entails that the difference between a 
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schema stage and event, noted by Gjerdingen, is taken more seriously as a necessary interpretive 
moment in the analysis of schemata. Chapter 3 discusses the topic of historical influence through 
the lens of the mid-twentieth-century encounter between the ragtime pianist, songwriter, and 
composer Eubie Blake and the music theories of Joseph Schillinger. The object-oriented 
viewpoint differs from both older and more recent tendencies to treat influence as a direct 
exchange of knowable properties. For Harman, influence is not cultivation, corruption, or a 
symptom of a larger relational system. Instead, it is an indirect fusion of one thing with the 
“style” of another. Furthermore, Harman’s historiography incorporates counterfactual 
speculation as a corrective to the assumption that what actually happened is more relevant to the 
being of historical objects than what could have happened. Finally, Chapter 4 addresses music 
criticism of the concert work De Staat (1976) by Louis Andriessen. (“Criticism” is meant in the 
sense of interpretive judgment.) In their impulse to reject formalism, critics of De Staat have 
tended to accept formalism’s basic taxonomic division between the sonic form “in itself” and its 
context. They emphasize the latter, meaning the conditions of the musical work’s genesis and the 
network of concepts and socio-political meanings around it. But according to criticism that is 
object-oriented rather than context-oriented, De Staat may contain supposedly “contextual” 
elements within its form through their aesthetic handling. Critics who attend to these aesthetic or 
nonliteral facets of experience may thus find common ground with object-oriented theorists and 
historians. 
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Introduction. Musicology via Graham Harman: A Difficult Partnership? 
The following chapters bring the relatively young philosophy of Graham Harman, called object-
oriented ontology (OOO, or “triple-O”) into the orbit of musicology. Harman has already had a 
sizable impact throughout the arts and humanities.1 In musicology, his ideas have mainly 
appeared through their affiliation with wider currents, such as a growing interest in non-human 
factors, “sound objects,” ecology, and his commentary on the work of Bruno Latour.2 But there 
has not yet been a sustained study of OOO in connection with the discipline. I contend that a 
careful use of object-oriented thought can provide a fresh way of looking at a variety of topics 
within musicology. 
While Harman himself has written about many things other than philosophy (e.g. media 
studies, literature, history, architecture), his general approach has been consistent: he always 
takes the perspective of OOO and keeps a constant eye on the tacit metaphysics of the discourse 
around his chosen subject matter.3 This stems from his career-long focus on fundamental 
questions about reality, originating in a critique of Martin Heidegger.4 (Note that unlike 
 
1
 Citations of Harman listed on Google Scholar grew from dozens in the late 2000s to thousands since 2010 
(https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=G-grK7QAAAAJ). Several fields in which OOO has provoked strong 
reactions are listed in Graham Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything (Pelican, 2018), 7-
10. Architects have framed OOO as a response to philosophies of “flux” and “becoming” (e.g. Gilles Deleuze). See 
Todd Gannon et al., “The Object Turn: A Conversation,” Log 33 (2015): 73-94. 
2
 In sound studies, see Drew Daniel, “What Is a Digital Sound Object?” O-Zone: A Journal of Object-Oriented 
Studies 1 (2014):84-96; Marie Højlund and Morten Riis, “Wavefront Aesthetics: Attuning to a Dark Ecology,” 
Organised Sound 20 (2015): 249-62. The object-oriented ecologist Timothy Morton regularly refers to music, e.g., 
in Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality (Open Humanities Press, 2013), and Hyperobjects: Philosophy and 
Ecology after the End of the World (University of Minnesota Press, 2013). Harman has written several books and 
articles on the influential French thinker Bruno Latour and his relation to OOO, starting with Prince of Networks: 
Bruno Latour and Metaphysics (re.press, 2009). A vocal Latourian in musicology is Benjamin Piekut. See his book 
Experimentalism Otherwise: The New York Avant-Garde and Its Limits (University of California Press, 2011), and 
“Actor-Networks in Music History: Clarifications and Critiques,” Twentieth-Century Music 11/2 (2014): 191-215. 
3
 On media studies, see Graham Harman, “Some Paradoxes of McLuhan’s Tetrad,” Umbr(A) 1 (2012): 77-95. On 
literature, see Graham Harman, Weird Realism: Lovecraft and Philosophy (Zero Books, 2012). On history and social 
theory, see Immaterialism: Objects and Social Theory (Polity, 2016). On architecture, see Graham Harman, 
“Aestheticizing the Literal: Art and Architecture,” Center 21 (2018): 60-69. 
4
 Graham Harman, Tool-Being (Open Court, 2002). See also Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. John 
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Harper and Row, 1962). 
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Heidegger, Harman does not use “metaphysics” in a derogatory way but treats it as more or less 
synonymous with “ontology.”) Harman’s recursive method of viewing multiple topics in an 
object-oriented light has features that may prove beneficial here, including his alertness to 
metaphysical ideas in whatever context they appear, the rigorous consistency of his philosophical 
filter, and the distinctive result of his take on each subject.  
The chapters that follow the opening primer about OOO (Chapter 1) are modeled on the 
general approach just described. I do not aim to formulate an explicit “philosophy of music.” 
Rather, I will put object-oriented principles in conversation with a mixture of musicological 
content to see what results. The selected subject matter conveys some of the variety that I have 
indicated in that it deals with issues of theory (Chapter 2), history (Chapter 3), and music 
criticism (Chapter 4), while also touching on different genres and musical sensibilities. Along 
with illustrating how a rigorous employment of OOO can affect musicological discourse, these 
chapters may also play a part in the ongoing development of object-oriented philosophy itself.  
I will return to the selection of topics momentarily. Before that, it may be useful to get an 
idea of what sets OOO apart and how it might initially come across as a difficult partner for 
musicology. OOO is a realist philosophy. Realism typically refers to the principle that things 
exist independently of observations and theories, as opposed to the view that their manifestation 
in consciousness exhausts their reality. But OOO’s realism is unique in three major ways. (1) It 
claims all encounters, not just perceptions and ideas, fail to directly contact the reality of objects, 
the “things in themselves.” When one thing enters a relation with another, it touches a distortion 
or translation, which Harman calls the sensual object. (2) A real object is also partly distinct from 
its own formative components. In other words, it is an emergent system over the sum of its parts. 
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(3) Real and sensual objects are not just shorthand terms for collections of properties. They are 
genuine units in tense relationships with their own qualities.  
All told, an object can be said to be autonomous from its relations, parts, and features. 
For Harman, one implication of this variant of realism is that interaction of any sort, including 
knowledge, is only ever indirect with respect to real objects. Indeed, he suggests that causality 
itself is closely aligned with aesthetics (as Chapter 1 will describe). Another implication is that 
non-human and human entities face the same fundamental ontological structures. From a 
musicological standpoint, these broad strokes may present some initial stumbling blocks. Is OOO 
regressive in its attitude toward autonomy? Does it offer anything more to musicology beyond 
supporting a trendy appeal to non-humans? Is applying the same ontology to different sizes and 
kinds of things too democratic to say anything meaningful about those specific things?  
 
I. First Concern: Autonomy 
A handy sketch of what “autonomous music” is often taken to mean, along with a customary 
critique (though presented as an underdog position), appears early in the first volume of the 
Oxford History of Western Music.5 Richard Taruskin writes that Medieval tropes, or more 
generally, “interpolations into a preexisting piece,” are “neither continuous nor coherent nor 
unitary nor independent.” The trope and the larger segment of Mass hosting it both lack these 
features, which we “tacitly expect pieces of music to exemplify.” If the thought of disunity 
irritates us, this is due to a deep-seated modern assumption in need of questioning:  
 
5
 Richard Taruskin, Music from the Earliest Notations to the Sixteenth Century, Vol. 1 of Oxford History of Western 
Music (Oxford University Press, 2010), 64-65. All further citations of the work are from these two pages. 
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The first [assumption] that might be questioned is the notion from which all the others 
stem—namely, that a piece of music worthy of consideration as such ought to be able to 
stand timelessly on its own two feet. What is demanded is that it have an existence 
independent of its context, its observers, and particularly its users. This is called the 
principle of autonomy, and it is pretty universally regarded today as a requirement for 
aesthetic appreciation—that is, for evaluation as a work of art. A trope certainly fails this 
test, but then so do all the other musical artifacts of its time. For music only became 
autonomous when it stopped being useful; and this did not happen until conditions 
allowed such a thing to happen. 
We learn in the same pages that technology has enabled and reinforced the principle of 
autonomy. Scores and audio recordings “reify” ephemeral acts into durable things. Now, in the 
most obvious sense, autonomy simply refers to independence from context. But let us consider 
four additional points about the principle of autonomy as Taruskin renders it: 
 
1. Enabling conditions: Written and audio recordings, which persist beyond performances, 
allow the principle of autonomy to flourish. They are durable, impersonal, and easy to 
reproduce and circulate. 
2. Context: We can add observers and users to a broader notion of “context.” According to 
the principle of autonomy, a self-contained musical work hums along on its own, 
unblemished by the meanings and uses people affix to it in the present moment. It is 
isolated even from the praise and blame of faddish audiences.  
3. Transcendence: Going a step further, the increasingly long-lasting musical work may be 
idealized as “transcendent” in the Platonic sense of existing apart from our world. It is 
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timeless, good “for contemplation, not for use, and for the ages, not for you or me.” To 
the believer, the timeless work is more real than its mundane appearance for “you or me.” 
4. Relations: The principle of autonomy can be tested and easily broken. An elaboration of a 
segment of Catholic Mass fails the test because the trope commentary depends on and 
affects its environment. This sets the stage for increasingly trivial variations to fail the 
test, such as we find when the “same” work changes with every new performance. It 
seems, then, that autonomy is not just an idea about music, but a literal trait that can be 
conspicuous in its absence. This may seem strange unless we assume that the reality of 
music is no different than its effects—ideas about it, how it is perceived, its uses.  
 
Harman defends a rather different principle of autonomy. The following qualifications of the 
above points outline the contrast (saving a proper description of OOO’s tenets for Chapter 1):  
 
1. Enabling conditions: OOO accepts the mediating role of technology and would just add 
two things. First, it admits counterfactuals into its picture of history. Objects such as the 
ideal of aesthetic autonomy that Taruskin describes could have emerged under different 
conditions, while song books and record players could have had different effects than the 
ones they did have. Second, OOO universalizes the problem of mediation. Other kinds of 
transmission (e.g. “oral”) negotiate and transform music in their own unique ways and 
are no truer to music than recordings, even if they are literally more personal.6 
 
6
 These comments on enabling conditions correspond with Harman’s critical engagement with Bruno Latour, whose 
actor-network theory seeks to open technological, scientific, and historical black boxes. See Harman, Prince of 
Networks; Harman, Immaterialism. 
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2. Context: OOO depicts a world of autonomous units. But the separation of a real thing 
from its context does not entail a lack of human involvement as a component of that 
thing. Musical objects, for instance, will necessarily contain “social” factors in terms of 
both production and listener interaction, though the precise mixture of relevant parts may 
change from one case to another.7 Indeed, the boundary between interior form and 
exterior context is not set in advance by separating sounds from concepts or by supposing 
musical form to mean “music without humans.”8 
3. Transcendence: OOO accepts the distinction between the reality of a thing and its 
appearances. It also holds that a principle of autonomy is a requirement for aesthetic 
appreciation. But for OOO, objects exist in this world and cannot be timeless. A recorded 
idea or gesture may endure for a while, but it is still finite, changeable, and fragile.9 
4. Relations: A liturgical trope emerges from relations and may enter new relations with 
certain other things. But OOO rejects any implication that the trope is nothing more than 
its causal background, function, or impact. Instead, it is autonomous in the sense that its 
reality is buffered in specific ways from both the conditions of its own genesis and its 
interactions. Genuine change to the underlying character of a portion of Mass is neither 
constant nor impossible, but only sporadic.  
 
 
7
 The idea of a listener being “inside” a musical object can seem strange but it is not contradictory. It follows from 
the thesis that the observer and observed entity are both on the interior of another object, the observation qua system. 
See Chapter 1, and Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Zero Books, 2011), 115-17. 
8
 These comments about context correspond with Harman’s critique of “formalist” art criticism and “new 
historicist” literary criticism. See Graham Harman, “The Well-Wrought Broken Hammer: Object-Oriented Literary 
Criticism,” New Literary History 43/2 (2012): 183-203. The “observer vs. ingredient” argument against formalism 
that I describe here first appeared in Graham Harman, “Art without Relations,” ArtReview 66 (2014): 144–47, 
available at: https://artreview.com/features/september_2014_graham_harman_relations/. 
9
 Points 3 and 4 correspond with Harman’s perspective as initially developed in his critique of Heidegger in Tool-
Being. Unawareness of point 3 (on transcendence) has already caused difficulties for the film theorist Luka 
Arsenjuk, “On the Impossibility of Object-Oriented Film Theory,” Discourse 38/2 (2016): 197-214. 
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II. Second Concern: Another Voice in the Chorus  
OOO may seem to offer just one more cheer in favor of greater emphasis on non-humans. For 
instance, a study of the Indian tabla’s tuning by P. Allen Roda groups several thinkers – Karen 
Barad, Jane Bennett, Ian Bogost, Levi Bryant, Manuel DeLanda, Graham Harman, Bruno Latour 
– under the banner of a “material turn.”10 These authors are all “engaged with thinking through 
the existence of things in the absence of humans and the complex relationships between humans 
and non-humans.” Roda believes the commonalities between the authors are “more important 
than the distinctions.”11 That is, their differences are irrelevant to Roda’s analysis of the tuning 
of the tabla. But is that actually true? Roda’s method, for instance, is to detect human and non-
human “nodes in a musical network” in mutual or “dialogic” relationships, and Roda holds that 
agency belongs to no single entity but is always co-produced.12 It turns out that Roda’s method 
and assumptions do not easily gel with OOO. Harman, as we shall see, often focuses on non-
reciprocal relations and “what objects are when not acting.”13 
The need to sharpen the fuzzy picture of OOO also becomes pressing when the fuzziness 
is used as a tool of critique. This can be a simple matter of mistaken identity, such as when an 
author assigns beliefs to Harman that actually belong to another philosopher.14 A more basic 
issue, though, is that the lumping tactic hinders progress in disputes that call for closer readings. 
For instance, the ethnomusicologist Tyler Yamin echoes Roda in seeing OOO as a supporting 
 
10
 P. Allen Roda, “Tabla Tuning on the Workshop Stage: Toward a Materialist Musical Ethnography,” 
Ethnomusicology Forum 23/3 (2014): 360-82. 
11
 Ibid., 361, n. 4. 
12
 Ibid., 362-63 (musical network), 365 (agency co-produced). 
13
 Harman, Immaterialism, 7. 
14
 See Isabella van Elferen, “Hyper-Cacophony: Lovecraft, Speculative Realism, and Sonic Materialism,” in The 
Age of Lovecraft, ed. Carl Sederholm and Jeffrey Weinstock (University of Minnesota Press, 2015), 79-96. Elferen 
critiques views held by the French philosopher Quentin Meillassoux, which she also attributes to Harman because 
they are both associated with “speculative realism.” This leads her to miss crucial points of agreement between 
herself and Harman, such as their shared emphasis on “the hidden realities of the cosmos” (92).  
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member of a larger trend that would “restore the ‘thing’ to a position of ontological equivalence 
to the human being.”15 He then endorses the assertion by anthropologist Severin Fowles that this 
broad trend risks putting the object at the mercy of the ethnographer.16 Specifically, the growing 
intellectual interest in non-humans transfers colonialist discourse “onto the world of things.” 
Non-humans, like “damsels in distress,” happen to “make very convenient subaltern subjects.”17 
Fowles supports his claim with a quote from Harman: “objects themselves are a perpetual Orient, 
harboring exotic spices, guilds, and cobras.”18 By disputing the existence of a deep ontological 
divide between humans and other parts of the cosmos, OOO puts non-human “subjects” in an 
exotic terrarium while simultaneously devaluing human subjects “who now quietly retreat into 
the blurred backdrop.”19  
Of course, it would take more digging to demonstrate that OOO holds the position that 
Fowles’s example symbolizes (a projection of subaltern political status onto things). Indeed, one 
would have to contend with Harman repeatedly arguing against projecting human values onto 
inanimate things in the same book that Fowles cites.20 (Harman has also written an essay 
addressing the vulnerability of his philosophy to charges of Orientalism, titled “Objects and 
Orientalism.”21) More constructively, Harman’s emphasis on metaphysical assumptions would 
become valuable in this context. Fowles indicates that the Orientalist vibe he detects explains the 
turn toward things and is not just a byproduct. That is, he locates the rising interest in non-
 
15
 Tyler Yamin, “One or Several Gamelan? Perpetual (Re)construction in the Life of a Balinese Gamelan Semara 
Pagulingan,” Ethnomusicology 63/3 (2019): 362. 
16
 Severin Fowles, “The Perfect Subject (Postcolonial Object Studies),” Journal of Material Culture 21/1 (2016): 9-
27.  
17
 Fowles, “The Perfect Subject,” 23. 
18
 Graham Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics (Open Court, 2005), 140. 
19
 Fowles, “The Perfect Subject,” 24. 
20
 Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 130, 174, 236, 250. 
21
 Graham Harman, “Objects and Orientalism,” in The Agon of Interpretations: Towards a Critical Intercultural 
Hermeneutics, ed. Ming Xie (University of Toronto Press, 2014), 123-39. 
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humans “within the wider swirl of challenges to Western intellectual authority,” so that OOO in 
the Yamin/Fowles sense of thing-human equivalence is only legible “as a response to and 
extension of postcolonial critiques.”22 Apart from the issue of its accuracy, this claim seems to 
take the position that discourse about varied cultural activities has its source of reality in power 
relations. A spirited good-faith dialogue on objects and ethnography could only emerge from 
contrasting this implied ontology with OOO itself, rather than with a version of OOO that is 
conflated with wider currents.  
   
III. Third Concern: Monotony 
A third stumbling block is the suspicion that OOO is not equipped to discuss particular things. 
This concern is apparent in an essay by Gary Tomlinson.23 Tomlinson, inspired by 
posthumanism (“a thinking-beyond the human and anthropocentrism”), aims to replace the strict 
distinction between linguistic meaning and indifferent physical “information” with a broader 
continuum of meaning: “a nonsymbolic making of signs that embraces but exceeds the 
human.”24 (His essay emerges from his interest in the link between music and human evolution, 
specifically from his thesis that music gradually coevolved with humans over long time scales.25) 
Tomlinson suggests OOO has something to offer here by putting humans on the same 
ontological level as other things. At first, he worries that OOO might ascribe psychology to non-
humans and so shade into “a revival of an ancient panpsychism.”26 He later admits, though, that 
 
22
 Fowles, “The Perfect Subject,” 12. 
23
 Gary Tomlinson, “Sign, Affect, and Musicking before the Human,” boundary 2 43/1 (2016): 143-72. 
24
 Ibid., 144, 146. 
25
 Gary Tomlinson, “Evolutionary Studies in the Humanities: The Case of Music,” Critical Inquiry 39/4 (2013): 
647-75. Also, Tomlinson, A Million Years of Music: The Emergence of Human Modernity (Zone Books, 2015). 
26
 Tomlinson, “Sign, Affect, and Musicking,” 158. 
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Harman’s position “amounts to much more than inadvertent category switching or wide-eyed 
panpsychism.” Unlike those who might assign affect or cognition to all things, Harman assigns 
non-relationality (i.e. autonomy) to all things: objects are irreducible to affect and can exist 
without entering relations. Tomlinson thus recognizes OOO’s distinction “between real objects 
and relationality.”27 
Tomlinson’s true worry here is that OOO is too general. He senses in the broadness of 
OOO’s categories of reality and relation something like a literal sameness between all relations 
(calling them “prehensions” in the tradition of Alfred North Whitehead), “whether it is the lizard 
or the rock or even the sun that prehends.”28 OOO for Tomlinson has a “tendency to flatten … 
the deep-historical rupture that introduced signs into a cosmos of informational causality alone.” 
And “there is little place in Harman’s ontology … for the difference in the biosphere between 
more and less complex organisms.”29 As a brief aside, it is difficult to ignore certain ambiguities 
in Tomlinson’s argument. For example, depending on what he means by “informational 
causality,” we cannot know if Harman does efface the difference between signs and information: 
he might actually insist on this very gap or flatly deny the existence of informational causality. In 
any case, the key point here is the implication that OOO accounts for everything at the cost of 
relevance to specific things, especially those things involved in the coevolution of music and 
humans over large time scales. It may be a worthwhile exercise to raise an object-oriented 
defense against this concern.30 But perhaps the most vivid way to address OOO’s relevance to 
specific topics is by counterexample. 
 
27
 Ibid., 162-63. 
28
 Ibid., 161. 
29
 Ibid., 163. 
30
 The broad strokes of such an argument might be as follows: First, Harman calls for and has undertaken ontologies 
of specific entities. More importantly, while Tomlinson recognizes OOO’s reality-relation gap, he misses other 
features of OOO that would be germane to his project. One useful line of inquiry would place OOO’s supposed 
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IV. Organization 
The first chapter, a primer on the main features of Harman’s metaphysics, moves from a wide 
view to specifics. Its overall discussion may simply be divided into the two topics of anti-
reduction and indirect causation. First, Harman characterizes the object as anything, alive or 
inanimate, that is irreducible not only to its underlying components but also to its effects on other 
things. This gives OOO a way to critique the implication that a given object under discussion is 
nothing more than what it is made of or what it does. It also suggests that an object-oriented 
musicologist’s interest in a topic refers to their interest in what it is apart from its origins or 
relations. Harman’s philosophical viewpoint emerges from his extension of “a single great 
thought” by Martin Heidegger: “The being of things such as candles and trees never lies fully 
present before us, and neither does being itself.”31 For Harman, all beings withdraw from both 
practical and theoretical handling. And this gap between being and relation haunts all kinds of 
things, not just sentient creatures. He also concludes that objects are not eternal or simple: they 
might exist for only a brief instant and they are assembled from other things.  
Second, the assertion that objects do not directly encounter the reality of other things 
raises the question of how they can influence one another and change. Harman argues they must 
somehow do so indirectly through the mediation of the same distortions mentioned earlier, called 
sensual objects. To explain indirect causation, Harman emphasizes a second polarity, this one 
between objects and their own features, leading to a combined fourfold model of real 
objects/qualities and sensual objects/qualities. Just as anti-reduction is OOO’s main tool for 
 
insensitivity to differences in dialogue with its anti-reductionism. Another way forward would be to compare the 
notion of non-linguistic signs with OOO’s concept of sensual objects in tension with their qualities. Harman would 
likely also raise questions about Tomlinson’s gradualist view of history. 
31
 Graham Harman, Heidegger Explained: From Phenomenon to Thing (Open Court, 2007), 1. See also Harman, 
Tool-Being, 1-10, for an overview of how Harman’s reading differs from much scholarship on Heidegger. 
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critiquing metaphysical assumptions in discourse, the various pairings of these four poles are 
OOO’s main tool for exploring the dynamics of interaction and change. For instance, Harman 
claims that the status quo of an object’s reality gets destabilized when it encounters the tension of 
another object’s link with its qualities. The idea seems to come straight out of aesthetics, but here 
it is at the center of a metaphysical explanation for causation. 
Regarding the selection of topics for the three applied chapters, I would first reiterate 
OOO’s neutrality about subject matter. Its “democratic” attitude allows and even encourages a 
quirky array of topics. Nevertheless, different authors may want to stress certain factors over 
others. A recent Bloomsbury series called “Object Lessons,” co-edited by the object-oriented 
author Ian Bogost, skews toward non-sentient things, as is apparent with titles such as Dust, 
Cigarette Lighter, Blanket, and Rust.32 This tendency is already active in musicology and, as I 
argue above, may even be a source of confusion about OOO. We see a different approach from 
Harman. He tilts in the direction of more conventional, sometimes well-tread sources of 
scholarly fascination, the familiarity of which helps to foreground the philosophical issues. For 
example, he has written about the fiction of H. P. Lovecraft (an influential twentieth-century 
author), the Dutch East India Company (a long-lived and powerful international actor), and the 
American Civil War (a major historical event).33  
As for the present project, I seek to avoid over-associating “tangible things” like musical 
instruments with objects in the proper object-oriented sense, while still honoring the topical 
breadth that OOO encourages. The applied chapters also engage with different aspects of 
Harman’s thought. The chapters will proceed as follows:   
 
32
 Michael Marder, Dust (2016); Jack Pendarvis, Cigarette Lighter (2016); Jean-Michel Rabaté, Rust (2018); Kara 
Thompson, Blanket (2018). 
33
 Harman, Weird Realism; Harman, Immaterialism; and Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 114-34.  
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● Chapter 2 discusses the modern theory of phrase-level conventions, or “schemata,” in 
eighteenth-century galant music. I identify similarities between schema theory and OOO 
and aim to strengthen the connection. I argue that understanding schemata as objects 
lends additional rigor to the conceptual edifice underlying schema theory. Doing so also 
points the way toward incorporating interpretive aesthetic distinctions in the theory itself 
rather than as a secondary (and optional) layer of commentary.  
● Chapter 3 deals with the ragtime pianist/composer Eubie Blake’s post-retirement study of 
the idiosyncratic ideas of the music theorist Joseph Schillinger. OOO understands 
influence in terms of an object’s nonliteral and irreversible bond with another object, an 
infrequent transformative union called “symbiosis.” I contrast this idea with the 
assumption that influence is a direct transfer of properties (a movement that can be 
constant and reciprocal), which I call “inscription.” The Blake-Schillinger connection 
also leads me to critique Harman's assertion that symbiosis occurs early in the life of an 
object. As part of this critique, I clarify the theory underlying symbiosis and I reinforce 
OOO's emphasis on counterfactuals in its social theory and historiography.  
● Chapter 4 considers the relation between music criticism and Louis Andriessen’s 1976 
concert piece De Staat, a setting of parts of Plato’s Republic. Critics who have 
sympathetically engaged with it have often shown hostility toward “formalism,” or the 
idea that De Staat is a self-enclosed work. I contrast both the formalist attitude these 
critics seek to avoid and their context-oriented alternative with OOO. Object-oriented 
criticism focuses on autonomous musical form but it is flexible in admitting supposedly 
contextual elements for treatment as part of the aesthetic experience.   
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At the level of explicit content, a thematic thread of education runs through these chapters. The 
short patterns studied by galant schema theory were pillars of Italian musical pedagogy in the 
eighteenth century; the chapter on Eubie Blake concerns the impact of his education on his 
musical life; and Andriessen’s De Staat is a setting of a section from Plato’s Republic about 
music in education. But these chapters also have a deeper, more unshakeable connection with 
one another. They all bring into play music criticism in the sense of “interpretation” and 
“connoisseurship.” This comes down to Harman’s idea that philosophia means devotion or 
attachment to an object – “love of wisdom” – rather than wisdom itself as discursive 
knowledge.34 The point is reinforced by the object-oriented theorist Noah Roderick. He suggests 
that unlike forensic argumentation, which asks how a thing came to be, or deliberative 
argumentation, which asks what is to be done in the future, OOO is most sympathetic with 
epideictic rhetoric of the present. Epideictic rhetoric is typical of art criticism, religious orations, 
political declarations of national values, and eulogies, all of which “argue for the endurance of a 
thing.”35 If there is a single key to understanding how OOO would position itself in relation to 
any particular region of musicology, this may be it. 
 
  
 
34
 Harman, Quadruple Object, 68. 
35
 Noah Roderick, The Being of Analogy (Open Humanities Press, 2016), 89-90. 
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Chapter 1. Object-Oriented Ontology and the Metaphysics of Change 
What is a musical object? The term may stir up several familiar associations. Perhaps it seems 
like an airy abstraction – a work concept, a sound structure – or maybe it strikes a frozen pose 
against a livelier opposite such as a human subject, a “decentered” multiplicity, a performance.1 
Less pejoratively, “musical object” might be taken to refer to the tangible stuff of musical 
activity and study: instruments, batons, recording devices, sound waves, band uniforms, scores, 
digital workstations. Yet for the philosopher Graham Harman (b. 1968) none of these 
associations get musical objects quite right. For one thing, he uses the notion of object to 
describe a world filled with nothing but objects. It is his basis for a full-fledged ontology or study 
of being as such. To bring object-oriented ontology (OOO) into conversation with music and 
musicology, then, we will first have to determine what Harman means by the object.  
Whatever it might be, an object invariably exists in a context. Indeed, it can only be 
accessed by way of the context within and around it. Yet Harman also holds that objects are 
autonomous in that they fail to directly touch in their relations with one another. Direct contact 
would mean uniting with something in its “labors amidst the world,” whereas an object only 
enacts or executes its own being.2 (Boldfaced terminology related to OOO appears in the 
glossary.) However, while objects cannot link to the reality of other things, they somehow can 
affect one another and change. In epistemic terms, knowledge fails to give us the real, yet the 
arts, sciences, and humanities somehow do more than gesture wildly. This paradoxical 
“somehow” is the topic of the current chapter.  
 
1
 For example, Lydia Goehr in The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works (Oxford University Press, 1992) contrasts 
treating the musical work concept as an “analytic object” with treating it as “historical content.”   
2
 Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 17. I return to the concept of “execution” toward the end of the present chapter 
with the topic of metaphor. 
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OOO focuses on the distinction between beings in themselves and for other things, the 
real and the sensual. For Harman, the chasm between an object and how anything else 
encounters it (its sensual image) cannot be bridged by assuming that certain kinds of images, 
such as literal descriptions, do correspond with the real while others do not. He believes this 
principle has long delimited the mission of philosophy: “by preferring philosophia over sophia, 
love of wisdom over wisdom, Socrates already drew a strict line of separation between reality 
and any knowledge of it.”3 If knowledge never quite grasps its target, then what could OOO say 
about objects, whether musical or otherwise? We may find some initial purchase in the 
distinction between literal and object-oriented thought with a suggestive example from a 
systematic music theory text. William Caplin’s Classical Form gives “precise and restricted” 
descriptions of “generalized compositional tendencies” shared by Haydn, Mozart, and 
Beethoven.4 Caplin focuses on common strategies that characterize the beginnings, middles, and 
endings of musical segments at different levels of scale. He permits his formal categories some 
flexibility and makes no attempt “to ground the concepts in some broader system of 
mathematics, logic, cognition, or the like,” but it is safe to assert that his theory aspires to 
produce knowledge about a body of music.5  
Sometimes, though, Caplin not only lists the qualities of his objects (by labeling the parts 
of phrases, for instance), but also expresses thoughts about their being in a way that seems to 
take the object/knowledge gap into account. Consider a memorable example (Figure 1.1). Along 
with an analysis of the opening phrase of Mozart’s Piano Sonata in G, K. 283 (mm. 1-10), Caplin 
 
3
 Graham Harman, “The Current State of Speculative Realism,” Speculations IV (2012): 25.  
4
 William E. Caplin, Classical Form: A Theory of Formal Functions for the Instrumental Music of Haydn, Mozart, 
and Beethoven (Oxford University Press, 1998), 4. 
5
 Caplin, Classical Form, 5. 
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includes a newly composed option for the end of the phrase (mm. 7-8, below it). This reimagined 
or counterfactual ending alerts us to the original phrase’s particularity by wiping it out.  
 
Figure 1.1. William Caplin’s Examples 3.3a (Mozart, Piano Sonata in G, K. 283, mm. 1-10) and 
3.3b (rewritten ending), Classical Form, 36.  
 
 
Caplin makes some unambiguous observations: Mozart extends the end of the middle segment 
and stretches the cadential passage right after it; the phrase thus has irregular proportions and a 
delayed ending.6 This description states with clarity how the phrase differs from the norm. It 
hardly calls for a recomposed ending. But the revision does a different kind of work. It alludes to 
something in the original that could be ruined, yet which exceeds any literal account of its 
content. It even appears to provoke further oblique (yet vivid) commentary from Caplin in the 
mode of music criticism about the untouched original: “The pent-up energy created by 
frustrating expectations of melodic and harmonic closure is finally released in a flurry.”7 
A more general question shadows that of how discourse can grasp musical objects, and 
this question has motivated Harman to develop his philosophical program: How do objects 
connect with one another? As one might guess from the Caplin example, Harman develops his 
 
6
 Ibid., 47-48. 
7
 Ibid., 48. 
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metaphysical explanation for causation (object-to-object contact) with a startling emphasis on 
the same sensual “images” that he distinguishes from the real. He argues that while no specific 
subset of images inherently delivers privileged insight, the disturbance of my link with the 
sensual both alludes to a surplus beyond appearance and produces a new reality. In other words, 
the real is not directly accessible, but may be indirectly reached through special events in an 
object’s relational experience. Aesthetics – if taken to include both sentient and non-sentient 
“beholders” – becomes the global study of causation in Harman’s ontology.  
 
I. Flat Ontology: Something to Say about Everything 
The subject matter addressed by first philosophy (also called ontology or metaphysics in 
Harman’s usage) is vast in scope. But Harman claims this does not make philosophy a master 
discipline any more than it is a social or ethical “handmaid” to the natural sciences. Each field of 
study “has a certain autonomy, a local texture and color not masterable from the outside,” 
whether it deals with “the chemistry of acids, or the history of capitalism, or the story of Captain 
Ahab’s hunt for the white whale, or the morphology of the Turkic languages, or the stylistic 
features of analytic cubism, or metaphysics.”8 Still, part of the local texture of (object-oriented) 
philosophy is that it aims to be capable of contemplating all things, fictional or real, small or 
large. It has a “systematic ambition to have something to say about everything.”9 Thus the 
categories it uses to address the structure of reality as such must be both relevant to the local 
 
8
 Graham Harman, “Concerning Stephen Hawking’s Claim that Philosophy Is Dead,” Filozofski vestnik 33/2 (2012): 
14-15. 
9
 Ibid., 16. 
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flavor of each object and general enough to avoid inherently privileging any one corner of the 
cosmos. Harman calls this starting point flat ontology.10  
The violation of flat ontology, or “wrongly ascribing two different ontological structures 
to two separate kinds of beings,” is the taxonomic fallacy.11 This is one of OOO’s main tools for 
critiquing other implicit or explicit ontologies. We may briefly see it in Harman’s readings of 
Immanuel Kant and Gottfried Leibniz. Kant’s famous concept of the thing-in-itself resonates 
with Harman—except it functions as a foil for the limitations of one kind of entity, the human 
subject. Kant’s focus on transcendental conditions may be of great import, Harman argues, but it 
elides the problem of how all things interact with one another. And only this problem leads to the 
theory described in the present chapter.12 Next, consider how Harman reads Leibniz’s famous 
distinction between substance and aggregate. Some things are real in their own right (substances, 
or “monads”) while others reduce to their components (aggregates). Leibniz believes all 
combinations of monads are aggregates. The general insight of this view for Harman is that 
substances are partly independent of the systems they enter. They “exceed any composite or 
aggregate into which they might fall.”13 But Leibniz only allows certain kinds of things – simple 
things – to be substances. A herd of sheep, a company, or a songbook is defined in advance as a 
mere aggregate simply because it belongs to the class of things with parts.14 Thus Leibniz's 
concept of substance errs with respect to the taxonomic fallacy. “What I object to … is the 
employment of the word ‘substance’ to refer to certain special entities at the expense of others, 
 
10
 Harman borrows the term “flat ontology” from Manuel DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage 
Theory and Social Complexity (Continuum, 2006), though the concept was important to OOO before that. 
11
 Harman, Quadruple Object, 116. 
12 Harman, Tool-Being, 104-05; 279-80. See also the comments on Heidegger in section III, below. 
13
 Graham Harman, “Plastic Surgery for the Monadology: Leibniz via Heidegger,” Cultural Studies Review 17/1 
(2011): 218. 
14
 Harman, Quadruple Object, 111. 
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and … to determine the substantiality of an entity by looking at its causal source rather than its 
formal structure.”15 Insofar as OOO incorporates “substance” and “aggregate,” the principle of 
flat ontology would push it to use the concepts for two faces of everything in the world. The 
basic entities that populate reality would have to be “both substance and aggregate 
simultaneously,” both irreducible and complex, hence decomposable and even destructible.16  
From the starting point of flat ontology, the question then becomes how philosophy can 
do justice to particular things. As a first but by no means conclusive gesture on this front, I 
would once more draw attention to Harman’s claim that no discipline is “masterable from the 
outside.” He argues that along with being systematically ambitious, philosophy is systematically 
barred from direct, literal mastery of the wisdom it professes to love. In positive terms, this anti-
literalism puts OOO in league with art, which orbits individual songs, dances, and paintings:  
If all method and all knowledge tries to pinpoint the genuine qualities of things, 
philosophy is a counter-method and counter-knowledge that aims at the thing-in-itself in 
separation from its qualities. But if philosophy stands alone in its ambition to consider 
every kind of object (including the unreal) it is not alone in its status as a counter-method 
or counter-knowledge: here, philosophy has art as its neighbor and close friend.17  
Unlike disciplines that aim to produce a descriptive correspondence or paraphrase of their 
objects in terms of their qualities, OOO is allied with an aesthetic outlook that avoids replacing 
things with literal paraphrase. Before taking up what this aesthetic outlook entails, though, let us 
continue to view objects with a wide lens. 
 
 
15
 Harman, Tool-Being, 275. 
16
 Graham Harman, “Objects and Orientalism,” 128. 
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 Harman, “Concerning Stephen Hawking’s Claim,” 16. 
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II. Between Undermining and Overmining 
We have now seen that OOO seeks maximum generality in its conceptual edifice and the subject 
matter it admits for treatment while still somehow trying to do justice to individual things. 
Perhaps the simplest definition of the object, then, would involve a highly generalized notion of 
the autonomous unit. Sure enough, Harman characterizes the object as that which resists 
reduction to its constituent ingredients and relational effects. Objects “must be autonomous in 
two separate directions: emerging as something over and above their pieces, while also partly 
withholding themselves from relations with other entities.”18 
 We have just two ways to gain paraphrasable knowledge about anything: “by determining 
either its constituent elements or its effects on the environmental context it inhabits.”19 There is 
value, for instance, in ascertaining that the morning and evening stars are both Venus, or in 
demystifying assorted misfortunes attributed to witchcraft as unrelated coincidences.20 Similarly, 
a music historian asks about Beethoven’s family, teachers, and the conditions that helped to 
shape his career. She also studies his interactions with others and the symphonies, sonatas, and 
chamber works he wrote. Even a basic description of a melodic phrase wavers between the 
context of its parts and its functions in a wider context. “But some observers go further than 
this,” writes Harman, “and claim that a thing is nothing more than its constituent elements, or 
nothing more than its environmental situation.”21 This “nothing more than” is the key factor 
separating discursive knowledge about a thing from debunking strategies of the sort OOO 
 
18
 Harman, Quadruple Object, 19. 
19
 Graham Harman, “Undermining, Overmining, and Duomining: A Critique,” in ADD Metaphysics, ed. Jenna 
Sutela (Aalto University Design Research Laboratory, 2013), 43. 
20
 Harman gives these examples as successful instances of the two ways to reduce objects: undermining (morning 
and evening stars) and overmining (witchcraft). See Graham Harman, debate with Tristan Garcia (transcribed), in 
Wijsgerig Festival Drift (2013), ed. Deva Waal, 52.   
21
 Harman, “Undermining, Overmining, and Duomining,” 43.  
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rejects. We may study recordings by a saxophonist to learn about changes in recording 
environments or performance practices. But it is another matter to imply that these facts can in 
principle exhaust their subject matter. In the latter ontological register, the two forms of 
knowledge are invoked to systematically eliminate objects. Harman’s terms for them are 
undermining and overmining. Combined, they are called duomining: 
One option is to claim that objects are unreal because they are derivative of something 
deeper—objects are too superficial to be the truth … The other and more familiar option, 
anti-realist in character, is to say that objects are unreal because they are useless fictions 
compared with what is truly evident in them—whether this be qualities, events, actions, 
effects, or givenness to human access. Here objects are declared too falsely deep to be the 
truth … While the first approach “undermines” objects by trying to go deeper, we can 
coin a term and say that the second strategy “overmines” objects by calling them too 
deep.22 
Undermining treats the object as incidental compared with a more fundamental ground. The 
deeper reality could be the parts that go into producing the thing (its causal history) or a primal 
whole of which the object is just a pawn or accident (the spirit of the age, a pre-individual 
substrate). When undermined, individual entities are stripped of their own specific characters in 
favor of another “really real” thing. Leibniz’s aggregates, for instance, are always mere 
aggregates, surface accidents of the layer beneath them. They are individual things only as 
correlates of the mind, not in their own right.  
One might expect an anti-reductionist philosophy such as OOO to be especially 
suspicious of theories of substance and essence. But Harman has sympathy for the impulse 
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 Graham Harman, “On the Undermining of Objects: Grant, Bruno, and Radical Philosophy,” in The Speculative 
Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism (re.press, 2010), ed. Levi Bryant et al., 24.  
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behind undermining.23 As I implied earlier, he accepts the general notion of substances that have 
“a depth lying behind all surface content.”24 Undermining only occurs when that depth reduces 
to one layer. “For if this deeper reality contains seeds of individual things, then these seeds are 
either distinct from one another or they are not. If not, then we have monism. And if they are 
distinct, then we have the same situation as the world of objects.”25 Harman has no quarrel with 
qualified concepts of substance or essence. He instead defends the individuality or emergence of 
things at different scales of combination.  
 Whereas undermining replaces the object with its composition, overmining replaces the 
object with its outward appearance and activity. Overmining accepts only manifest relations and 
so dismisses the object as a “reified” abstraction, “a useless hypothesis, a je ne sais quoi in the 
bad sense.”26 Nothing lies beneath whatever is registered. “On this view, objects are important 
only insofar as they are manifested in the mind, or are part of some concrete event that affects 
other objects as well.”27 What is the risk of overmining? Recall that undermining misses 
emergence, the uniqueness of a thing beyond the contributions of its ingredients. Overmining 
struggles to account for change, whether in perspective or in the object. Relations themselves 
lack a surplus or “unexpressed reservoir that might lead to future change. The world thereby 
becomes static, no matter how much one might protest with alibi-like assertions of the inherent 
dynamism, flux, or conatus of the world. Change is merely asserted rather than earned.”28 
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Since Harman considers overmining “the greater danger for the humanities and social 
sciences,”29 and since it differs from the usual conception of reductionism (which falls under the 
category of undermining), an illustration from musicology might be helpful. Consider two 
modern readings of the ancient Greek author Aristoxenus, a music theorist and student of 
Aristotle. What is pitch (tasis)? Aristoxenus distinguishes pitch from the continuous motion of a 
speaking voice. But his exact meaning is up for debate. The commenters Thomas Mathiesen and 
Andrew Barker translate Aristoxenus’s definition of tasis as follows:  
 
● “a certain hesitation and positioning of the voice” [Mathiesen].30  
● “a steady motionlessness of the voice,” or a more literal translation, “a remaining and 
standstill of the voice” [Barker].31 
 
As one might guess from “positioning of the voice,” Mathiesen takes a fully relational, 
overmining view of Aristoxenus’s tasis. He argues that unlike physical definitions of pitch, for 
which stability is irrelevant, an emphasis on stability distinguishes speech from song by making 
it possible to grasp “the relationship of one pitch to another.” The full significance of tasis is that 
it “allows for differentiation of pitch by position.”32 We might assume pitch is subordinate to 
some other principle of (intervallic) change. But Mathiesen’s Aristoxenus also overmines 
candidates such as “note” (phthongos) and “song” (melos).33 
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Barker, like Mathiesen, sees a contrast between continuous speech and the standstill of 
musical pitch. His agreement with Mathiesen ends there, though. “As Aristoxenus defines it 
here, tasis is not ‘pitch in general,’ the dimension in which high and low notes are located (his 
word for that is topos, ‘space’ or ‘place’), and neither is it ‘a pitch,’ a position in this dimension 
on which a note may fall. It is the ‘resting of the voice’ at such a position.”34 The pitch is not a 
relational location; rather, it is a definite musical event, “a ‘pitching’ rather than a pitch.”35 It is a 
kind of substance that is prior to but capable of positioning, of entering new relations with other 
pitches and joining a larger context as a named note.36 Overall, the concept of tasis is part of a 
larger “revolutionary” attempt to address the nature of musical practice the way one does with 
plants or animals. Pitches are not just abstract points in “the topography of auditory space,” but 
musical objects or “landmarks … created by the voice.”37  
This is a good opportunity to observe that while the word “metaphysics” is often taken to 
indicate something otherworldly, OOO claims to be a metaphysics qua fundamental philosophy 
while aiming at this world. For example, Barker argues (and Mathiesen would likely agree) that 
Aristoxenus makes “no implications of a metaphysical or cosmological sort,” meaning he does 
not reduce (i.e. undermine) melos to physics or a cosmic “harmony of the heavens.”38 However, 
from an object-oriented perspective, Aristoxenus does take a broad metaphysical stance on his 
topic—and Mathiesen and Barker differ over what that might be. Mathiesen’s Aristoxenus 
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suspends any notion of musical sounds being objects in favor of how they enable the perception 
of intervals.39 For Barker’s Aristoxenus, though, pitch is not just a je ne sais quoi posited beneath 
intervallic relationships. Instead, “melodically moving voices are as real, in the domain 
accessible to our ears, as are dandelions and crocodiles in the visual realm.”40 
 
III. Reality and Relation: Objects Within Objects 
Let us take OOO to be in rough agreement with Barker’s rather than Mathiesen’s Aristoxenus. 
What does it mean for melodies to be real in the domain accessible to our ears, i.e., perception 
(aisthesis)? That claim seems to mix two categories related to the study of being, namely, the 
thing itself and my perception of it. This distinction is important for Harman as a metaphysical 
realist—enough so that he puts it at the heart of his philosophy. After all, OOO wants to avoid 
overmining the object to its relations, including my access to it. Real objects have “an 
autonomous reality inexhaustible by any relations.”41 By contrast, sensual objects exist only as a 
correlate of some relation, such as perception. They are “secondary” objects, derivative of 
“primary” real ones. The issue here is that certain entities such as melodies and fictional 
characters are not strictly real in an obvious one-to-one sense. Does this mean sound waves and 
their qualities are real, while musical sounds and their features are all sensual?  
[A] musical tone, after all, seems to exist only for some hearer. We might assume that the 
“primary” object is merely a physical sound wave, while the musical tone is a merely 
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“secondary” object, and as such, only the primary sound wave could have primary 
qualities, and the secondary musical tone could only have secondary qualities that exist 
for some hearer alone, and not in themselves. Paradoxically enough, the world does not 
work in this simplistic a fashion.42 
Harman does not strictly divide the real and the sensual into two estranged realms. I will discuss 
this in more depth momentarily, but it might be noted now how musical sounds seem to swoop in 
from the outside to affect us like friends or intruders. They leave enduring topics of 
contemplation in their wake, which do not always reduce to vibrations of the air, symptoms of 
human biology, or historical and economic forces. The defender of autonomous objects faces the 
paradox that unreal melodies somehow are real. Harman will argue that a beholder of a melody 
indirectly accesses something real. Indeed, the issue of indirect contact between objects is not 
only about the nature of perception for OOO, but follows from a fundamental tension between 
reality and relation, the real and the sensual.43 The apparently paradoxical reality of melodically 
moving voices thus joins the more general problem of object-object contact or causation, the 
question of how one thing affects another.   
Harman’s ontology (a) raises and (b) attempts to address the problem of indirect 
causation. These two moments roughly correspond with the first two books of his career, Tool-
Being and its sequel, Guerrilla Metaphysics.44 The former undertakes a critical study of Martin 
Heidegger, and the latter develops the topic of indirect causation through a study of authors 
associated with phenomenology (Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, 
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Alphonso Lingis). In Harman’s commentary on Heidegger, the basic result is the gap just 
mentioned between reality and relation. A real object is withdrawn, which means other things 
never directly access its being but only encounter an oversimplification. The fact that objects do 
seem to come into relation raises the central problem of OOO. For the most part, I will elide the 
details of Harman’s readings of other philosophers in favor of the overall picture of his 
philosophical program. But indirect causation is the centerpiece of OOO, so I will briefly 
summarize the results of its origins. 
For Heidegger, the being of a thing is never identical with its presence to consciousness.45 
A tool that imposes itself on our awareness – a “broken” (or simply observed) tool – depends on 
and differs from the tool itself. The phenomenal hammer “is only a shallow caricature of the 
hammer executing its own reality.”46 Harman accepts this distinction between the being of a 
thing and its presence but argues that it should be more significant for ontology than is usually 
supposed. His critical interpretation follows two steps: 
(1) The critique of presence extends to praxis, despite Heidegger’s own tendency to treat 
practical coping as a more primal access to being than observation and theory. “To use 
the hammer does not give us any more intimate contact with the hammer’s reality than to 
see or to think about it does. The same sort of translation or distortion occurs in both 
cases—the hammer is rendered in a foreign tongue distant from the original.”47 In other 
words, Heidegger does not give us an interplay between two kinds of relation (usefulness 
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and visibility), but one between “the reality of the hammer itself” and “whatever exists 
only in relation to [human] access.”48  
(2) The critique of presence also applies to non-sentient objects, not just Dasein (the being of 
humans). “Humans do not have the unique gift or burden of translating entities into 
modified terms … In fact, any relation between any two entities must result in the same 
type of translation or distortion with which human Dasein treats hammers.”49 This is not 
to suggest that plants and cars have uniquely human gifts, only that the polarity between 
reality and relation applies to their worlds no less than ours. “The primary dualism in the 
world is not between matter and mind, but between objects and relations, and most 
relations will be unrecognizable as anything mental, just as objects turn out not to 
resemble what is usually called the physical.”50 
An object thus has a specific reality, a form unto itself. Harman sometimes associates objects 
with the terms “form,” “substance,” and “substantial form.”51 Objects do resemble the substantial 
forms of the Scholastic tradition in some ways, but they are not easy allies. An outline of some 
differences may help to clarify Harman’s notion of the object:  
 
● An object cannot move to a new medium without distortion. It must be translated.  
● An object is destructible and not necessarily natural. 
● An object is composed of other objects. 
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First is the principle of translation. OOO opposes the belief that a form can shift from one 
medium to another and remain what it was.52 This claim follows from the critique of under- and 
overmining. Against undermining, an object has a specific character belonging to it per se 
(regardless of the relations it enters), an individuating thisness that Harman calls its real 
qualities. “Objects are not interchangeable, after all.”53 And against overmining, this specific 
character differs from our access to it. Objects “cannot be brought into any relation without 
significant distortion.”54 Extracting a form in knowable terms means “paying the price of 
changing the form into something else.”55 Hence, “truth cannot be correspondence, since 
knowledge is a translation of real things rather than a copy of them.”56 Second, objects need not 
be natural or eternal.57 A lyre, a synthesizer, and the Moog Music Corporation may all be 
objects. Third, objects are composites no less than they are substances. Insofar as an entity has 
real qualities or “a definite qualitative character,” it must be articulated by pieces that somehow 
interact.58 That is, an object is more than the sum of its parts but is also composed of relations 
between them.59  
This last point about composites suggests every object is a compound form that is 
irreducible to its pieces. It is an endless descent of parts and emergent wholes:  
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A sports car is an autonomous reality compared with all the many uses of it. But the car is 
also a relational whole built of many parts, none of which the car fully exhausts (as 
proven by the fact that any of the parts can malfunction). Each of these car parts, in turn, 
is made of further parts, and I do not doubt that this chain of assemblages stretches to the 
dankest infinities of Hell and beyond.60  
The principle of the compound object also indicates that performances and “events” are objects. 
Harman gives the example of two planes colliding: “we think that their impact caused damage so 
severe as to lead to the crash and explosion of both. But according to the model just sketched, 
this is merely a ‘retroactive effect on its parts’ of a larger collision-entity.”61 We can easily 
imagine less brutal examples, such as jam sessions, marriages, or concerts.  
 
IV. Objects and Qualities: The Interiors of Objects 
We now arrive at the question of how real objects interact. “Objects or substantial forms, then, 
exist in all different sizes. But whatever size they may be, they have a problem relating to one 
another.”62 Given that real objects are withdrawn, they cannot interact directly but only through a 
third term: a vicar or mediator. With this problem in mind, let us complete the basic picture of 
Harman’s model of objects. Along with the poles of the real and sensual, Harman takes a second 
polarity as basic to OOO, namely objects and their qualities. Objects are not only irreducible to 
their relations with other objects but are also irreducible to their own features.  
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To better grasp the object-quality divide, let us start with just the realm of perception. 
According to the influential tradition of British empiricism, consciousness bundles raw sense 
data or “simple impressions” into a more complex synthesis.63 Objects in this view are nothing 
more than the packing together of neutral content. They are their qualities. This is similar to the 
idea that complex aggregates reduce to simple substances, but solely within the mental sphere. 
OOO rejects this view. Against the notion that “all qualitative details are on exactly the same 
footing,” Harman draws on the idea in Husserl’s phenomenology that consciousness is made of 
“object-giving acts.”64 The phenomenal realm “is torn apart by a duel between objects and the 
content through which they are manifest.”65 Regardless of whether the tree I see is an illusion, it 
is “a unified tree-object immanent in consciousness, accompanied by … tree-content through 
which it always appears, but which varies in the wildest manner and is never identical with it.”66 
Let us examine each portion of this statement in turn: the object, the content, and the duel itself. 
Sensual objects (SO) – the things at which we direct our attention, called “intentional 
objects” in phenomenology – are not identical with their specific profiles or “adumbrations.” The 
sensual crocodile is “less” than how it appears from different angles and distances rather than a 
sum of these qualities. “Intentional objects always appear in more specific fashion than 
necessary, frosted over with accidental features that can be removed without the object itself 
changing identity for us.”67 Harman does not mean the SO is hidden by its accidents: “it is 
always present, but merely covered with the gems, glitter, and confetti of extraneous detail.”68  
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As for sensual qualities (SQ), Harman has mentioned two possible interpretations. 
Either they are a totally different kind of thing than objects (e.g. free-floating universal 
properties, or unreal predicates supplied by human minds), or they are more deeply imbricated in 
the world of objects:  
One option is that the qualities adrift in the world are made of an entirely different stuff 
from objects, which would leave us with a dualistic cosmos of objects and properties, 
perhaps along the traditional lines of form and matter. Another option is that the qualities 
are themselves objects … This would give us a world filled with a single genre of reality 
known as objects, unaccompanied by any second, foreign principle.69 
With his preference for the second option, Harman is not banishing qualities from OOO – far 
from it – but claiming they are always linked to a given level of an objectifying act: “a 
cacophony of random sound is already interpreted as a specific unit against its background.”70 In 
other words, an object individualizes its content; qualities are qualities of something. The main 
consequence of never separating qualities from the mediation of an object is that there are no 
independent self-same properties in OOO. The keenest observer will not find features wandering 
alone without a guardian. “As soon as we shift our focus from the hotel as a whole to the 
peripheral dance of light along its façade, we have turned sunbeams or moon-rays into our new 
intentional object.”71 Successive stages of categories, from green clothing to the color green to 
color itself and beyond, are successive stages of objects, each one partly distinct from the 
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specific ways in which it is given, like “an endless knotted rope in which each thing is tied into 
its nearest neighbor.”72  
 And what of the duel itself between the sensual object and its varied appearances (SO-
SQ)? Here we return to our theme of the reality of musical sounds. A sensual object forms a 
continuum with its varied shadings (we will find no continuum elsewhere in OOO). For SO to 
persist through its accidents, it must be this unitary thing and no other. “After all, if we strip 
away the swirling accidents of an object, what remains is not merely an empty pole of unity.”73 
This means that SO has features that it “desperately needs in order to be what it is,” i.e., real 
qualities (SO-RQ).74 Rigorous intellectual intuition or practical handling only indirectly accesses 
this background of real qualities, given that the real withdraws.75 Once more, a sensual object has 
real qualities, which are withheld from direct access. Here we see one of the ways an object-
oriented Aristoxenus can say musical sounds are real. A real background form makes them what 
they are for me within the realm of aisthesis.    
 Let us linger with this theme to consider how surface content may also pair with a real 
thing (RO-SQ). We have seen that Harman identifies the Heideggerian modes of being and 
presence with the non-relational (being) and relational (presence). His example of tool versus 
broken tool ends up doing double labor. In one sense it refers to the in-itself hammer versus the 
implement I use or notice. But even within that relational level, the broken tool is distinguished 
from everyday equipment. Taking a thing for granted means plainly identifying it with its 
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qualities. An unbroken hammer does its hammering; a familiar melody runs its course as such; a 
cadence simply functions. But in moments of surprise, qualities that do not neatly parse with the 
object become relevant to it. A hammer breaks, a melody haunts us, a cadence “seems to exhibit 
a genuine inner life.”76 In this sense, the broken tool is not less than its qualities, but more. 
“Tools break because they are something a bit more, an excess of reality that no system can ever 
fully exploit, and which eventually returns to haunt every user.”77 This is the second way our 
Aristoxenus can say musical sounds are real. Accessible traits sometimes alert us to a real 
object’s inner executancy like radio signals emanating from a black hole.78  
Just two more points will complete Harman’s basic model of objects. The first might be 
assumed by now but should still be mentioned: Harman generalizes the gap between objects and 
qualities, applying it to all kinds of things and not just to the targets of conscious object-giving 
acts.79 This is the same line we have seen him take with the polarity between reality and 
relational translation: “Yes, human cognition is very different from the collision of two grains of 
salt, but the point is that both are built out of something even more primitive.”80 We may thus 
ascribe aisthesis to entities that lack psyches, as long as we mean the nascent structure of a real 
thing translating the objects it encounters.  
Second, we return to the question of what mediates relations between real objects. I 
specifically mean the problem of identifying a direct point of contact. For OOO, this directly 
accessible thing can only be a sensual object (RO-SO).81 Sensual objects “would not even exist if 
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they did not exist for me, or for some other agent that expends its energy in taking them 
seriously.”82 RO-SO is both two things and one. In my perception of a tree, “the tree and I are 
distinct. We do not fuse together in instantaneous union.”83 But crucially, the encounter itself is 
one thing. It is irreducible to an outside view and to its pieces since neither the tree nor myself 
alone produce a perception of a tree. “In short, the intentional relation has an inherent reality that 
is never exhausted by analyzing it.”84 Now, a melody I encounter is not “inside” my mind. 
Rather, the melody and I are both on the interior of another entity, a composite formed indirectly 
by me and whatever real thing lies behind the melody.85 Here is a third way musical sounds are 
real. My relation with the music produces an attachment. That is, we both enter the interior of a 
new object and so shift the relation to “the register of the real.”86 Notice that RO-SO is by 
definition non-reciprocal: the sensual object is a correlate of the real object’s experience. For a 
sensual tree’s real counterpart to be affected by me, it would have to be a second relation. “If the 
tree relates to me as well, this must happen on the interior of a separate but related object.”87  
The model described above may be summarized as follows. A real object is irreducible to 
its parts and relational effects and so resists under- and overmining. It is an emergent unit 
composed of other things in vicarious relation. Such indirect relations take place by translation 
through sensual intermediaries. (Again, this just means a real object encounters other objects in 
its own style.) As part of this model, Harman defends two polarities, one between reality and 
relational presence, and the other between the unified object and its qualities (see Figure 1.2). 
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The combination of those options leaves us with a fourfold of real objects (RO), real qualities 
(RQ), sensual objects (SO), and sensual qualities (SQ). I have also provided three interpretations 
of the reality of musical sounds: (1) an encountered musical object has real qualities; (2) its 
sensual features may allude to a real object; (3) the musical object and the attached beholder 
exist on the interior of a real object.  
 
Figure 1.2. The elements of OOO as the intersection of two polarities. 
 Object Qualities 
Reality Real Object        RO Real Qualities         RQ 
Relation Sensual Object   SO Sensual Qualities    SQ 
 
 
We have not yet considered how indirect contact with the real occurs. There might 
already be a sense in the above discussion that causation only happens sporadically since it is 
buffered by sensual mediation. Indeed, Harman sees an important difference – to which the 
remainder of this chapter is dedicated – between normal “banal” experience and special moments 
of “tension.” The key to these special moments may be found in the experienced dynamics of 
objects and their qualities, hence the aesthetic flavor of OOO. There are four possible object-
quality pairs. Sensual objects have a specific appearance (SO-SQ), real objects have identity-
defining real qualities (RO-RQ), as do sensual objects (SO-RQ), and sensual qualities emanate 
from a real source (RO-SQ). After I summarize how banality differs from tension, I will go over 
the structure and terminology of the pairs and elaborate on the two where the real becomes 
relevant in experience.88   
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V. Fractures: The Object-Quality Tensions 
A. Banality and Tension 
Harman distinguishes between the typical pairing of an object with its qualities and special 
disruptions that elicit change. Consider the sensual object. Normally it is banal, bound together 
with its features and taken “for what it seems to be.”89 The beholder links it to familiar qualities. 
For instance, M&Ms might repeat to the point of becoming interchangeable instances of shared 
candy features.90 Musical phrases sometimes end with no more than dutiful punctuations. Entire 
musical genres reduce to familiar signature moves for some listeners. In short, a banal object is a 
literal one, with little to separate it from a bundle of qualities. “Usually an object does not seem 
very different from the sum of qualities it presents to us; this is the grain of truth in Hume’s 
‘bundle’ theory.”91 The restrained phrasing here (“does not seem very different,” “grain of 
truth”) alerts us to the fact that OOO leaves no room for absolute banality, given the unstable gap 
between any sensual translation and its real counterpart. “[E]very relation, every object, is 
already born into a state of disintegration—for it immediately sets up an internal space in which 
the union of its parts is no longer entirely unified, in contrast with its sleek unity from the 
outside.”92 As for real objects, their normal status is just withdrawal, “so there is actually no 
banal state of tension when a real rather than sensual object is involved.”93   
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Sometimes an object comes into tension with its qualities. In a story by H. P. Lovecraft, 
the narrator compares a monstrous idol to an octopus, a dragon, and a human caricature, “but it 
was the general outline of the whole which made it most shockingly frightful.”94 Lovecraft 
suspends the literal link between the idol and its features, fusing dragon and octopus qualities to 
a frightful whole that exceeds all paraphrase. Such object-quality tension is the source of change 
in OOO. “In order for something to change in the status quo, the bond between object and 
quality must be dissolved and a new one produced.”95 Notice the twofold aspect here of 
dissolving an object-quality bond, which Harman calls fission, and producing a bond, called 
fusion. A pre-existing object-quality link gets interrupted and a withdrawn reality becomes 
relevant. Fission and fusion “go hand in hand, since objects and qualities never exist outside of 
some bond that must be ruptured if another is to emerge.”96 Two of the four object-quality pairs 
bridge the sensual with the real. But before I discuss them in more depth, let us name and 
summarize all four tensions to get a sense of the territory.     
 
B. Naming the Four Tensions 
The four tensions in OOO are called time (SO-SQ), space (RO-SQ), essence (RO-RQ), and eidos 
(SO-RQ). These terms meet their everyday meanings only obliquely. That is, well-known 
categories such as space and time are derivative of something “even more basic,” the 
polarization between objects and qualities.97 Harman has also employed more active-sounding 
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language for the same concepts: simulation, allure, causation, theory.98 As far as the present 
summary is concerned, the significance of the extra terminology is stylistic rather than structural. 
It may sometimes be convenient to refer to tensions “per se” or to events where those tensions 
become “at issue” (Figure 1.3). Yet there is no ontological distinction here. Either a tension is 
already active as such or the object lacks tension as a banal SO or withdrawn RO.   
 
Figure 1.3. The object-quality tensions. 
Object-Quality Pair Name (“per se”) Name (“at issue”) 
SO-SQ Time Simulation 
RO-SQ Space Allure 
RO-RQ Essence Causation 
SO-RQ Eidos Theory 
  
Time (SO-SQ) or simulation names the continuous endurance of unity through shifting 
accidents. Since time is sensual, there is not one universal time but “a separate time on the 
interior of every object that exists, in which [sensual objects] are showered with a varying 
succession of different floodlights, strobes, confetti, and glitter.”99 To take a favorite example of 
Husserl’s, the musical tone, even an isolated tone has an element of continual animation while 
remaining the same.100 Time thus comes down to the experience of stability through change.101 
(Harman has compared SO-SQ to oscillatory motion.102) Insofar as a sensual object is unified 
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and commensurate with its accidents, time may be called a banal form of tensions that allude to 
the real.103 But time is not banal in its own right, since that would entail a lack of tension with 
SQ.104 Banality with respect to SO-SQ would mean the sensual qualities do not just correspond 
with their object but are compressed with one another so that the object has minimal time.105 
That is, a banal SO approaches the “quality position” as a kind of structured noise or singular 
element of experience, like an extra car in a stream of traffic.106  
If time is a tension between stability and change within a relation, space (RO-SQ) or 
allure is a tension between relation itself and non-relation. A distancing occurs when an object 
splits from its tangible profile (e.g. by innuendo, surprise, or the veiled coordination of disparate 
parts). Space in this sense is neither a literal measurement nor a container for measurements: 
“even when I travel to stand in the exact center of Osaka I will not exhaust its reality.”107 In fact, 
space subverts the literal, laying bare an object’s incongruity with its accessible features. This is 
exemplified by the Heideggerian broken tool that alludes to a surplus beneath it.108 I will note 
just two more points here, one about space’s connection to time and the other about its larger 
significance for OOO. First, punctuated interpretations of time – successions of now-states, the 
mingling of past and future in an ambiguous present moment – would count as “spatial” in OOO. 
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Harman’s main example is the concept of time associated with Heidegger about the projection of 
possibility (SQ, future) on a veiled reality (RO, past).109 Second, space is the key aesthetic 
concept in OOO, the metaphysical significance of which is that it produces an attachment 
between the experiencing entity (the “beholder”) and a sensual object. In this context Harman 
tends to call it allure. I will discuss allure in more detail shortly. 
Essence (RO-RQ) or causation is “the duel … between the unified real object and its 
multitude of real hidden features.”110 Just as with time and space, the use of the term essence has 
to be qualified, such as we find in Harman’s essay about Edward Said.111 His points will be 
familiar by now. Essence is not masterable by knowledge; nor does any kind of thing have a 
monopoly on being real and thus having an essence; nor is essence a timeless universal since it is 
individualized by its object.112 Essence is also called causation because it is “produced from the 
outside through causal interactions.”113 The emphasis on interactions here reminds us that the 
real and relational are intimate aspects of the same world. For while an essence belongs to a 
single object, it is produced by (indirect) relations.114 Is this a fourth way our Aristoxenus might 
speak of the reality of “melodically moving voices”? Perhaps, though he would no longer be 
dealing with “the domain accessible to our ears” so much as a musical encounter in itself, apart 
from its accessibility to anyone. Finally, Harman distinguishes between two basic kinds of 
causation: the birth of a new object, and the meaningful transformation of a pre-existing one 
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through the influence of something else, called symbiosis.115 I will return to the latter in Chapter 
3 (on Eubie Blake) because of its relevance to object-oriented historiography.  
 The remaining tension is eidos (SO-RQ) or theory. As noted earlier, a sensual object is 
by definition unified. Therefore, the status of SO-RQ prior to theory is identical to the status of 
the sensual object itself. Harman borrows “eidos” from Husserl’s notion of eidetic variation, in 
which the unarticulated defining features of an object become at issue by subtracting its 
inessential qualities.116 The main difference between Husserl and OOO on this point, as I noted 
earlier, is that for OOO real qualities are never directly accessible—not even by the intellect. In 
certain ways, eidos/theory is a mirror twin to space/allure. Both involve indirect tension with the 
real, yet whereas allure forms attachments, theory transforms attachments. These two important 
real-sensual tensions could use some more filling out. 
 
C. Allure [RO-SQ] 
Allure is the basis of aesthetic experience for OOO. Harman asserts that in human life, cases 
“bound up with unusually strong emotions” take root in allure: tragedy, comedy, cuteness, 
embarrassment, hypnosis, beauty, disappointment, loyalty, etc.117 In the shorthand of the current 
project, allure refers to a sensual object becoming “more real.” But its precise meaning is 
knottier than that. Harman launches his analysis of allure from a reading of Jose Ortega y Gasset 
(1883-1955), whose discussion of metaphor – specifically, “the cypress is like a flame” – 
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exemplifies aesthetics in general for its author.118 Overall, we shall see that allure suspends the 
literal and composes a new compound object through the ingenuous (“theatrical”) involvement 
of the beholder. 
Ortega is important for Harman because he incorporates the theme of real objects and 
nearly touches on causation. Like Harman, Ortega separates images and concepts of things from 
their “inwardness, or anything in the act of executing itself.”119 Execution refers to the “lived” 
reality of a thing, so it should not just be taken in a volitional sense of carrying out some end. 
The headache I suffer is an executant headache, as opposed to a headache analyzed through 
introspection or witnessed in someone else. “Between my life as it executes itself and the life of 
another as seen from outside, there is an absolute gulf.”120 Furthermore, humans are not the only 
entities with an “I.” Inwardness applies to “all things—men, things, situations—inasmuch as 
they are occurring, being, executing themselves.”121 A red leather box has an executant reality, 
while any relation with it captures little more than a shadow of its execution.122  
Despite the gap between SO and its real counterpart, SO does still involve a real “I.” 
After all, a sensual object is “a single executant reality within my life, an actual experience that I 
undergo.”123 This is true of both banal and alluring images. In Ortega’s terms, all sensual objects 
are “feeling-things.” What makes allure unique is the object’s tense fusion with its qualities. A 
banal object could be paraphrased in terms of its manifest characteristics. For instance, we easily 
grasp the comparison of cypress and juniper in a literal way, linking them at the level of their 
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features: “my attention is absorbed by a set of remarkably similar qualities; I am adrift in a world 
of attributes of things.”124 But the alluring object stands at a distance from its own qualities. 
Consider the simile, “the cypress is like a flame.” There is scant obvious commensurability 
between tree and flame. The superficial similarity of their visual outlines is just a pretext to 
trigger a deeper resonance. Allure suspends the literal paraphrasability of the cypress in terms of 
its fiery qualities, moving this new version of it to the RO position.  
Harman notes, however, that Ortega is quick to cut off any line of access to the real: “Art 
is granted a sort of magic power, allowing us to confront the impossible depth of objects. Or 
rather, art is only granted the power of seeming to be able to do this, since even Van Gogh 
cannot really put the internal executant being of shoes onto a piece of canvas.”125 Here we run 
into a problem. The alluring object somehow gives us the inward execution of real things. But 
Harman, like Ortega, wants to maintain a rigorous distinction between reality and image. This is 
the object-oriented paradox that aesthetic contact touches without touching. How can a real 
cypress participate in a metaphor if it is withdrawn while the metaphor is present as an image?126 
Ortega’s solution is to qualify that the aesthetic cypress only seems real. But as far as OOO is 
concerned, “seeming real” can only be a placeholder for the deeper problem. Harman here is not 
after the difference between fictive cultural constructs and brute objective reality. Aesthetic 
experience for him clues us in to a more universal structure. Hence, the contrast between allure 
and banality is about two general modes of relation rather than two specific kinds of objects 
(“artistic renderings” and “actual things”). 
 
124
 Ibid., 109. 
125
 Ibid., 105.  
126
 Harman, “Materialism Is Not the Solution,” 108. To my knowledge, this 2014 essay is the first published 
instance where Harman explicitly raises the “seeming real” problem and introduces his theatrical solution, described 
below. 
  
  
46 
Overall, then, the point cannot be that the real hammer actually recedes into withdrawn 
execution whereas the aesthetic hammer seems to unveil its executant inwardness or seems to 
withdraw like a real one.127 Rather, the underlying structure of an experienced object becoming 
“more real” is implicated in all genuine relations. And Harman calls that structure theatrical. 
The only real entity on the scene is the beholder of the alluring object, so only she can execute 
the cypress-becoming-flame as the cypress, like a method actor does with a character or a mask-
wearer does with ancestors and spirits.128 This is not to say she displays the qualities of this new 
tree-as-flame for others to see in exaggerated theatrics. Her “theatrical” involvement with the 
metaphor simply means that she lives the cypress medium’s unification of its fiery qualities. 
Allure thus has a “forcefulness and sincerity” while it occurs; it “rearranges the landscape of 
what we take seriously,” inaugurating our attachment to the object.129 In short, RO-SQ does 
make contact with the real, but it does so by building a new compound entity rather than by 
digging down to the cypress-in-itself. Allure can thus be understood according to two 
simultaneous moments:  
1. Tension: The object-quality continuum breaks down and the object withdraws. For 
example, the cypress recedes into a proprietor of nonliteral flame qualities.  
2. Coupling: The beholder lives the union of the object with its qualities, forming a new 
entity made of herself plus alluring object (e.g. the cypress-flame metaphor).   
 
 
127
 These two different options of “seeming” correspond with Ortega’s model (unveiling) and Harman’s early model 
(withdrawal), respectively. See Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 161-62. Harman has more recently explained the 
“real object for me” in the theatrical sense of mimesis presented here (see previous footnote). 
128
 Harman, “Materialism Is Not the Solution,” 108-09: “This is the surprising sense in which we must defend the 
long-abandoned theory of mimesis.” See also Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 83-84. 
129
 Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 179. 
  
  
47 
D. Theory [SO-RQ] 
Eidos/theory (SO-RQ) is important for OOO, but it rarely arises as a topic of sustained focus in 
writings by Harman. This appears to have been motivated by his strategic emphasis on 
aesthetics, but it is worth noting the occasional ambiguity of theory in OOO. In Guerrilla 
Metaphysics, for instance, Harman associates theoretical comportment in humans with 
“improved descriptions,” and interprets this as meaning that theory “maintains the typical fusion 
of a thing with its features.”130 The analytic philosopher Jon Cogburn (a careful reader of 
Harman) has drawn on similar statements to argue that theory “reverse-engineers” the bond 
between the sensual object and its defining features.131 But Harman complicates this literalizing 
implication even in Guerrilla Metaphysics. He indicates that theory is like allure in avoiding 
banality. Theory “must have something in it of the refreshing displacement of [qualities] that 
occurs when a resemblance is at least mildly unexpected.”132 Even before we go over theory in 
detail, this displacement may be immediately apparent in the experience of paradox, where 
surface contradictions make unknown real qualities relevant. For example, a key OOO paradox 
is that music and other alluring objects are at once “more real” and strictly sensual. As we saw 
above, Harman accepts this tension for its rhetorical weight while ultimately resolving it with his 
model of theatrical attachment. He thus refines his longstanding agreement with Ortega that 
metaphor creates a decisive coincidence rather than merely a comparison of features.133 
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Like allure, theory reaches the real indirectly; its structure must apply no less to wasps 
and orchids than to astronomers and quasars; and it draws on the beholder’s reality in place of 
that which withdraws from the relation.134 The difference between allure and theory tracks the 
asymmetry between objects and qualities. Allure is about attachment itself; theory concerns the 
form of an attachment. With this big picture in place, we are now in a position to approach the 
topic through the following questions: (1) What is the banal status of SO-RQ? (2) How does SO-
RQ become a tension? (3) How is the beholder implicated?  
The banal status of SO-RQ is no tension at all. It is simply SO itself, fused in advance 
with its deepest real qualities.135 Next, how does theory take place? That is, how does the eidos 
of the sensual object become at issue? Harman’s main exemplar of this tension is the human 
impulse to seek “a knowledge lying deeper than first appearances,” which implies that prominent 
sensual qualities become contiguous with their host object: they interfere with it appearing as 
such like a kind of impedance or noise.136 We do not simply look at the sun and decide on a 
whim to seek further knowledge about it. Indeed, the beholder must already have a commitment 
or sincere attachment to the object.137 Theory occurs against the backdrop of that commitment, 
when conspicuous features or “first appearances” become obstacles to its decisive unity. We 
view the sun through an eclipse or hear a muffled symphony around a corner. Unknown defining 
qualities of the sun or symphony split from it. This differs from allure, in which accessible 
qualities fuse to an absent RO.138  
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A sensual object may exist as a correlate of the beholder, but its real qualities are 
definitionally executant and cannot be replaced with literal paraphrase. Claiming that RQ only 
seem real or are somehow converted into “something accident-like” is a placeholder for the 
problem posed by the withdrawal of RQ.139 We saw this same issue come up with the notion of 
allure seeming real. And once again the solution is that the beholder steps in, this time to 
experience a tension between their own real qualities and the object.140 We can get a sense of 
what this means from Harman’s use of the term paradigm.141 The beholder is already 
conditioned to encounter other things in a certain way by her form, as if guided by veiled 
assumptions. This background structure (RQ) forms a “hard core” that the beholder “does not 
immediately abandon in the face of occasionally contradictory evidence.”142 An object 
encountered through a paradigm must be pre-theoretical. When theory occurs, unarticulated 
aspects of the paradigm enter tension with the object. Ultimately, then, theoretical experience 
points to a gap in the rightness of fit between the beholder and object.143  
Recall that normally, SO and RQ simply collapse into identity. Theory can resolve to a 
normal lack of tension when the beholder conforms with the object and thus modifies the 
attachment.144 There are two possible consequences of this movement toward stability. Either 
conforming has no meaningful impact on the beholder’s paradigm or it leaves a lasting mark. In 
the first case, the paradigm is literalized in piecemeal fashion through the sifting out of noisy 
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interference from relevant SQ (I find an optimal location to hear the symphony or develop my 
vague grasp of celestial objects into a concrete model).145 Theory may thus empower fruitful 
knowledge production, but it may also lead to over-reliance on already established literal 
orthodoxy.146 Second, an incipient, largely unarticulated paradigm can itself undergo a handful 
of major changes.147 Of course, no perfect fit (correspondence, adequation) between a paradigm 
and object is possible either way, given the elusive reality theory deals with. In sum, theory may 
be understood according to two moments: 
1. Tension: The SO itself becomes at issue qua RQ against sensual interference. 
2. Transformation: The committed beholder’s own paradigmatic RQ enter transformative 
tension with the object.  
* * * 
The present overview now comes to an end. My strategy has been to zoom in from general to 
fine-grained features of OOO’s infrastructure. OOO begins from a flat ontology, contrary to 
viewpoints that would base global categories on specific differences (such as human vs. non-
human). It similarly rejects the tendency to inflate two kinds of knowledge about objects into the 
systematic elimination of objects themselves from ontology. The more familiar strategy of 
elimination “undermines” the object to a more primal layer; the less familiar strategy 
“overmines” the object to its concrete accessibility (as in Thomas Mathiesen’s reading of the 
ancient Greek music theorist Aristoxenus). The real object lies between its parts and relations.  
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Yet the boundaries separating an object from other things and even its own features are 
by no means absolute, hence OOO’s core theme of indirect causation. Harman proposes a 
fourfold model of real objects (RO), real qualities (RQ), sensual objects (SO), and sensual 
qualities (SQ) to address this theme. The fourfold makes it possible to identify three ways that 
music as perception intersects with music as reality according to OOO. First, perceived music 
has real qualities; second, its surface features can allude to a real ground; third, the larger 
attachment (beholder plus music) is itself a real entity. To round out the chapter, I explored the 
object-quality pairings in more detail. These are important, Harman argues, because contact with 
the real only happens when the normal state of an object-quality link gets disrupted. We should 
be sure to hold that thought for the next chapter. 
Harman argues that “something to say about everything” not only entails an initial 
commitment to flat ontology but also an obligation to make tentative progress into specific 
regions of the world. With its infrastructure in place, he suggests, OOO may bring a fresh 
perspective to other disciplines. “In short, we expect a philosophy to tell us about the features 
that belong to everything, but we also want philosophy to tell us about the differences between 
various kinds of things.”148 Moreover, Harman’s output demonstrates that the evolution of his 
own ideas has been meaningfully touched by ostensibly extra-philosophical fields, such as media 
studies, sociology, literature, visual art, history, and architecture. Bringing the critical and 
constructive features of OOO into further contact with musicology may benefit both sides.    
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Chapter 2. Galant Schema Theory and Object-Oriented Ontology 
Comedians, on the other hand, study and fortify their memory with a wide variety of things 
such as sayings, phrases, love speeches, reprimands, cries of despair, and ravings, in order to 
have them ready for the proper occasion.  
—Niccolo Barbieri, La supplica (1634).1  
 
Life is always some actual state of things, some scenario. We could easily say that it is made 
up of what the old Italian comedy called lazzi, stock gags or lived situations of an immediate 
and irreducible force (“Colombine flirts with the Spanish pirate”; “Pierrot chews on holy 
wafers”). 
—Graham Harman, Tool-Being (2002).2   
 
Since the 1980s, Robert Gjerdingen has championed a theory of “schemata” or stock musical 
phrases. But the lasting influence of schema theory on musicology is probably thanks to his 
accessible 2007 compendium, Music in the Galant Style. The galant schema concept offers a 
compelling bridge between musical ideas and their context, pairing easily recognized melody-
bass designs with the training methods of Italian conservatories and the regimented nuances of 
eighteenth-century court etiquette. Yet schema theory is also a broad theory that seeks to elevate 
canonic phrase-level formulas into the bread and butter of musical meaning. Gjerdingen states 
(or understates) as much in a passage where the word “galant” could be extraneous: “Knowing 
relevant schemata allows one to make useful comparisons or, as the saying goes, to avoid 
‘comparing apples with oranges.’ … Becoming acquainted with a repertory of galant musical 
schemata can thus lead to a greater awareness of subtle differences in galant music. The music 
may seem to develop more meaning.”3  
 
1
 Niccolo Barbieri, “What is a Buffoon?” trans. from La supplica (1634), in Actors on Acting, ed. Toby Cole and 
Helen Chinoy (New York: Crown, 1954), 53. 
2
 Harman, Tool-Being, 83. 
3
 Robert O. Gjerdingen, Music in the Galant Style (Oxford University Press, 2007), 11. 
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It is no wonder, then, that some authors have sought to extend the schema concept to new 
idioms and analytical projects, such as by putting it in dialogue with Schenkerian analysis,4 
coordinating it with topic theory and the formenlehre tradition,5 and using it in a study of musical 
irony.6 Yet to widen the scope of the schema is also to test its core identity, its roots. One way to 
explicitly take on this task might be to compare the schema with a similar concept in order to 
clarify what is already known about both. Consider the stock blues-and-country patterns that 
Nicholas Stoia writes about under the heading of “schemes.”7 Stoia acknowledges a kinship 
between schemes and Gjerdingen’s schemata that runs deeper than the glaring idiomatic gap 
between blues and galant music. In fact, he uncovers no conspicuous boundary between the two 
concepts even as the different terms invite the attempt.8 A similar potential for clarification goes 
for cases where the only differences are hidden in the theoretical background. For instance, 
Gjerdingen has described the “Indugio” schema as an extended first-inversion chord over scale 
degree four.9 That seems to describe a pre-dominant prolongation. Whatever distinguishes an 
Indugio from a traditional harmonic prolongation might be decided by comparing how their 
 
4
 Gilad Rabinovitch, “‘Schenker the Galant?’ Tacit Knowledge, Contradiction, and Complementation in the 
Interaction between Gjerdingen’s Theory of Galant Schemata and Schenkerian Analysis” (Ph.D. diss., Eastman 
School of Music, 2013). 
5
 Vasili Byros, “Topics and Harmonic Schemata: A Case from Beethoven” and William E. Caplin, “Topics and 
Formal Functions: The Case of the Lament,” Chapters 14 and 15 in The Oxford Handbook of Topic Theory, ed. 
Danuta Mirka (Oxford University Press, 2014), 381-452. 
6
 Janet Bourne, “Perceiving Irony in Music: The Problem in Beethoven’s String Quartets,” Music Theory Online 
22/3 (2016). 
7
 Nicholas Stoia, “The Common Stock of Schemes in Early Blues and Country Music,” Music Theory Spectrum 
35/2 (2013): 194-234. 
8
 Stoia writes that a “blues scheme” refers only to the duration of a song verse, whereas “schema” can refer to many 
levels of scale, from full movements down to motives and cadences (“Common Stock,” 194). By this reckoning, all 
schemes are schemata.  
9
 Gjerdingen, Galant Style, 274. Similarly, John Rice treats the Ponte schema as identical to Caplin’s “standing on 
the dominant” and Hepokoski’s “dominant-lock.” See Rice, “The Morte: A Galant Voice-Leading Schema as 
Emblem of Lament and Compositional Building-Block,” Eighteenth-Century Music 12/2 (2015): 158. 
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implicit background theories explain similar phenomena. Comparisons like this can be revealing, 
but that is not what I am after here. 
Another kind of case puts schema theory in conversation with itself and so helps to reveal 
what it achieves, what is at stake, and what might be missing. Gjerdingen himself provides a 
vivid example about the historical aspect of schemata. According to him, schemata are style-
specific and have localized “microhistories:” they develop in bounded environments through 
periods of “experimentation, consolidation, maturity, decline, and obsolescence.”10 But he has 
also found instances of Italian-inspired galant schemata of the eighteenth century in Russian 
music at the turn of the twentieth century, and not just in isolated archaic references.11 The 
apparent persistence of locally constrained ideas across diverse times and places emphasizes the 
more general problem within schema theory of how to interpret those ideas.  
I believe there are enough parallels between schema theory and object-oriented 
philosophy for contact between them to be productive on this front. If nothing else, outlining 
how the schema concept relates to OOO will help to clarify aspects of schema theory’s implicit 
ontology. And on the philosophical side, this chapter will work in greater detail with some of 
Graham Harman’s underexplored ideas, such as his “ontography” of object-quality tensions. 
Finally, an object-oriented perspective emphasizes the problem that meaning plays for schema 
theory. It does this in two ways. At a broad cultural level, schema theory has tended to focus on 
pedagogy, on the role of schemata in producing literal expertise. At the level of specific musical 
works, schema theory has concentrated on the technical problem of identifying instances of 
schemata. But OOO has other interests. At the broad level, it considers how a schema provides 
 
10
 Robert Gjerdingen, “The Formation and Deformation of Classic/Romantic Phrase Schemata: A Theoretical 
Model and Historical Study,” Music Theory Spectrum 8 (1986): 33-42. The term “microhistories” appears in 
Gjerdingen, Galant Style, 434-35. 
11
 Robert Gjerdingen, “Gebrauchs-Formulas,” Music Theory Spectrum 33 (2011): 191-99. 
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indirect (nonliteral) access to real qualities of a given musical style. At the level of individual 
appearances of schemata, it seeks a framework for discussing their artistry or allure.  
What follows will be organized in three parts. First, I will outline how schema theory and 
OOO intersect, touching on their shared critiques of reductive ontologies. More specifically, they 
both treat objects/schemata as units in tension with their qualities, as having a degree of 
independence over the contributions of their parts, and as mediating the passage of styles or 
paradigms within and between cultures. The second section will then outline a critique of 
schema theory from the perspective of OOO, with the implication that none of these differences 
are serious enough to hinder the development of an object-oriented schema theory. OOO would 
criticize schema theory for occasionally treating schemata as units of direct historical access, for 
sometimes conflating the broad schema concept with a single kind (the galant schema), and for 
giving schemata the same basic status in both pedagogical and aesthetic contexts. In all of these 
cases, an aspect of the schema is literalized and thus overmined to its relational profiles. OOO 
would also criticize schema theory for exaggerating the importance of just one level of schema 
(the phrase level), and for inflating the admittedly important musical ingredient of human 
cognition into the schema’s only source of reality. Here, the schema is undermined or reduced 
to some radix. In the final section, I propose an aesthetic approach to schemata by expanding 
upon Gjerdingen’s distinction between schema events and the stages where they are embedded. I 
then map out some possible ontological categories of schemata in acts of interpretive judgment. 
 
I. OOO Pro Schema Theory 
This section will outline some aspects that schema theory and object-oriented thought have in 
common. First, I should note that although Gjerdingen’s approach to the topic has its origins in 
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his study of music from a specific historical environment, the schema is amenable to more 
general treatment. An early essay that announces his interest in phrase-level galant conventions, 
for example, also asserts the wider significance of the schema concept.12 At its heart, Gjerdingen 
claims, the issue at hand “is not so much musicological as psychological; it is the problem of 
how the mind correlates unique individual experiences with common classes of events and their 
contexts.”13 Supposing humans are necessary ingredients in music, it makes sense for the study 
of global musical roots to relate in some way with cognition. And schemata, Gjerdingen implies, 
are the building blocks of cognition.14 More recently in Music in the Galant Style, he links the 
schema concept to both psychology and philosophy.15 His colleague Vasili Byros has similarly 
claimed that “a theoretical framework capable of sustaining the notion of a historical mode of 
hearing, on both cognitive and philosophical grounds, lies in the concept of a schema.”16 Byros 
cites, among others, Foucault, Aristotle, Locke, and Hume.17 He shares with Gjerdingen the 
belief that the musical phrase schema is best grasped more generally (in Byros’s case, as a 
projection of knowledge onto a neutral material substrate).18 I have previously outlined the 
concept of flat ontology, the claim advanced by OOO that ontological distinctions should not be 
linked a priori with taxonomic categories, i.e. kinds of things. We may now see a similar 
 
12
 Gjerdingen, “Formation and Deformation.” 
13
 Ibid., 25. The problems Gjerdingen raises explicitly follow in Leonard Meyer’s footsteps (26). The roots of these 
problems are not limited to the psychology of music, though: he also cites Hegel (31). 
14
 Ibid., 25 n. 4. The introduction to schema theory he cites is David E. Rumelhart, “Schemata: The Building Blocks 
of Cognition,” in Theoretical Issues in Reading Comprehension, ed. Rand J. Spiro, Bertram C. Bruce, and William 
F. Brewer (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1980), 33-58. 
15
 Gjerdingen, Music in the Galant Style, 10, 13, 115. 
16
 Vasili Byros, “Towards an ‘Archaeology’ of Hearing: Schemata and Eighteenth-Century Consciousness,” Musica 
Humana 1/2 (2009): 236. 
17
 Byros, “Towards an ‘Archaeology’ of Hearing,” 236-38. 
18
 Ibid., 239. The “projection of knowledge” idea puts most of its weight on one piece of the musical object (the 
human subject), and for this reason would likely be rejected or heavily amended by an object-oriented account, as 
we shall see later in this chapter. 
  
  
57 
principle within schema theory’s “local” ontology of music: schemata are fundamental enough 
categories to not be limited to a certain kind of music. 
 The generality of the schema concept is also evident in Gjerdingen’s summaries of its 
basic features, which draw on non-musical analogies and abstract models. For instance, to help 
explain what a schema is he has sometimes referred to the visual art historian Ernst Gombrich.19 
In Art and Illusion, Gombrich insists on “the tenacity of conventions, on the role of types and 
stereotypes in art.”20 Painters or musicians learn their craft through such stereotypes. One 
possible definition of the schema offered by Gjerdingen is the organized unit resulting from 
similar past experiences.21 Hence we compare new experiences with unified “packets of 
knowledge.”22 In a Gombrich-like illustration based on eighteenth-century copybook designs 
(see Figure 2.1), Gjerdingen gives three exemplars that, when absorbed and repeated as units in 
their own right, help the student form a single broad schema for representing a face. (They 
contain specific proportions of ovals, lines, and curves only upon further analysis.) And the face 
schema carries additional implications for rotating and detailing facial features.  
 
 
Figure 2.1. Schema for drawing a three-dimensional face (Gjerdingen, “Partimento,” 90).  
 
 
 
19
 Robert Gjerdingen, “Courtly Behaviors,” Music Perception 13/3 (1996): 365-82; Robert Gjerdingen, “Partimento, 
que me veux-tu?” Journal of Music Theory 51/1 (2007): 85-135; Ernst Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the 
Psychology of Pictorial Representation (Pantheon Books, 1960). 
20
 Gombrich, Art and Illusion, 19, 21. 
21
 Gjerdingen, “Formation and Deformation,” 25. 
22
 Gjerdingen, Galant Style, 11. 
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Gjerdingen has also provided an abstract model of schemata that unfold in time (Figure 
2.2). A temporal schema coordinates a small number of significant events characterized by 
stereotypical features, such as the two-event schema “child touches stove → child pulls hand 
away and cries,” which suggests a type of person, a thing they interact with, and an effect.23 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Schema in time (Gjerdingen, “Formation and Deformation,” 26).  
 
 
 
A musical schema event from the galant period might be typified by factors such as metrical 
position, melodic scale degree, chord inversion, bass scale degree, and even rhetorical 
implication. For example, the four-event Prinner schema was usually a “riposte” to an opening 
gambit in the same or previous phrase. Figure 2.3 shows Gjerdingen’s illustration and analysis of 
the Prinner in the opening phrase of Mozart’s famous C Major Sonata, K. 545. The above sketch 
of the concept – perhaps even the Prinner example alone – might be enough to help a student of 
galant music start learning about many such patterns and develop a greater appreciation for the 
music (assuming the psychological validity of the theory). But a few odd details stand out even 
with this typical Prinner. It has elements that may be relevant to the identity of the phrase but not 
 
23
 Gjerdingen, “Formation and Deformation,” 26. 
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to the schema (such as the trill, melodic leap to a non-Prinner tone, and accompaniment style), 
and it lightly contrasts with the prototype (compare the left hand chord positions). We clearly 
have more to unpack about the concept.  
 
Figure 2.3. The Prinner schema (Gjerdingen, Galant Style, 455), and illustration from Mozart, 
Sonata in C, K. 545, mm. 3-4 (Gjerdingen, Galant Style, 365).  
 
 
 
 
The galant phrase schema may be called a mid-level object in several different senses. Literally 
speaking, “mid-level” refers to size or scale. Gjerdingen observes that high-level conventional 
forms (sonata, rondo, da capo aria…) are “the most intensely studied schemata in all of music,” 
and low-level conventions (rhythmic motives, melodic figures, chord grammar, rules of 
counterpoint) are also “well documented.”24 Yet galant music is dominated not by either of these 
but by phrase-level conventions. Graham Harman has likewise noted that “the victim of choice” 
of reductive philosophies “has been medium-sized everyday objects.” His larger point, though, is 
that tables and artworks happen to be convenient targets to explain away in terms of their 
 
24
 Ibid., 25. 
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granular elements and the larger structures in which they participate.25 Medium-sized musical 
objects may similarly have been convenient targets to reduce (or at least ignore) in favor of such 
explanations. Nevertheless, an object-oriented perspective must be focused less on the actual size 
of schemata than on the individual object of any size at a mezzanine level between the “ground 
floor” of its ingredients and the “first floor” of its relational givenness: between undermining and 
overmining.26 In short, a flat ontology not only applies to different kinds of musical schemata, 
but also to their sizes. A consequence of this sort of ontological flatness is that different levels of 
scale have a degree of independence. Gjerdingen takes this view when he argues that one and the 
same schema might be relevant in relation to one level of scale (e.g. the Prinner as a 
representative feature of galant music as a whole) but passing or “subordinate” to another (an 
instance of a Prinner in this or that particular piece).27 
Gjerdingen’s nonliteral view of the mid-level schema extends to his own critique of what 
Harman calls over- and undermining. In a passage that praises Gombrich’s treatment of visual 
representation, Gjerdingen contrasts the schema concept with two approaches to do-it-yourself 
art in the 1950s: paint-by-numbers, and the method of Jon Gnagy, a television host who claimed 
all pictures are built from a few basic shapes. The paint-by-numbers method provides concrete 
rules for how to use pre-arranged colors in a given situation. Gjerdingen offers a musical 
equivalent in the eighteenth-century regola dell’ottava, or rules for painting harmonies over a 
given bass context. In object-oriented terms, this is analogous to overmining in that even a 
complex regola exhaustively identifies musical situations with specific known qualities.28 The 
 
25
 Graham Harman, “I Am Also of the Opinion that Materialism Must Be Destroyed,” Environment and Planning 
D: Society and Space 28 (2010): 774.  
26
 The metaphor of floor levels was introduced in Harman, “I Am Also of the Opinion,” and subsequently replaced 
by his “–mining” terms. 
27
 Gjerdingen, Music in the Galant Style, 13. 
28
 Gjerdingen, “Courtly Behaviors,” 366.  
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schema concept also challenges Gnagy-like attempts to base visual representations on 
fundamental forms such as spheres and cones, timeless solids that “reveal the essence of the 
appearances.”29 Gjerdingen associates nineteenth- and twentieth-century music theory with this 
idea, citing Hugo Riemann’s reduction of harmonic progressions to the radices of tonic, 
dominant, and subdominant. He appears to take issue less with the classification scheme itself 
than with its reification into “idealized forms” lying beneath all specific instances.30 A reduction 
of harmonic progressions to the micro-level entities beneath them would be analogous to 
undermining. (And the purportedly exhaustive knowledge of the nature of those units amounts to 
duomining.) Overall, Gjerdingen argues that cognition of music at its most basic level is neither 
built up from a priori universal forms nor fitted to rigidly determinate systems: 
Rather than tapping into hidden truths of harmonic essences, or mastering the 
combinatorics of discrete musical ‘colors,’ composers seem to have worked largely 
through the emulation and variation of learned musical Gestalts. In the same way that 
showing how a human face can be depicted as a composite of idealized solids in no way 
describes how that face came into being or how it is perceived by others, so being able to 
show that musical Gestalts can be decomposed into some idealized constituents may have 
little bearing on how these Gestalts arose or how they were and are perceived by 
listeners.31  
The notion of a Gestalt helps to clarify the second sense of mid-level after literal size: the 
“intermediate zone” of sensual objects inflecting the various qualities we experience.32 Harman 
 
29
 Ibid., 365. 
30
 Ibid., 366. 
31
 Ibid., 366. 
32
 The term “intermediate zone” appears in Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 70. 
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sees names as indicative of the underlying tension in this zone between the object and its 
qualities: “properties only help us identify the blackbird; they are not quite enough to name it, 
since there is always much more to the blackbird than any list of sensual traits we might 
produce.”33 Gjerdingen also gives schemata proper names, whether that be the name of a music 
teacher of the past, like Johann Prinner, or an associated quality in the manner of a synecdoche 
(“The Do-Re-Mi,” “The Quiescenza”). Early in The Galant Style he emphasizes that “a complex 
mental category is something more than a fixed list of defining features.”34 Much of how he 
characterizes the schema on that same page follows from the idea that it is not fully 
commensurate with its qualities. For one thing, any individual instance “may not have all the 
features that [supposedly] define the schema.” This statement implies schemata are flexible, 
capable of losing and gaining qualities while remaining recognizable. More than that, note the 
word I have added in brackets. If an instance of a schema does not have its defining features, 
then how could it be what it is? There must actually be a fundamental lack of certainty in 
distinguishing a schema’s primary and secondary characteristics, or real and sensual qualities. 
In object-oriented terms, this lack of direct access to real qualities is to be praised as a dose of 
reality accompanying the schema-for-us. Hence, “a schema may have defining features that are 
not overt.” (Such defining features are never overt for OOO.)    
Let us briefly explore another line of thought related to the point that the schema is a 
unified object prior to its qualities. A schema individualizes its features, the way a yellow couch 
individualizes its “yellow.”35 It can be said that the priority of the schema over its qualities allies 
 
33
 Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics, 28. He associates the loose link between an experienced object and its qualities 
with the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl.  
34
 Gjerdingen, Music in the Galant Style, 13. 
35
 Harman, Quadruple Object, 30. Qualities “are always individualized by the object to which they belong,” unlike 
the notion that “a certain shade of green can be embodied in many different particular objects.” 
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it with phenomenology (and the Gestalt concept) while putting it at odds with the tradition of 
British empiricism, at least by analogy with Harman’s argument about objects:  
What comes first for the empiricists are isolated qualities, sometimes known as 
“impressions.” By contrast, the tradition of phenomenology begins not with qualities, but 
with phenomenal objects. While the British school holds that objects are a bundle 
produced through the habit of linking diverse qualities together (Hume) … 
phenomenologists such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty insist on beginning with the total 
Gestalt before any reduction to discrete tones and hues. For phenomenology, the 
slamming door and the black fountain pen precede their qualities, which gain sense only 
through a relative enslavement to those objects.36 
This shows us how to read Gjerdingen when he calls the schema a “packet of knowledge” 
(quoted earlier). Unlike Hume’s bundle of qualities, the object-oriented packet is like a substance 
that informs all knowledge about it. And even without diverting our attention to its many 
features, it is already a kind of knowledge—a familiar face, a blackbird.   
 The idea that the schema is a single thing rather than a synthesis of properties (or 
“contractions” of discrete sense data) suggests a constraint on any attempt to explain how it is 
recognized or learned, a constraint that is especially evident through the lens of OOO. 
Remember, qualities are individualized by their object and cannot themselves interact. Hence, 
different instances of a schema are not called “similar” on account of sharing self-same features. 
Hearing a chunk of music as “Prinner” must involve object-to-object similarity rather than the 
sort of predicative logic implied by the comparisons we make.37 In other words, statements such 
 
36
 Harman, “On the Horror of Phenomenology,” 350. 
37
 Noah Roderick shows that OOO faces the special problem of explaining how knowledge categories evolve 
without resorting to repeatable independent features. He argues that new objects derive from the repetition of 
similarity (a real object conforms to a sensual one). This broadly accords with Harman’s theory of mimesis, leaving 
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as “the Mozart phrase and the Prinner both have descending parallel lines from the sixth and 
fourth degrees” depend on having first recognized a phrase-to-Prinner likeness, not the other way 
around. The parallel lines may appear in situations that do not read as Prinners. And even if we 
never encounter a Prinner without parallel lines, recognizing this feature is not a prior condition 
for recognizing the object. In a book-length conversation, Harman and the Deleuzian philosopher 
Manuel DeLanda agree that “we have a vague, general sense of what a sensual object is, but one 
that cannot be spelled out either as an adequate concept or as a bundle of invariant qualities.”38 
When a neural net trains to recognize something as a member of a kind, DeLanda explains, it 
extracts a “rough prototype” from a sample of objects without relying on a set of conditions for 
category membership.39 Gjerdingen describes much the same situation: 
In matching a new experience to a host of similar, previously stored exemplars, we may 
behave as if we have abstracted a category or prototype. We may respond to the new 
experience as if to say “it’s one of those,” even if we have no name for “those.” … 
[O]ne’s memory of these individually unique but collectively coherent exemplars will be 
brought to bear on one’s hearing of the passage.40 
The schema is thus not a byproduct of a listener’s exposure to the repetition of certain qualities. 
Rather, it is an object from the start, produced by the “collective coherence” of many similar 
objects.  
 At this point, it appears that a schema is a unified thing that resists overmining, i.e. 
reducing to a specific known example or set of concrete qualities. It can be recognized through 
 
aside distinctions between allure (RO-SQ) and theory (SO-RQ) and between tension and its resolution in theory. See 
Roderick, The Being of Analogy, 13-28, and Harman, “Materialism is Not the Solution,” 107-09.  
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 DeLanda and Harman, The Rise of Realism, 98.  
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 Ibid., 97. 
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 Gjerdingen, “Partimento,” 101. 
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many variations while the features that it needs to be what it is (its real qualities) cannot be 
directly intuited. Now, in addition to being “one of those” that is less than its many qualities, the 
schema is also more than the contributions of its parts. It is emergent at any given level of scale. 
We have seen that Gjerdingen contrasts the schema concept with attempts to reduce musical 
phenomena to a more primitive substrate. Rightly or wrongly, he believes that the influential 
theorist Heinrich Schenker, like Riemann, is guilty of what OOO calls undermining through a 
“totalizing ideology of a transcendent tonality.”41 Gjerdingen elaborates on his complaint with 
what could pass as an object-oriented defense of emergence: 
Underlying the analytical strategy presented here is the rejection of the hypothesis of 
hierarchical uniformity—the common presumption that because a complex system 
appears to be hierarchically structured, the same elements and relationships present on 
one structural level will be present on all levels. … Pitches, rather than transforming into 
higher-level “super-pitches,” transform into lines, chords, schema events, and other 
structures that cannot be summarized as, or reduced to, a single pitch. Likewise, schema 
events transform into schemata, which again cannot be summarized as, or reduced to, a 
single pitch. At each new level new descriptions are needed to describe newly emergent 
phenomena.42 
With a possible exception to be discussed in the next section, Gjerdingen avoids grasping the 
schema as “emerging” in the sense of a mere surface effect of a deeper background. A key to his 
theory’s respect for emergence is the independence of one schema from another, regardless of 
shared content, at different levels of scale (such as when the end of a phrase is also part of the 
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 Gjerdingen, Music in the Galant Style, 435. 
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 Gjerdingen, “Formation and Deformation,” 29-31. 
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beginning of a section). It takes work to connect one schema to another and one scale level to a 
smaller or larger level. Galant musicians were like commedia dell’arte actors in making this 
labor their livelihood:  
An improvising actor of the commedia dell’arte, for example, needed to memorize the 
jokes, banter, dialogues, soliloquies, and physical comedy for the stock character 
appropriate to his or her age and gender. The actor then needed to learn how to connect 
those atoms of comedy into the molecules of scenes, which would ultimately be 
integrated within the skeletal plot narratives known as scenarios.43 
In Music in the Galant Style, Gjerdingen explicitly aligns the emergence of schemata – the 
independence of a particular schema from the parts below it – with the difficulty of connecting 
them into a seamless unit. His analogy is Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, with its phonemes, 
words, clauses, sentences, paragraphs, and chapters: 
At each level of this cognitive hierarchy the elements are somewhat different in kind. The 
gist of a chapter, for instance, is not the text of any individual paragraph, nor is the gist of 
the novel as a whole the text of any one of its chapters. … The more closely one studies 
the craft of eighteenth-century court music, the less the “organic unity” of the musical 
artwork seems “a truth universally acknowledged,” to echo the opening line of Austen’s 
novel.44 
Citing the cognitive scientist Herbert Simon, he writes that “each level in the hierarchy has a 
measure of independence” and he sees a “relative weakness of interactions between levels.”45 
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 Gjerdingen, “Partimento,” 91. 
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 Gjerdingen, Music in the Galant Style, 425. 
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 Ibid., 425. See also Herbert Simon, “The Organization of Complex Systems,” in Hierarchy Theory: The 
Challenge of Complex Systems, ed. Howard H. Pattee (George Braziller, 1973), 1-28. 
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From the mutual autonomy of each level of scale, it should be clear that a schema resists being 
undermined to its genetic components. 
After the (literal) mid-level of the schema’s size and the (object-oriented) mid-level of its 
separation from its own qualities and parts, we come now to the final sense of the mid-level 
schema to be discussed in this section: the schema as a communication medium that links 
individuals and groups over geographical and historical distances. This role might be most easily 
associated with people or their technology. Gjerdingen gives the example of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, whose commentaries on music occupied a middle ground between two social roles in 
rare communication: the elite literary philosophe and the insider musician who dined with the 
servants and talked shop. But Gjerdingen believes the famous French lover of Italian 
musicianship just barely missed out on discovering the “important means for eventually 
achieving this fabled Italian ‘facility’: partimenti and solfeggi,” exercises that served as the main 
written carriers of musical schemata.46 Schemata for Gjerdingen are a kind of technology that 
enable the proper transmission of a historical musical style. They mark the difference between 
black-and-white television (“modern habits of listening”) and full color access.47  
OOO would agree with schema theory on one point and partially agree with it on another. 
The more general agreement lies in the idea that the transmission of any piece of music (even 
within the same environment) is never direct to begin with. Among its stops along the way is the 
listener, who is conditioned in part by her particular mode of hearing or background paradigm. In 
other words, transmission is always translation through some filter. The second, more specific 
implication is that schemata are particularly well-suited for transmitting this background. For 
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Gjerdingen, the schema is a basic category of (musical) cognition that carries essential 
information about a mode of hearing from one location to another. Hence, we can speak of lower 
and higher fidelity hearing on the basis of exposure to the appropriate universe of schemata. In 
object-oriented terms, schema theory addresses the real qualities or musical paradigm of a 
culture by identifying schema objects, and it studies the transmission (or translation) of these 
objects in specific works.  
The term paradigm may call to mind Thomas Kuhn’s flexible concept.48 In the present 
context it refers to the idea that normal visible practices are informed by a background medium – 
the tacit assumptions and expertise imparted by experience – which can never be directly 
observed or put into words.49 A paradigm also informs future behavior, like a research program 
that one “does not immediately abandon in the face of occasional contradictory evidence.”50 
Harman has elaborated on the paradigm’s meaning for OOO in terms of how one experiences an 
investigated object’s link with its real qualities. As I explain in Chapter 1, theory (SO-RQ) 
happens when the rightness of fit between the object of study (e.g. galant musical culture) and 
my own paradigm becomes at issue. I can only resolve the tension indirectly, by conforming my 
“unnoticed background assumptions” to the object and thus translating its mysterious reality into 
something visible, such as by attempting to separate its most characteristic origins and effects 
from its accidental features.51 As for Gjerdingen, he vividly invokes the background assumptions 
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of courtly life in nearly everything he writes about galant schemata, and often finds evidence of 
the training of a musical paradigm within the larger world of courtly propriety.52  
Let us return to Gjerdingen’s claim for the superiority of schemata in providing full color 
access to historical modes of hearing. This is the point of partial agreement. OOO accepts the 
difference between better and worse knowledge when taken to mean better and worse fitness to a 
paradigm.53 Harman adds that there might even be a “finite plurality” of ways to address the real 
qualities of an object of study (e.g. five or six).54 The question is whether we can jump from the 
notion of gaining a degree of mastery over a given historical paradigm (including our own) to 
that of directly accessing historical modes of hearing. This problem holds for paradigms across 
many distances and levels of scale, including both “courtly listeners 1750-1800” and “my 
neighbor Stacey.” The object-oriented position is that schemata can only ever translate a mode 
of hearing, not transmit it without loss. It is unclear to me whether Gjerdingen would agree with 
this claim. But this brings us to some possible conflicts between object-oriented thought and 
schema theory as currently practiced. 
 
II. OOO Contra Schema Theory 
Vasili Byros has neatly summed up the paradoxical purpose of schema theory with respect to 
style transmission.55 On the one hand there is a historical break between galant modes of hearing 
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and modern ears, an idea he dates to Charles Cudworth in 1949.56 On the other hand, schemata 
somehow provide a means of access to that past. When this paradox is taken in the form of a 
captivating encounter with historical distance, OOO might see it as a classic case of space (RO-
SQ), the ontological tension between relational features in our midst and the non-relational 
historical reality behind it—and when the paradox is taken as a perplexing object of research, 
OOO might see it in terms of a tension between the thing being studied and its real features, or 
eidos (SO-RQ). Spatial objects and eidetic features are always alluded to in an object’s 
experience, and Harman claims human attention can only be drawn to them by indirect means.57  
Byros prefers another route, though, proposing that we can close the historical gap by 
reinterpreting it in terms of knowledge. “For a historically informed listener, once having formed 
these schemata in memory, historical distance becomes immaterial.”58 Bridging galant and 
modern modes of listening becomes mainly a practical concern. Even if that distance is measured 
by more sophisticated means than clock time (e.g. statistical redundancies and discontinuities in 
musical practices), making past modes of hearing accessible is still a manageable project. Byros 
would thus resolve an ontological problem with an epistemological solution. But for OOO, 
knowledge-orientation comes with its own implicit ontology, an overmining one allowing only 
for direct knowledge and its absence. Among other things, that perspective tends to treat 
historical differences as quantitative differences: more temporal distance means more 
discontinuity, which can be eliminated by identifying correct criteria for access (schemata).59  
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By contrast, OOO holds that while any given mode of hearing may develop through a 
learning process, education does not make this paradigm directly knowable. For one thing, the 
features of my paradigm that allow me to recognize a Prinner as a Prinner (whether or not I pin a 
name to it) are themselves real, existing with or without my awareness or use of them. The same 
thing goes for the historical mode of hearing that I study, the galant paradigm behind the Prinner. 
One may identify a technical means of transmission as Gjerdingen ably does when he discovers 
galant schemata in late nineteenth-century Russia, but that would not change the problem of the 
ontological status of these migrant microhistorical units.60 In short, noticing a Prinner does not 
reveal the galant paradigm in the flesh, even if only a quantifiably small “portion” of it. The real 
features of a given musical sensibility can only be qualitatively translated. An object-oriented 
schema theory may therefore address real qualities but it does so by alluding to them through 
available surface elements and at constant risk of missing something essential.  
One consequence of OOO’s principle of translation is that a cultural unit is partly 
independent of its own qualities and influences. For example, an object-oriented schema theorist 
would not necessarily interpret the appearance of galant stereotypes in late nineteenth-century 
Russia as a continuation of the galant style. (It might instead be understood as one musical 
culture productively retrieving a similar element from another.) Since the apparent continuity of 
qualities does not necessarily amount to the continuity of an object, the theorist faces judgement 
calls about how schemata relate to changing environments, even when those schemata seem 
unchanged. Indeed, such cases might provoke the theorist to reconsider her tentative definition of 
a given schema in the first place, daring her to put certain “non-musical” qualities on the same 
level as the usual melody-bass scaffolding. Similarly, when the level of scale switches from 
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galant music (a relatively large object) to smaller things, such as compositions in which 
individual phrase-level schemata appear, there is no guarantee that significant features at one 
level will be relevant at the other. That is, we cannot ignore the additional work necessary for 
judging “which environmental aspects of a given thing are assimilated by it, and which can be 
excluded as irrelevant.”61  
The problem of translation is also global, not limited to a particular historical era or 
measure of time. With that in mind, consider a parallel track running through Byros’s essay. He 
argues that schema listening is historically differentiated from the modern habit he calls 
“structural” listening.62 Yet we have seen that at least Gjerdingen believes the schema is an 
unavoidable cognitive primitive. Is the gap between historical and modern ears supposed to 
reflect a gap between true musical cognition and retroactive structural abstraction? Or is it meant 
to reflect different schema paradigms?63 The former option maps a taxonomic difference 
(historical vs. modern listening) onto an ontological difference (real music vs. unreal concepts), 
which threatens the principle of flat ontology. Only the latter option would acknowledge 
differences between “modern” and “galant” ears without jettisoning the universality of the 
schema concept. To be consistent in its claim for the universality of schemata, an object-oriented 
schema theory must argue that a galant courtier, a concertgoer of the nineteenth century, and a 
twentieth-century tonal theorist hear different schemata and link them by different threads, not 
that one of them hears schemata and the others pass them by as if in an ideological daze. It is for 
this same reason that Gjerdingen’s polemic against theories of large-scale structural progressions 
only works against a dismissive attitude toward the microhistorical conventions he studies. It 
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would be premature to automatically deny existence to macrohistorical conventions or to claim 
that the principle of emergence (independent hierarchical levels) inherently excludes a degree of 
similarity between the harmonic/contrapuntal logic at each structural level of scale in the music, 
as Gjerdingen argues against Schenker.  
The last and perhaps most important way schema theory flirts with overmining relates to 
its emphasis on the otherwise underappreciated historical use of schemata in training exercises 
(partimenti and solfeggi). When a schema is presented as plainly as possible in a pedagogical 
context, it could be called mid-level in the sense of not yet music.  
At least sonatas merited publication and the appellation opus. Partimenti, unpublished, 
untitled … provided but the single thread of one part (usually a bass) from which the 
student was expected to re-create a self-standing piece of music. The given thread – il filo 
– meant that a partimento was not free, not a mode of fantasia, yet the phantom nature of 
the other parts, especially the lack of a notated melody, meant that a partimento was not 
quite a composition, not quite a work.64 
Gjerdingen remarks about the training of visual artists that “the schema itself was not an image. 
It was a framework on which to draw an image.”65 The same is true, he claims, about musical 
schemata. “Just as the oval-and-cross schema was not a face but a scaffolding for drawing a face, 
so a contrapuntal schema was a frame for adding the motivic cues of real music.”66 Remember, 
though, that the schema concept is a general one. A Prinner must always be a kind of scaffolding. 
We might assume, then, that the difference between a pedagogical and musical schema comes 
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down to its author’s purpose, which can typically be gleaned from context, such as by observing 
that something is a sketched exercise as opposed to fully notated “finished music.”  
But the boundary between instructional and composed schemata turns out to be hazier 
than “partimento vs. published score,” and this issue points to a missing feature in the theory. 
Gjerdingen implies at one point that some schemata are more real than others even within the 
same kind of context (say, a score). He gives the example of a sonata by Isabelle de Charrière, a 
member of the court at The Hague who was also an amateur musician. After the opening gambit, 
a Prinner appears in “emphatic” but unadorned repetition. He writes: “Is this ‘inspired’ music? 
No. Does it show proper behavior at court, executed with zest and confidence? Yes. It is securely 
in the galant style, though it may lack the ‘superior gracefulness’ we might expect from a 
professional.”67 De Charrière has apparently literalized an aspect of courtly life with a pared-
down Prinner. Yet the example is fully in line with Prinners as they are currently understood. It 
is hard to tell what the significance of a graceless Prinner might be or even how it lacks 
professional grace without additional interpretive justification that Gjerdingen does not 
provide—or, more crucially, incorporate into the theory. If schemata are always units of almost-
music, then whence the distinction between graceful and ungraceful Prinners?  
We seem to be facing two distinct views of the “not-yet-music” aspect of the schema. 
The schema is either (1) a literal first step, a half-empty frame in need of filling, or (2) a 
recognizable unit that is ontologically prior to its “motivic cues.” A similar ambiguity appears in 
Ernst Gombrich’s account of the visual schema. He characterizes it as the “first approximate, 
loose category which is gradually tightened,” but also as an inescapable mode of experience, a 
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“‘will-to-make-conform,’ the assimilation of any new shape to the [prior] schemata ….”68 
Blending these meanings would conflate the categorical knowledge linked to an initial sketch 
with the musical unit that assimilates creative surprises. The analytical toolbox developed for 
Music in the Galant Style favors the former: it is designed to straightforwardly list schemata, 
leaving further interpretive distinctions ad hoc and arguably irrelevant to the theory. Overall, I 
see two ways to address the missing depth in overmined approaches to schemata. The first, 
mentioned earlier, is to incorporate the concept of a schema paradigm that has a reality deeper 
than the rigid categories of knowledge assigned to it (SO-RQ). The second strategy, and my 
focus below, is to examine the schema as an element in an aesthetic context (RO-SQ). 
 Before elaborating on this aesthetic approach, I should note certain ways that schema 
theory has supplemented its overmining tendencies with undermining. One way to overmine the 
schema concept is to identify it with features of a single exemplary kind, the phrase-level 
schema. But this can lead to dismissing other levels of scale as epiphenomena of the real thing, 
reducing or undermining them to a single layer. Gjerdingen leans in this direction when he 
implies that galant musicians and theorists who worked with phrase-level contrapuntal schemata 
understood “the real art of composition” better than those who have thought in terms of large-
scale form:  
“[F]orm” had relatively little influence on the “connecting of parts.” Rather than failing 
to understand form and being unable to articulate its “deeper” secrets, galant composers 
and writers about music understood it very well. They understood … that the real art of 
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composition lay in guiding their patron’s and audience’s moment-to-moment 
experiences.69 
Consider the idea of multiple schemata combining into units or even nesting inside one another 
(Figure 2.4). Gjerdingen may see nesting as evidence of sophistication, but according to his 
theory, nested schemata simply co-exist at the same level. That is, they overlap or even share 
simultaneous events without producing an emergent form. In Figure 2.4, Gjerdingen does not 
conceptualize the large schema C as fundamentally different than A and B, or as different than 
an alternative version of schema C without those nested elements. One schema happens to be 
inside another rather than before or after it, but they might as well be strung together as three 
contiguous pearls. Our understanding of the ways schemata combine comes down to knowing 
their relational properties, enacted in music on a moment-by-moment basis.70 Larger 
assemblages are accidents of stringed phrase-level schemata. 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Nesting and overlapping schemata (Gjerdingen, Galant Style, 376). 
 
 
 
Why does Gjerdingen stop at the phrase level? The answer comes down to his use of a specific 
understanding of cognition, along with the view that one kind of cognition is truer to music than 
 
69
 Gjerdingen, Music in the Galant Style, 423-24. 
70
 Ibid., 372-80. 
  
  
77 
others. For one thing, the phrase-level schema fits what Gjerdingen considers to be the basic 
duration of musical memory. “An important constraint that limits the ultimate number of 
schemata to which a listener need attend is provided by our short-term memory. Beyond six, 
seven, or eight seconds … our immediate memory of a previous schema event fades rapidly.”71 
Apparently, intermediate- and long-term memories are not domains of musical cognition, and 
short-term memories fade after seven seconds. He observes an especially slow example of a 
schema called the Fonte and notes that eight seconds is pushing it: “the example lasts almost a 
full minute, with as much as seven or eight seconds between the stages of the Fonte (approaching 
the practical limits of short-term memory). One can almost imagine characters from the 
commedia dell’arte slowed down into living statuary.”72  
In a way, this emphasis on short-term memory is consistent with the (object-oriented) 
view that perceiving a schema unit requires its sustained presence, though it may be difficult to 
ignore the intuition that human cognition can attend to longer chunks of music and even entire 
pieces.73 (A seven-second limit seems to universalize extreme cases of amnesia like that of the 
English musicologist Clive Wearing.74) Yet even if we accept Gjerdingen’s bracketing of longer-
term memory, the specific nature of a schema’s presence turns out not to be object-oriented. For 
Gjerdingen, the minute-long Fonte coheres because we are reminded of it just often enough. As 
soon as the literal sounding-out of a schema event ceases, a countdown begins: “if the 
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appropriate next event in a schema does not appear within this time frame, we drop that schema 
as a probable structure.”75 This means that an event held in short term memory is not maintained 
there by the music around it. Those other notes do not allude to the event, elaborate on it, or 
indirectly refresh or belong to it in any relevant way. The space between the literal updates – the 
“seven or eight seconds between” – might as well be empty. In other words, the schema is not 
sustained by a musical medium the way an object persists through its qualities. It does its job of 
forming meanings inside the mind over a predetermined span of clock-time rather than through a 
unified experience. 
For OOO, it is not objectionable to presume that the number of emergent levels above the 
phrase level is limited. After all, the schema is a correlate of finite human experience.76 But the 
mind plays another important role for schema theory in addition to shaping the limits of musical 
experience. The mind fully accounts for how schemata persist and change: “The schemata of 
galant phrases were not immutable objects of the real world that could be bolted together in only 
a certain way. They coalesced, evanesced, and mutated in response to a variety of cues that could 
easily lead down divergent paths.”77 An object-oriented theorist would enthusiastically agree that 
schemata appear, vanish, and mutate in response to a variety of cues. But the first sentence 
implies that the mutability of schemata is a consequence of something profoundly separate from 
a “real world,” namely, the human brain. Mental activity alone accounts for the existence and 
mutation of schemata. “Since music, in the full sense of the word, takes place in the human brain 
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rather than in a metaphysical world of tonal ‘spirits’ and ‘wills,’ we should be interested in a 
cognitive hierarchy, which is typically a mental structure that outlines levels of abstraction or 
‘chunking.’”78 As Byros puts it in an article about Gjerdingen, schemata “are to be understood 
not simply as music-theoretical constructs, but fundamentally as categories of mind.”79 A 
problem this viewpoint faces from the standpoint of OOO is accounting for the emergent 
individuality of schemata over pre-inscribed structures of the human brain. Specific schemata are 
undermined to their ultimate medium, the mind.  
The idea that music occurs in the brain might seem so obvious that we ought to be 
suspicious of any resistance to “reducing” it in this way. As Harman has noted about conscious 
activity in general, though, this standpoint misses an alternative account of the relationship 
between mind and music that both takes the undermining complaint seriously and holds a 
coherent view of parts and wholes. For Harman, the sensual music exists on the interior of the 
unit formed by the mind plus the thing it directs its attention toward, a unit we might call the 
musical object proper. He explains: 
If I perceive a tree, this sensual object and I do not meet up inside my mind, and for a 
simple reason: my mind and its object are two equal partners in the intention, and the 
unifying term must contain both. The mind cannot serve as both part and whole 
simultaneously. Instead, both the mind and its object are encompassed by something 
larger: namely, both exist inside the object formed through the relation between me and 
the real tree, which may be rather different from the trees found in everyday life.80 
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We have seen how schema theory risks reducing the schema both upward to literal 
knowledge and downward to a mental substrate. Harman shows here how we can avoid the 
downward risk with objects such as schemata: the mind and the experienced entity are pieces of 
“something larger,” the compound real object formed by both. Furthermore, he indicates in the 
final sentence that the sensual object itself translates something real. Byros claims that the 
perception of music involves a projection of consciousness onto a neutral material substrate, and 
Gjerdingen would likely agree, given his comments above. But for OOO, the real entity on the 
other end is neither neutral nor a projection of the mind. It has its own form, a distinct interior 
environment with real components. We can never directly know the object on the other side, but 
for the sake of argument let us accept something having to do with sound waves or patterns of 
neurons firing. Even these patterns of air pressure or neural activity are informed by a unique 
character and history, some contributions of which are more important than others. In visual 
terms, a “cube” image on a page exists prior to my perceiving it and has a real form that makes it 
possible for the right beholder to see a three-dimensional solid. Just because a perceiver is a 
necessary ingredient does not mean perceiving cubes or Prinners is “entirely an act of 
imagination.”81 Again, the background structure of my cognition may be a condition for me to 
notice a schema, but some real thing has to be there to be noticed, and that thing would exist 
with or without my observation of it.  
Just as is the case with my own paradigm, the other thing has a real background. Harman 
argues that we must be careful not to interpret that background simply in terms of what we fail to 
notice in the foreground. He draws on Gestalt psychology’s interplay between figure and ground 
but argues for an ontological rather than psychological interpretation. An electric light in a 
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conference room is “ground rather than figure” not because it is absent from conscious 
recognition, but because “even when I am staring at it I do not exhaust the reality of the light.”82 
Elsewhere, Harman associates the dueling pair of ground and figure with form and content.83 
Whatever the terminology might be, the idea remains the same: the background is not a neutral, 
shapeless unity. It is embodied in the plurality of surface elements and it is formed: “the depth is 
not something distinct from the things [on the surface], but is incarnated directly in them … 
[T]he depths are already formed.”84 Going further, he claims that: 
each painting, each artwork, must generate its own background. More than this, each part 
of each artwork must have its own background, so that we do not fall into the untenable 
holism of claiming that an artwork is a well-oiled machine in which each part is 
thoroughly determined by all the rest. If this were the case then any modification of any 
artwork, however trivial, would result in the production of a completely new artwork.85 
The special role of artists or musicians according to this viewpoint is to provoke some 
experience of the tension between form and content, or ground and figure. Aesthetic specialists 
such as composers and performers turn figures that we take for granted or reject as dead clichés 
into “creatures of the background.”86 How could an object-oriented schema theory account for 
this interplay of figure and ground that is somehow incarnated in the musical object at any given 
level of scale? 
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III. Towards an Ontography of Schemata 
Luckily, Gjerdingen has already supplied a jumping-off point. In Music in the Galant Style, he 
adds a conceptual layer to the schema: the stage. The stage is “the longer utterance into which 
the event is embedded,” though it might last no longer than the event itself.87 Occasionally, the 
term seems to indicate something that is pertinent to a particular instance of a schema, something 
that brings it to life with “important parallels or contrasts.”88 An expanded third stage of a 
Prinner might stress its event’s implied dominant harmony, or the harmony of one stage might 
overlap with the next as a kind of suspension and so produce “a lovely dissonance.”89 This vision 
of the stage is compatible with OOO. Gjerdingen even frames the relationship between stage and 
event in terms of form and content, one of Harman’s go-to conceptual pairings.90 
However, the idea of the stage as a genuine musical object in rapport or conflict with 
schema content has not been fully incorporated into schema theory. Indeed, Gjerdingen avoids 
integrating stages with his analytical apparatus: the tense resonance between stages and events 
belongs only to the self-evidence of some musical examples, whereas schemata are exclusively 
“defined with reference to their events.”91 For the most part, a stage is just the durational 
container for an event. The distinction between a “clearly” and “loosely” defined stage, for 
example, only refers to clearly and loosely specified durations.92 Even this sense of the stage 
concept does have the benefit of separating events from other musical details; it also permits the 
view that an event endures while its stage is in play. But the significance of non-event details is 
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unclear since the container is indifferent to its cargo; and as we saw above, Gjerdingen sees the 
endurance of a schema not in terms of a robust object but as the mental bundling of events across 
empty spans of time.93 Therefore both words in “durational container” pose problems: the stage 
is undermined to a uniform temporal container and overmined to a literal duration. For OOO, 
though, the stage concept should remind us that a deeper form individualizes the schema’s 
content and endures through varying profiles. Like the schema a level above it, the stage is more 
than its content. In short, schema objects segment into other objects (stages), while events help 
us to identify the telltale qualities of schemata thanks to efforts by theorists.  
Having established that the background depth of schema events is found in their stages, 
the next step is to consider the problem of interpreting the relationship between foreground and 
background. How do relations between a schema’s form and content make the schema “more 
real”? Furthermore, do I hear a Prinner as a familiar object the same way a restaurant patron 
might see this or that location of a fast food chain? Or does the schema shift into a quality of the 
musical object, like redness as a property of flowers or accent walls? Nothing in OOO prevents 
the experience of objects in the quality position and vice-versa; OOO claims only that they are 
very different in each case (as in, “the cypress is like a flame” versus “the flame is like a 
cypress”). Indeed, the phrase-level schema must already have a variable ontological status from 
what has been discussed so far. For instance, the schema can be judged as relevant to a wider 
cultural paradigm, or as a unit of local interest in a composition with a certain loose relation to its 
qualities. The difference here seems to depend on whether we “zoom out” to the culture or 
“zoom in” to the schema itself. By analogy, something like this distinction between different 
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levels of interest might also apply in an aesthetic context, within the experience of a single 
work.94 Now, judgment calls about the ontological status of schemata would partly depend on 
one’s own paradigm – certainly on one’s past exposure to schemata – and cannot be known with 
certainty, but they would also be justifiable in a finite number of ways.  
Harman uses the term “ontography” for the study of pairings between RO, SO, SQ, and 
RQ.95 Three object-quality pairings appear to be the most germane to aesthetic situations:  
● An “allusive” tension, as found in metaphors and half-failed descriptions, where apparent 
qualities are relevant to an inaccessible object.96  
● A “cubistic” tension, where discrete objects are held together by an opaque organizing 
principle.97  
● A literal (or “banal”) experience that lacks tension, in which a tacit “bundle of qualities” 
theory is in effect.98  
The difference between the allusive and cubistic options could use some clarification. In my 
view, they both involve the “spatial” object-quality pair (RO-SQ), allure, and so both are 
aesthetic.99 Yet OOO’s double emphasis on the separation of the object from how it appears and 
on the mutual autonomy of wholes and parts supports the above division. Aspects of an 
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 The zooming metaphor suggests a change in the contextual frame of our attention to the object. Assuming we 
project or “conform” to it, zooming is analogous to a “deictic shift” in literary and cognitive theory. See Judith F. 
Duchan, Gail A. Bruder, and Lynne E. Hewitt, eds., Deixis in Narrative: A Cognitive Science Perspective 
(Routledge, 1995).  
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 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 124-25 
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 Harman, Weird Realism, 24. See also Harman’s example of the architect Tom Wiscombe in Object-Oriented 
Ontology, 249-50. 
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 Harman, Weird Realism, 34-35. See also Harman’s example of the architect Mark Foster Gage’s use of 
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encountered object may allude to a withheld reality, but there are also distinct boundaries and 
concealed bridges among its individual pieces. Thus the experience of allure can happen in two 
ways: (1) head-on, through an object’s tense resonance with unlikely qualities, and (2) bottom-
up, through the articulation of discrete components in half-hidden coalition. In both cases, the 
schema is the alluring object; it becomes “more real.”100 The difference is that the allusive 
schema has a singular style that its recognizable features fail to exhaust, whereas the cubistic 
schema draws attention to its discrete chunks while somehow unifying them in the background. 
But if the schema may be the object either way, then there must also be times when another 
object is “like” the schema (as in a metaphor), and times when the schema itself is a cubistic 
fragment of a still larger entity. In other words, we have four rather than two choices: the schema 
may be in the object or quality position in an allusive or cubistic aesthetic experience.  
Before reviewing these four permutations with the help of examples, let us move on to 
the final option, the banal object-quality relation. I have argued that while Gjerdingen leaves a 
door open to an object-oriented conception of the schema stage (the “utterance into which the 
event is embedded”), he theorizes it as a literal durational container, thus prioritizing events. 
OOO disputes literalization as a global strategy. However, the literal does have a place in OOO. 
It refers to banal experience where we take a thing for what it seems to be—we conflate the 
object with its qualities. Gjerdingen again leads the way with his briefly noted distinction 
between “simple” and “more involved” presentations of schemata. In the former, “each event 
may constitute its own stage.”101 Similarly, a banal schema has minimal object-quality tension. 
Like a simple presentation, it might nakedly abstract several similar instances (though not 
 
100 In terms of the beholder’s “theatrical” involvement (see Chapter 1), (1) allusive experience performs the style 
that emanates surprising qualities (contra overmining), and (2) cubistic experience performs the hidden center that 
draws other objects into its orbit (contra undermining). 
101
 Gjerdingen, Music in the Galant Style, 21-22. 
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necessarily in the same “simple” way as other schemata). Or it might repeat a well-known 
exemplar, such as a famous theme. The point is that it closes the gap between stages and events. 
But is the literal schema an object or quality? This is ambiguous. As I argue in Chapter 1, an 
object can endure in fairly banal stability or approach the status of a bare element that gets its 
meaning from context. That is, it may be commensurate with its accidents as they stream past the 
listener (SO-SQ) or it may be so compressed with its features that it reduces to an accident of its 
environment, pivoting to another object of experience.  
Assuming a schema can serve as object or quality, we have four permutations of the 
allusive (“A”) and cubistic (“C”) tensions, plus the ambiguous literal schema (“L”): 
● A/obj. The schema adopts the unique character of its stages (allusive, object position). 
● C/obj. Independent stages are coordinated by the background schema (cubistic, object 
position). 
● A/qual. Qualities associated with the schema fuse with another object (allusive, quality 
position). The object is metaphorically “like” the schema.  
● C/qual. Distinct phrase-level objects that include the schema form a single unit by some 
other organizing principle (cubistic, quality position).  
● L. The schema is plainly identified with its qualities (literal schema, SO-SQ). 
This ontography attends to the reality of a musical experience through the interplay of form and 
content. In terms of musical analysis, the purpose of these categories is to integrate aesthetic 
interpretation into schema theory. As the metaphor of zooming in or out to different levels of 
scale has suggested, phrase-level schemata take part in the formation of musical objects in a 
variety of ways. Another good aid for the interpretive process being outlined here is the sonata 
theory of James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy. They argue that generic expectations provide a 
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baseline for the interpretation of particulars, and the authors integrate this interpretation into their 
theory as a necessary moment.102 Of course, a full theory of galant norms and deformations with 
respect to the above ontography is outside the scope of this chapter, but it is worth noting that 
galant schemata are hardly neutral. They come with expectations for their artful handling.103 For 
instance, highly conventional gestures such as cadences tend toward L whereas other schemata 
depart from their aesthetic norms when literalized. This idea of aesthetic norms can have 
counterintuitive consequences for “deformation,” especially when L is involved. Gjerdingen 
claims the Prinner in de Charrière’s sonata is not artful yet remains securely in the galant style. 
Her modest deformation of an aesthetic norm in the L direction cools it off according to 
Gjerdingen, rendering the music less artfully visible and more a hypnotic intoning of a courtly 
background. And in a different interpretation (or with a different musical work), Gjerdingen 
might claim the Prinner has become too literal and thus more visible as a raw, un-courtly 
intrusion of a rote exercise into a musical setting.  
I see two options here, not a contradiction. Despite the implied singular judgment of the 
term “banal,” L has many faces, starting with the fact that it can blend into its paradigmatic 
function or draw attention to its context. Yes, L always forms a continuum with its own content 
(SO-SQ, object position). But does it also plug seamlessly into wider context, like de Charrière’s 
Prinner? Or does it break free—whether as clichéd obstacle or aesthetic feature? Even a literal 
schema’s historical distance from the listener could have an aesthetic effect. In the first 
movement of Mozart’s Piano Sonata, K. 283, a schema called a Quiescenza repeats after the 
cadence in both the exposition and recapitulation (Figure 2.5). From what we know about the 
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 James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy, Elements of Sonata Theory: Norms, Types, and Deformations in the Late 
Eighteenth-Century Sonata (Oxford University Press, 2006). 
103
 Gjerdingen remarks on implicit formal functions for most of the schemata he lists in Music in the Galant Style. 
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schema, this instance straightforwardly follows the fashion of the time as “a moment of 
quiescence following an important cadence.”104 Yet its pattern of flattening the seventh scale 
degree before rising back up through a leading tone may seem unique or spicy to a modern 
listener, thus fusing the bare features of the schema with an enigmatic post-cadential ground 
(A/qual). Furthermore, a literal schema can create opportunities for “cubistic” disconnections 
between chunks of music, in which extreme shifts at a larger scale justify smaller scale displays 
of the familiar or the obvious. The Quiescenza passage above is followed by a sudden change in 
texture to initiate the next section’s opening period. At a “moment-by-moment” level, the new 
section takes an abrupt turn that sends us looking for a connecting thread in the wider context 
(C/qual). By contrast with this situation, the schema at the beginning of the piece, called a 
Meyer, is more individualized and segues into the next chunk less drastically. There, a Prinner 
(or maybe just the opening of one) elaborates on the Meyer’s opening motive while changing in 
accompaniment style (see Figures 2.6 and 2.7). Of course, we should be aware that while some 
literal content is always at play in an aesthetic tension, not every A/qual or C/qual in which a 
schema participates necessarily involves a literal version of that schema (L).  
 
 
Figure 2.5. Left: Gjerdingen’s model Quiescenza (Galant Style, 460). Right: First Quiescenza at 
the end of the exposition in Mozart’s Piano Sonata in G, K. 283, i (mm. 51-52). 
 
 
 
 
104
 Ibid., 183. 
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Figure 2.6. Left: Gjerdingen’s model Meyer (Galant Style, 459). Right: Meyer at the beginning 
of K. 283, i (mm. 1-4). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7. Prinner immediately following the Meyer in K. 283, i (mm. 5-10). 
 
Let us continue getting a feel for the ontography of schemata through the example of the Mozart 
sonata. The early bars of K. 283 have hardly been invisible to musicological discourse, but I can 
make my initial observations about the action within and between its two schemata briefly. In the 
case of the Meyer (Figure 2.6), note both its distinctive wide leaps and initial melodic emphasis 
on the fifth scale degree, by contrast with a Meyer’s typical ^1. This Meyer thus has a certain 
uniqueness over others, but at the same time the wide registral gaps undercut its immediate 
melodic self-sufficiency. As for the Prinner after that (Figure 2.7), it is worth mentioning that it 
is part of the “first theme” rather than an elaborate spinning out of individual Prinner stages. It 
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seems to stall after its second stage—or else we must hear its characteristic events sliding into an 
inner voice and eliding with the downbeat of the cadential passage.  
Now, the artful presentation of a familiar schema presents us with an interpretive choice 
between A/obj and C/obj, where the schema is in the object position. The question is whether 
the passage has a distinct character as a whole or draws attention to its parts. Nothing prevents an 
elaborate blending of both, but in general we should usually notice greater emphasis either on the 
singular character of the passage or on the fracturing of its stages. Using the mindset of norms 
and deformations, I would expect first themes to fall under A/obj, and the loosened subdivisions 
of later passages would bring more emphasis to their interiors (C/obj). The expectation for first 
themes only partly plays out here. Certainly, the patterned alternation of the Meyer’s motives at 
different registers creates a single unique opening shape rather than four distinct units (A/obj). 
The Prinner is trickier, though. It starts with a medial “riposte” function that is typical of 
Prinners, with its forward-looking descent colored by suspensions that take their cue from the 
preceding Meyer’s high register and rhythm (A/obj). The twist, as I mentioned above, is that the 
Prinner stalls out halfway through. In one interpretation, it transforms into a unit that is not so 
much a Prinner as “like a Prinner” (A/qual). That endpoint has a certain priority, just as the 
realization that a falling leaf is actually a blackbird favors the blackbird, but the shape of the 
experience can still be captured in the form A/obj → A/qual.  
A different possible interpretation of this Prinner follows from Gjerdingen’s observation 
of a galant norm: “it became common to separate 6—5 from 4—3.”105 Accordingly, even half of 
a Prinner after the initial theme may be enough for it to be heard as such and not in the 
metaphorical sense of “like a Prinner.” The strangeness of the passage would come down to 
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hearing the music starting at m. 7 as a kind of viaduct to the cadence, hence a new unit that 
belongs not to the Prinner but to the overall phrase. At this moment, we pivot from the level of 
the schema-object to the level of the phrase-object. The half-Prinner itself (mm. 5-6) becomes 
one of the independent chunks within that phrase (C/qual). Any “loss of energy” at m. 7 is not 
just a modification of the preceding Prinner or fuel for future energy gain, then, but a deflection 
to the wider level of the phrase. The basic difference between this interpretation and the previous 
one is that in the former, the surprising moment at m. 7 still belongs to the object that turns out to 
be like a Prinner, whereas in the latter, the surprising moment belongs to a transition into the 
cadence and so is already separate from the half-glimpsed Prinner.    
Meyers, Prinners, and Quiescenzas—let us conclude this chapter by comparing their 
appearances mentioned above with their initial appearances in the second movement of the same 
sonata. (See Figure 2.8 for an overview.) At first glance, the opening of the second movement 
has something in common with the first. It begins with certain features that are commonly 
associated with a Meyer, including its characteristic bass and melody tones. But there are barriers 
to hearing a Meyer here. One of them is that the opening chunk has three stages, not four (see 
Figure 2.9). The “fourth stage” begins a new gesture, a cadential passage. This elision on its own 
might not be enough to stop us from hearing the opening chunk as a Meyer. Yet consider the 
pacing. A call-response grouping of stages 1-2 and 3-4 appears to be a major feature of typical 
Meyers. Normally the third stage would echo the first, but this one does not. The first stage with 
its steady tapping lasts as long as the second and third combined. All of this suggests that the 
three-stage object in m. 1 is “like a Meyer,” meaning it is a unique non-Meyer object that has 
fused with Meyer qualities (A/qual). One more thing to note about the period in which the 
Meyeresque object participates is that the consequent phrase (mm. 3-4) blurs its boundary with 
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the antecedent instead of repeating the most literal Meyer-like qualities of the antecedent. This 
smoothed-out transition back from the half cadence to the theme leads to the “wrong” note (^3) 
in the bass at m. 3, which not only destabilizes the structural boundary between the half cadence 
and the tonic “restart” but further undercuts the theme’s Meyeresque identity. In any case, my 
point is simply as follows. The same pattern of bass and melody notes appears at the beginning 
of the second movement as the first, but they are very different types of phrase-level units. And 
even if one were to hear them both as Meyers, OOO would regard them as individual and 
allusive musical objects rather than filled-in pre-musical mental frameworks. 
 
Figure 2.8. Ontography of three schemata in Mozart’s Piano Sonata in G, K. 283, i-ii. 
 
First Movement (Allegro). 
Measure #  Schema  Ontological category 
1-4    Meyer   A/obj 
5-10 (11-16)  Prinner? [x2]  A/obj → A/qual, or A/obj → C/qual 
51-53   Quiescenza [x2] L 
 
Second Movement (Andante).  
1-2    “Like a Meyer”  A/qual 
5-6    Modulating Prinner C/obj (embedded C/qual Quiescenza) 
11-14   Quiescenza [x2] A/obj 
   
 
 
 
Figure 2.9. Opening of Mozart, K. 283, ii (mm. 1-2), “Like a Meyer.” 
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The Meyeresque period is followed by a “modulating Prinner” (Figure 2.10). This refers to a 
“Prinner to end in the key of the dominant” that starts its melodic descent at ^3 in the tonic key. 
It is less a witty ad hoc idea than a generic one: “Among the maestros of the Neapolitan 
conservatories its use was considered standard practice.”106 Aside from being a different 
subcategory of Prinner than in the first movement, certain aspects of this one are noteworthy. 
The schema itself is a single object, but it is structured like a two-part antecedent phrase in a 
period.107 Specifically, the first stage out of four (m. 5) takes up half of the Prinner’s total 
duration and sounds like an independent basic idea with its own internal contours. (The bass has 
a leading tone neighbor under a melodic descent from G that does nothing to give away the 
upcoming modulation, then a voice exchange between C and E on beats 3 and 4 rounds out the 
shape.) Schema theory usually treats schemata in more or less synchronic fashion, but that is 
difficult to maintain here: the first bar (m. 5) is an isolated un-Prinnerly segment of what will 
only turn out later to be a larger Prinner landscape (stage 1 → C/obj).  
 
 
Figure 2.10. Modulating Prinner with embedded Quiescenza in Mozart, K. 283, ii (mm. 5-6).  
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 Using William Caplin’s terminology from Classical Form, it is a “compound basic idea” because it does not end 
with a cadence. But my point here is that it has a two-part form like an antecedent phrase. 
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The second half responds to the first. Its character is marked by a hastening pace that 
both transitions to the key of G and pushes down to reveal the Prinner as such against some 
upward resistance to that push. Stage two (m. 6, first two beats) facilitates the modulation with 
the embedded F# of the Quiescenza. The Quiescenza itself seems to be in the quality position of 
the Prinner (C/qual). It is secondary to the overall structure of the two measures and is easy to 
miss insofar as its function as a small single-use modulating device severs it from its normal 
“quiescent” inertia. But it also flavors the passage with its emphasis on the coming tonic, G, and 
with its characteristic upward melodic motion in the second half. Notice that, unlike the 
Quiescenza in the previous movement (Figure 2.5), this is not a literal Quiescenza but a weird 
variant that starts out woven into a passing chord (m. 5) before fusing with an un-Quiescenza-
like contextual function. It may be C/qual in relation to the Prinner, but it is A/obj at its own 
smaller scale. Layers of nonliteral parts within nonliteral wholes is a fascinating theme to ponder, 
but let us move on. The larger Prinner concludes with just one beat for each of the final two 
stages. The unusual pacing of all four stages (4 + 2 + 1 + 1 quarter notes) creates momentum into 
what comes next. Overall, the Prinner’s interior fragmentation and future orientation mask the 
unitary schema object itself (C/obj). The reshaping of a well-known musical pattern into 
something less immediately recognizable helps to make this cubistic Prinner “more real” in an 
ontological sense and “more graceful” in an aesthetic sense, as opposed to a straightforward 
enactment of courtly protocol or a theoretical abstraction. 
 So far, we have seen a literal use of a Quiescenza in the first movement (L) and a 
metaphorical use of Quiescenza qualities for a modulation in the second (C/qual). The end of the 
same movement’s exposition features another Quiescenza (see Figure 2.11). This is an allusive 
variant, in resonance with the unique style of its stages (A/obj). We might expect the features of 
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the stages to only obliquely relate to the recognizable Quiescenza. But some A/obj schemata can 
be “masked” in a different way, namely, with self-exaggerations. An exaggerated schema’s 
stages magnify the familiar impact of its events as if the composer were discovering them for the 
first time. Such is the case here. Functionally speaking, this Quiescenza doubles as both a riposte 
to a repeated basic idea (mm. 9-10) and as a structural cadence in G following an earlier half 
cadence at m. 8. Its cadential function prevents the full quiescence of a tonic pedal, but Mozart 
makes up for this twist by amplifying other typical Quiescenza features into a kind of caricature. 
He stresses the melodic descent to ^6 with a chromatic neighbor note figuration. He also 
emphasizes the two-part down/up division of the Quiescenza (flat ^7 down to ^6, then leading 
tone back up to ^1) with a loud/soft division and a long anacrusis separating the first part from 
the second part, the cadence proper. The conventional fall into the cadence does take precedence 
over the Quiescenza’s expected literal rise to ^8, thus relegating the leading tone to an inner 
voice. But a dominant chord magnifies the customary return up to tonic following the assertive 
flat ^7 to ^6. Mozart exaggerates the Quiescenza even more the second time around with a “let-
it-sink-in” fermata. 
 
 
Figure 2.11. Repeated Quiescenza in Mozart K. 283, ii (mm. 10-14 shown).  
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Now that we have taken some steps toward an ontography of schemata, it may be useful 
to look back at the overall shape of the chapter. Robert Gjerdingen pursues his study of musical 
conventions with one specific kind in mind: eighteenth-century European court music at the level 
of the phrase. Yet he indicates the underlying schema concept is relevant to a variety of historical 
scopes, genres, and levels of musical form. OOO takes this view seriously. Furthermore, 
schemata are like Harman’s objects in their heterogeneity and durability (that is, their resistance 
to duomining), as well as in their “technological” mediation of paradigms. I argued that schema 
theory can preserve the consistency of these insights in two basic ways. First, it could insist on 
our fundamental uncertainty about the real qualities of musical paradigms and schemata. Second, 
it could incorporate an organized variety of aesthetic judgments in its analytical framework.  
Future efforts would parallel these two paths. First, if literal lists of schemata and their 
properties do not sufficiently account for RQ when producing knowledge, then the varying uses 
and constitutions of these objects across and within cultural-historic divides merits further study, 
a task left mostly passed over in this chapter. Second, if schemata are not just unfilled shells or 
byproducts of the mind – if they are names for musical forms that can appear as graceful, 
clumsy, surprising, or clichéd – then aesthetic interpretation becomes a key problem, hence the 
project begun here of exploring the ways music has put the reality of these forms to the test. 
(With all this talk of remote real forms, we must remember that it is not the form itself that OOO 
is after but the interplay of form and content.) Finally, there is still more to consider about the 
ontology of schemata. For example, a schema’s stages unfold in linear order rather than all at 
once. In what sense is the schema already “there,” like a house awaiting a tour, and in what sense 
is it like the evolution of an idea or a life?    
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Chapter 3. Eubie Blake and the Schillinger System: Attachment as 
Counterfactual Symbiosis 
When the ragtime pianist and songwriter Eubie Blake (1887-1983) had all but retired at the age 
of sixty, he decided to resume his music education. The teacher he sought out, Rudolph 
Schramm, was affiliated with the music program at NYU, but Schramm’s main appeal for Blake 
was his exclusive focus on the theory and pedagogy of the recently deceased Joseph Schillinger 
(1896-1943).1 (Blake had set up a meeting with Schillinger some years earlier, but he never 
arrived at the apartment-studio.2) Blake went through the course with enthusiasm, finishing in 
1950 after two and a half years. Schillinger, the man whose theory Blake studied, emigrated from 
Russia in 1928 and became well known as a private teacher in New York during the 1930s. His 
teaching materials were posthumously compiled into the 1640-page Schillinger System of 
Musical Composition [SSMC] in 1946.3 Many former students (including Schramm) taught from 
these materials in the booming post-war educational environment.4 The ideas were idiosyncratic 
and expansive in scope, making Schillinger a ready ally of figures in the American experimental 
tradition such as Henry Cowell and, a generation later, Earle Brown.5 Yet Schillinger’s work as 
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an instructor and consultant for George Gershwin, Glenn Miller, and other commercial musicians 
outside an academic setting also tied his reputation to popular genres. 
This chapter places the topic of Schillinger’s influence on Blake in an object-oriented 
light. What roles do biographical background and wider context play? How do we assess Blake’s 
agency and judge the significance of his new technical paraphernalia for the reality of his 
musical life? The philosophy of Graham Harman draws attention to implicit ontological 
viewpoints that accompany different ways of handling these questions. Particularly relevant here 
is Harman’s approach to the theme of influence in Immaterialism: Objects and Social Theory.6 I 
will contrast his key concept of symbiotic stages with a common stance on influence that I call 
inscription. As for the Blake-Schillinger connection itself and its role in Blake’s life, I will draw 
on commentary by Blake, Schillinger, and others, the score to the piano rag Dictys on Seventh 
Avenue (which Blake reportedly wrote as a kind of thesis), recordings of the rag, and the dicty 
stereotype associated with its title.7 
What do I mean by “inscription”? It refers to the assumption that influence has the sense 
of a verb: a direct movement of properties from one location to another. This view entails certain 
beliefs about how change works and what must be relevant in a relationship of influence, both of 
which this chapter will critique. First, inscribed change is literal, or paraphrasable without 
distortion, so that one can in principle fully explain influence with accessible information about 
its sources and effects. Second, one judges something to be important because it enacts or is 
affected by the transfer of features. But OOO finds that the object itself, partly distinct from its 
relations with other things and from its own parts and qualities, is important: “a thing acts 
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introduction to the score (p. 5) and in most other sources, “seventh” is spelled out. 
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because it exists rather than existing because it acts.”8 An account of an object seeks its singular 
“style” as a noun. Is Eubie Blake considered an object here? Yes, but more notably for the 
present chapter, much of his musical life is made up of attachments between him and other 
things (see Chapter 1 on space, RO-SQ). Attachments themselves are objects, and some of them 
may genuinely alter the reality of Blake’s life.  
This brings us to symbiosis. A given object may be bounded, but it is not in principle 
closed off to change. Its underlying character can undergo a finite number of turning points. This 
happens through what Harman calls symbiosis, an irreversible attachment where the object 
couples with something dissimilar on the pretext of their weak ties (their affinities) and adopts 
its style in a nonliteral way. “As was seen in the case of metaphor, symbiosis is not a literal case 
of two objects exchanging common features and benefits, but of one object stripping away the 
qualities of another.”9 And a historical account that puts symbiosis front and center is like 
aesthetic criticism in that instead of attempting to paraphrase things literally, it focuses on 
organizing an indirect ontology of the object around its boundaries and transformative fusions.  
Object-oriented social theory and historiography offers a novel approach to the Blake-
Schillinger connection, but this connection also pushes the theory further in return. Harman 
claims that, as a basic rule, symbiosis happens early in the life of the object.10 Though it does not 
outright contradict the early life rule, the Blake-Schillinger connection raises serious doubts 
about how well the rule accords with other, arguably more fundamental aspects of object-
oriented social theory. My critique of this rule will prompt further development of Harman’s idea 
that “proximate failures” allude to the reality of an object through its boundaries with its 
 
8
 Harman, Immaterialism, 7. 
9
 Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 112. Harman adapts the term from the evolutionary biologist Lynn Margulis, 
Symbiotic Planet: A New Look at Evolution (Basic Books, 1998). 
10
 Harman, Immaterialism, 118. 
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surroundings.11 Specifically, I will draw attention to a special variant of what Harman calls the 
pre-winners and pre-losers of history: significant attachments that could be symbioses but have 
not yet reached a point of no return.12 Such tense mixtures of challenge and opportunity inspire 
counterfactual speculation into situations that could make new symbiotic stages possible—or 
could lead nowhere. 
 
I. Inscription and Symbiosis 
In considering what distinguishes the object-oriented standpoint from other possible ways to 
frame the link between Eubie Blake and SSMC, we might start with established discourse around 
two commonly cited ragtime trends: “ragging the classics” and “classicizing rags.” (Note that my 
comments are limited to the discourse and not the trends themselves.) Historian Edward Berlin 
has observed that ragging the classics was widespread in both education and performance.13 
Pianists would rag well-known marches, popular melodies, and classical concert and chamber 
works. Blake himself ragged the “Pilgrim’s Chorus” of Tannhäuser.14 Some listeners – 
especially “classical” musicians and critics – responded antagonistically to the practice. Ragging 
a classic had little value for them other than as a nose-thumbing gesture of rebellion that did an 
injustice to the original material.15 The problem with this complaint from an object-oriented 
perspective is not that it ignored context or fell into a hierarchic essentialism, but that it 
presumed knowledge of boundaries and essences from a prior musical taxonomy (itself likely 
 
11
 Ibid., 116-17. 
12
 Ibid., 64, 98-99.  
13
 Edward Berlin, Ragtime: A Musical and Cultural History (University of California Press, 1980), 66–71.  
14
 Berlin lists the work as the Tannhäuser Overture (ibid., 67). The Maryland Historical Society has a copy of 
Eubie’s ragged version of the “Pilgrim’s Chorus” in manuscript form (MS 2800.1). 
15
 Berlin, Ragtime, 70–71. 
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informed by a social and racial taxonomy). Specifically, these critics assigned to ragged classics 
such as Tannhäuser an ontological status like that of vandalism, in which qualities of a classic 
were covered over by supposedly vulgar features common to all rags. For them, (1) former 
classical landmarks were all reduced to one shared source of change, “ragging,” and (2) that 
source was inseparable from a context of social disrepute. These points correspond with both 
forms of anti-object reductionism (undermining and overmining, or duomining). 
The other trend, classicizing rags, reversed the direction. A version of this idea informs 
an essay by Gunther Schuller about (among other things) the inevitability of “cultural grafting” 
between “classical music and its neighbors.” Schuller notes that, unlike early critics who wanted 
music to “avoid ‘contamination’ by ragtimers and their ilk,” some composers such as Claude 
Debussy, Darius Milhaud, Igor Stravinsky, and Charles Ives wrote their own stylized renditions 
of ragtime. Schuller also hears upwardly mobile “classical yearnings” in Joseph Lamb’s Ragtime 
Nightingale (1915) and traces the trend back from late novelties of the 1930s (such as Alec 
Templeton’s Bach Goes to Town) to Tom Turpin’s Harlem Rag of 1897. According to Schuller, 
Eubie Blake mainly participated in the distinct but comparable project of ragtime’s evolution 
into jazz. Schuller cites the fast tempos and walking bass of one such “transitional” Blake work, 
Charleston Rag (copyrighted 1917, written possibly as early as 1899), taking it to exemplify 
Blake’s contribution to this historical development.16  
Schuller sometimes acknowledges the ideal of folk-refinement famously championed by 
Antonín Dvořák, for which some popular music is inherently immature but ripe for cultivation. 
“If we are surprised that Europeans took our humbly born popular music so to heart, we may 
recall that it was the Bohemian Dvořák who had to urge his American students in New York to 
 
16
 Gunther Schuller, “Rags, the Classics, and Jazz,” in Ragtime: Its History, Composers and Music, ed. John Edward 
Hasse (McMillan, 1985), 79–90. 
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listen to and use their own folk musics; or that the first serious acceptance of jazz occurred in 
Europe, not America.”17 As Harry Farjeon remarks about Dvořák in a 1924 piece, the Old World 
artist “entered into the spirit of the Negro tunes, gathered from that spirit what was beautiful,” 
and “showed [the New World] the way.”18 We can imagine a similar portrayal of Blake’s 
education. The cultivating influence need not have been successful for the same underlying 
conceptual scheme to apply. For example, one might argue, like Farjeon ultimately does about 
the cultivation of ragtime, that Schillinger via Schramm tried and failed to show Blake the way. 
Taking a step back, a notable feature of this viewpoint is, as before, the asymmetry or hierarchy 
between the two sides, with strong or weak agency assigned to the influencer and passive 
receptivity assigned to the influenced. But, also as before, OOO does not take issue with the 
asymmetry of influence in which one entity adopts the features of another. Rather, it denies that 
(1) the reality of Blake’s musical life reduces to its influences, and (2) the source of influence 
itself is already a known quantity (whether good or bad) according to a prior taxonomy. 
As described by these authors, ragging classics and classicizing rags involve a movement 
of free-floating, knowable musical markers of social difference.19 Inscription is a good word for 
the image of one agent branding or cutting into another. It is a duomining position, as I have 
noted, but its above unidirectional form in which the inscriber “takes over” wherever their 
influence is felt is mainly recognizable by its undermining tendency. Inscription is a broad 
concept, though, and recent varieties have displayed both conceptual and socio-political 
sophistication.20 Consider Ronald M. Radano’s Lying Up a Nation, an impressive historical 
 
17
 Ibid., 81. See also Antonin Dvořák, “Music in America” (1895). 
18
 Harry Farjeon, “Rag-Time,” The Musical Times 65/979 (1924): 797. 
19 My critique applies only to the discourse around ragging classics and classicizing rags. A OOO account of genre 
interaction (treating genres as real objects) is possible, though new difficulties arise at increasingly general levels.  
20
 The term “inscription” also appears in Judith Butler’s famous Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of 
Identity (Routledge, 1990), but its unidirectional sense in that book differs from how I intend it here. 
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critique of race music in America. Radano explains “race music” in terms of wider ideological 
discourses. For instance, he states that “rhythmically oriented black music” was “dependent on 
the rigid commitments of white supremacy,” albeit as a “dynamic and propulsive absence.”21 
This example of ideological inscription implies musical objects are directly touched by their 
wider environment. In a twist he calls paradoxical, Radano observes his own political goal of 
“celebrating black distinctiveness while acknowledging the social constitution of racial 
categories.”22 There is no deep contradiction here, though, since black distinctiveness for him has 
no reality “apart from the contingencies of social and cultural change.”23 An important feature of 
these contingent relations is that the products of human culture are fully articulated by them, with 
no autonomous essence of their own. Music and other discourses co-produce one another. The 
point is not that they can and often do interact, but that they continuously intra-act, meaning they 
are reciprocally “bound up” in a system from the start.24  
This approach warrants further exploration. In a review, Denis-Constant Martin applauds 
Radano’s wary rejection of “essential conceptions of black culture,” but wishes Radano would 
supplement his ideological critique with musical analysis and more attention to the “particular 
dynamics arising from specific places, moments, and sociopolitical circumstances.”25 Still, I take 
Martin’s recommendation to be consistent with the perspective Radano establishes.26 The 
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 Ronald M. Radano, Lying up a Nation: Race and Black Music (University of Chicago Press, 2003), 233. 
22
 Ibid., 232. 
23
 Ibid., 3. 
24
 Ibid., 232-33. “Comprehending the modern conception of black rhythm means undertaking a critical genealogy 
that reaches into the historical depths of American language structures in order to trace the contours of a peculiar 
musical sensibility bound up with modern notions of race.”  
25
 Denis-Constant Martin, Review of Radano and Ramsey, JAMS 59/3 (2006): 759, 761 (emphasis altered). 
26
 Martin does find his divergence from Radano to be significant. For instance, he argues that the ideology of 
African atavism amplifies a prior “sonic reality.” Yet the latter for Martin is itself a byproduct of human-human 
power relations (ibid., 763-64). Do note, though, Martin’s reference to Édouard Glissant’s theory of creolization, 
according to which parts of interacting cultures keep their relative autonomy while producing new emergent styles 
(762). See Édouard Glissant, Poetics of Relation (University of Michigan Press, 1997), 34, 89.  
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implicit philosophical outlook of inscription could help to explain and develop that perspective. 
Consider the term intra-action, used above. It comes from Karen Barad, whose philosophy is a 
rival of the object-oriented position. Intra-action means “agencies are only distinct in relation to 
their mutual entanglement; they don’t exist as individual elements.”27 Criticism of Lying Up a 
Nation in the style of Barad would push its implied ontology further, echoing Martin’s demand 
for greater granularity (since agencies are never one thing but multiple) and extending Martin’s 
interest in musical analysis to include other materials.28 This agnosticism about human and non-
human ingredients in music and society overlaps with OOO. But it comes from a rejection of 
“intrinsic boundaries,” not from a rejection of the taxonomic organization of ontology (see 
Chapter 1).29 Individual objects do not pre-exist the reciprocal inscriptions (“agential cuts” for 
Barad) that demarcate the matter-discourses of “ragtime” or “Blake-Schillinger,” let alone 
broader categories such as the “black rhythm” that Radano would both critique and celebrate.  
Graham Harman has summarized some common axioms associated with the above 
viewpoint in a list under the heading of “New Materialism,” quoted in its entirety here:  
1. Everything is constantly changing. 
2. Everything occurs along continuous gradients rather than with distinct boundaries and 
cut-off points. 
3. Everything is contingent. 
4. We must focus on actions/verbs rather than substances/nouns. 
5. Things are generated in our “practices” and therefore lack any prior essence. 
 
27
 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 33. In other words, relata for Barad do not preexist their relations. 
28
 Ibid., 139 (“This relational ontology…”). Elsewhere Barad criticizes Foucault, an intellectual model for Radano’s 
near-exclusive focus on texts: “Foucault is not clear about the material nature of discursive practices” because he 
only assigns agency to the human domain (63). Barad later argues the same thing about Judith Butler (145). 
29
 Ibid., 146. 
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6. What a thing does is more interesting than what it is. 
7. Thought and world never exist separately, and therefore “intra-act” rather than interact. 
8. Things are multiple rather than singular. 
9. The world is purely immanent, and it’s a good thing, because any transcendence would 
be oppressive.30 
Harman argues that these axioms indicate “a deep commitment to the overmining position,” 
which does not distinguish objects “from how they currently happen to be acting or otherwise 
manifesting in the world.”31 The risk of overmining, noted in Chapter 1, is its inability to account 
for change since it allows for no surplus beyond what is already expressed in relations. Hence, it 
is usually combined with “alibi-like assertions of the inherent dynamism, flux, or conatus of the 
world,” which takes change for granted instead of treating it as a genuine problem.32 The 
undermining supplement posits a “shapeless primal layer of the cosmos.”33 As we saw with the 
simpler unidirectional form of inscription, undermining denies the emergent individuality of 
things by reducing them to a root, such as a ragging vandal, a cultivating influencer, or a vague 
creative force arising from the “pre-individual fertility of a dynamic folding and unfolding 
cosmos.”34 The object-oriented counter to the above list is as follows: 
1. Change is intermittent and stability the norm. 
2. Everything is split up according to definite boundaries and cut-off points rather than 
along continuous gradients. 
 
30
 Harman, Immaterialism, 14. I have numbered the list for ease of comparison with its counterpart, below. 
31
 Ibid., 15. 
32
 Graham Harman, “Agential and Speculative Realism,” ¶22. Note also Radano, above, on “the contingencies of … 
change.” 
33
 Harman, Quadruple Object, 15. 
34
 Harman, “Agential and Speculative Realism,” ¶23. For example, Barad in Meeting the Universe Halfway writes 
that utterances emerge from “a dynamic and contingent multiplicity” (147) and that matter is “a dynamic intra-active 
becoming that is implicated and enfolded in its iterative becoming” (151).  
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3. Not everything is contingent. 
4. Substances/nouns have priority over actions/verbs. 
5. Everything has an autonomous essence, however transient it may be, and our practices 
grasp it no better than our theories do. 
6. What a thing is turns out to be more interesting than what it does. 
7. Thought and its object are no more and no less separate than any other two objects, and 
therefore they interact rather than “intra-act.” 
8. Things are singular rather than multiple. 
9. The world is not just immanent, and it’s a good thing, because pure immanence would be 
oppressive.35 
At issue here is the interpretive assumption of inscription. To review: the simpler form is 
concerned with an unencumbered transfer of features from a source to a target. It may coincide 
with certain object-oriented views, such as the idea that things are autonomous and have an 
essence, but it also assumes undistorted knowledge of essences and sees no formal difference 
between the thing and its genetic origins. It leans on undermining, where influence is understood 
in the reductive sense of the phrase, “under the influence.” Sophisticated recent versions of the 
inscription model lean on overmining, concluding that cultural discourses exchange properties in 
reciprocal intra-action. Music and its wider environment are “exhaustively deployed in their 
mutual influence.”36 (Asymmetry becomes a question of relative quantity.37) Finally, for OOO, 
inscription is untenable. Objects pre-exist their effects; specific barriers separate them from their 
 
35
 Harman, Immaterialism, 15-16. 
36
 Ibid., 17. 
37
 Elsewhere, Harman has noted that the basic assumption of reciprocal contact between actors tends to celebrate 
subversion without recognizing at a formal level that “such relations are often heavily non-reciprocal, weighted 
prohibitively in favor of the dominant actor” and are often deeply entangled with non-human things (Harman, 
Object-Oriented Ontology, 113). 
  
  
107 
influences; and they are a reality in surplus of their articulation in any given situation. Instead of 
continuously inscribing their signatures on one another, they jump into qualitatively distinct 
stages through symbiosis, an intermittent and irreversible strengthening of surface affinities with 
other things. Symbiosis is a “special type of relation that changes the reality of one of its relata, 
rather than merely resulting in discernible mutual impact.”38 As I note above, Harman has 
compared the structure of symbiosis with metaphor: 
Such interaction is not the literal combination of two terms sharing something in common 
(“a pen is like a pencil”), which we see at the moment when objects are born. Instead, it 
is the half-failed combination we find in metaphor (“a cypress is a flame”). Metaphorical 
relations occur not when there is no evident resemblance between things or significant 
resemblance, but only a weak sort of resemblance.39 
Symbiosis thus appears to have a similar structure to attachment, which as we saw in Chapter 1 
refers to a beholder’s “theatrical” absorption with the rift between an object and its qualities. 
This is indeed a useful comparison, since symbiosis can be defined as a special kind of 
attachment—an irreversible, path-defining attachment, of which even a long-lived object may 
undergo just a handful.40  
The question of influence now returns to Eubie Blake. I am not interested in a narrative 
of major events in Blake’s career. My main topic is the Blake-Schillinger connection and its role 
in an ontology of Blake qua musician. If Schillinger influenced Blake like a metaphorical figure 
 
38
 Harman, Immaterialism, 49. See also “Fifteen Provisional Rules of OOO Method,” 114-25. 
39
 Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 119. 
40
 In his example of the Dutch East India Company, Harman finds a half dozen (Immaterialism, 107, 117). 
Elsewhere, he suspects the scarcity of symbioses to be generally true for objects at any scale, “whether human or 
non-human” (Object-Oriented Ontology, 125). Note that while he has so far only used the concept for objects that 
count humans among their ingredients, symbiosis seems to have more general relevance. 
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influences its ground, an attachment occurred. We can then decide if the attachment was 
irreversible and thus life-changing in the special sense of symbiosis.  
As a preview, I will divide the remaining discussion into four main areas: (1) affinities; 
(2) attachment; (3) the early life rule; (4) counterfactuals. First, (1) preexisting affinities, or 
commensurable traits, helped to facilitate a metaphor-like bond between Blake and Schillinger. 
They need to be accounted for because they made Blake amenable to some attachments rather 
than others. But affinities are never the essential features of an attachment. When quality-quality 
symmetries do seem to dominate a relation (e.g. in cooperative projects, financial agreements, or 
analogies), we might instead call them dependencies because they reinforce ties between things 
at the cost of the objects’ relative independence. Inscription-orientation will tend to overrate 
Blake’s dependencies as the only relations worth investigating and underrate his affinities, thus 
diminishing his other possible futures that were part of his reality. From the present standpoint, 
though, affinities are relevant as surface-level alibis for deeper unions that fortify the autonomy 
of the object.41 (2) Next, I will look at evidence of an attachment, which in the present case 
means I will consider how Blake’s affinities with Schillinger, while plentiful and shaded by a 
degree of technical dependence, did not exhaust the Blake-Schillinger connection. This is 
supported by comments by Blake that point to a less literal alliance with his studies, along with a 
unique result of their union in a rag composition. (3) Once we decide the connection was an 
attachment rather than a literal exchange of properties, the question becomes whether the 
attachment was also an irreversible symbiotic stage. This is denied from the get-go by Harman’s 
rule that symbiosis occurs early in a social object’s life, but I believe the rule is problematic.42 
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 Harman, Immaterialism, 121-24 (Rules 10-12). 
42
 Harman, Immaterialism, 118. “Rule 6: Symbioses will occur relatively early in the life of an object.” 
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We must weigh the early life rule against other aspects of object-oriented social theory, including 
OOO’s emphasis on “proximate failures” and counterfactual speculation.43 (4) Finally, I will 
return to the ontological status of the Blake-Schillinger attachment in Blake’s musical life. As 
mentioned previously, this object does not appear to directly contradict the early life rule. But it 
occupies an intermediate position between a full-blown symbiosis and a mere passing accident 
that is no less difficult to parse with the rule.  
 
II. Blake-Schillinger Affinities 
Inscription may seem removed from the question of the Blake-Schillinger connection, but it has 
already played a part in scholarship related to Schillinger’s pedagogical influence. For example, 
in his 2003 biography of George Gershwin, William Hyland considers the impact of Gershwin’s 
years of study with Schillinger in the 1930s.44 Hyland sees a struggle between a naïve Gershwin 
whose work was a “result of Schillinger’s influence” and “an authentic Gershwin straining to 
break through.”45 Ultimately, Schillinger had an “unfortunate” sway that caused Gershwin’s 
music to become “too complex and difficult to follow.”46 Hyland even speculates that at times, 
the devil on Gershwin’s shoulder literally took control (“it may be that Schillinger himself wrote 
out some of the variations [in Variations on I Got Rhythm]”).47 It would be unusual if Schillinger 
remained silent about such things, though, since he also apparently “claimed credit” for his 
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 Ibid., 116-17. 
44
 William G. Hyland, George Gershwin: A New Biography (Praeger Publishers, 2003). Another example appears in 
Allen Forte, “Reflections Upon the Gershwin-Berg Connection,” The Musical Quarterly 83/2 (1999): 150-68. 
Unlike Hyland, Forte concludes Schillinger was an unsuccessful inscriber because his ideas were “arcane,” less 
aspirational than the music of Alban Berg, and musically incompetent (a judgment Forte supports with a supposed 
mishandling of the octatonic scale in SSMC, but which Forte himself incorrectly identifies as an octatonic scale).  
45
 Hyland, George Gershwin, 148, 150. 
46
 Ibid., 148. 
47
 Ibid., 150. 
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student’s song “Mine” from Let ‘Em Eat Cake.48 This assertion is telling. Schillinger does 
mention “Mine” in SSMC, stating that Gershwin transformed an ostinato harmony exercise into 
the song, yet he does not claim he wrote the song himself or completed the exercise.49 Hyland’s 
conclusion is still possible, though, if we assume the “efficient cause” – the source of the 
influencing exercise – was of utmost importance to the being of the song.  
Eubie Blake also characterized his rag Dictys on Seventh Avenue as an outcome of a 
Schillinger exercise, a claim the pianist Terry Waldo repeated during a 1974 concert with 
Blake.50 But for my purposes here, Schillinger initially comes into view as a factor in Blake’s 
musical life through their pre-existing weak ties, or affinities. (At the end of the previous section 
I distinguished this term from strong literal ties, or dependencies.) To start, facets of 
Schillinger’s thought may have already been compatible with Blake’s prior musical persona, i.e., 
who he was as a musician before Schillinger entered the scene. On a stylistic level, we can look 
to an important element from the hallmark of Schillinger’s pedagogy, the “Theory of Rhythm.” 
This first major section of SSMC contains most of the basic concepts and techniques developed 
throughout the two volumes.51 A recurring idea is the “interference of monomial periodicities,” 
the single rhythm one hears when two or more pulses move at different rates. (See Figure 3.1.) 
Schillinger applies this concept to nearly every musical process that appears in SSMC – an 
indication of its centrality to his thought – and he reinforces its importance in Mathematical 
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 Ibid., 148. 
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 SSMC, 875. Hyland cites SSMC, 195, where Schillinger recommends that composers explore several melodic 
variations before settling on one and states that Gershwin did this when composing Porgy and Bess. The “Mine” 
exercise is reproduced in Steven Gilbert, “Nice Work,” in The Gershwin Style (Oxford University Press, 1999), 85. 
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 Al Rose, Eubie Blake, 122 (“thesis equivalent”); Terry Waldo, Eubie Blake and His Protégés: Live at the Theatre 
de Lys, 1974 (CD transfer 2012, Vintage Masters).  
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Basis of the Arts. There, he lists “the generation of harmonic groups through interference”52 as 
one of two “fundamental processes” that determine “the laws of rhythm, formulated in this 
theory as general esthetic laws.”53 Elsewhere he defines rhythm itself as “the resultant of the 
synchronized component periodicities, their progression, modification and powers.”54 
 
Figure 3.1. SSMC, 8, fig. 15. Interference of Periodicities. The “generators” (a and b) form a 
“resultant of interference” (r). The common denominator (c.d.) is the shortest duration in the 
resultant. The common product (c.p.) is the total duration of the resultant before it repeats. 
 
 
 
An expression of three against four appears in bars 5-7 of Dictys (score given in the Appendix). 
But it also shows up in the A strain of Blake’s Troublesome Ivories from 1911 (Figure 3.2), in 
the B and C strains of “Zez” Confrey’s Dizzy Fingers, and as “false triplets” in countless other 
 
52
 The term “harmonic groups” refers to periodic oscillations, which Schillinger represents visually as a sine wave. 
In physics, periodic oscillation is called “simple harmonic motion.” 
53
 Schillinger, Mathematical Basis, 4. The other “fundamental process” is actually two distinct ideas: “combinatory 
and involutionary techniques.” The former means permuting elements like durations, rests, accents, and their 
groupings. Involution means producing self-similarity or “homogeneity” of rhythmic patterns across multiple levels 
of time (see SSMC, 63-83). Schillinger ultimately subjects all of these techniques to “synchronization” via 
interference of periodicities, which indicates the priority of the interference technique.  
54
 Ibid., 109. He stresses this notion in SSMC, writing several variants of the following: “All rhythmic patterns in 
music are either complete or incomplete resultants of interference” (6, 10, 46).  
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examples (abstraction in Figures 3.3a and b). Indeed, triple melodic accents against duple meter 
is a general mark of ragtime. Schillinger calls the eighth-note triplet device a “fox-trot” in 
SSMC, after the dance that commonly accompanied ragtime.55 The theory’s most pervasive 
concept can thus be irrelevant to an analytical search for signatures of its influence on a ragtime 
piece. Yet there is a clear affinity between the general possibilities available to both the music 
and the theory.  
 
 
Figure 3.2. Rhythmic interference in Troublesome Ivories. Analytical markings are shown in 
Schillinger’s graphical style (a stylized sine wave). Triple time in the left hand against duple in 
the right hand repeats for six bars. 
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Figure 3.3a. SSMC, 28, fig. 52. 
 
Figure 3.3b. SSMC, 86, fig. 140. 
 
Schillinger confirms that his interference technique is general when he argues that interference 
patterns such as three against four exemplify “secondary selective systems”—he likens them to 
pitch scales, even calling the resultant rhythms “temporal scales, the parent shapes of all 
rhythms.”56 The main uses of interference patterns are also general: they are meant to (a) suggest 
a “natural nucleus” of musical texture to students (Figure 3.1 implies obbligato figures, chords, 
thematic rhythm, sustained tones),57 (b) model a scale-like pattern that is predictable but has 
potential for variety,58 and (c) theoretically account for regularity in music.59 Interference 
patterns are not intended solely to be dropped unchanged into a score, but also to appeal to the 
imagination for further manipulation. “Temporal scales” may be used in actual music, but 
Schillinger expects students to use segments of them, varying them with techniques such as 
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 Schillinger, Mathematical Basis, 273-74. See also SSMC, chapters 9-11, and chapter 13. A primary selective 
system is an even more general “dense set” divided into fixed possibilities, such as a tuning system or pulse stream. 
57
 Schillinger, SSMC, 9. 
58
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contrasts, and inversion. (See also Mathematical Basis, 140.)  
59
 Ibid., 4-6. When a generator in a pair of uniform generators equals one, “the resultant expresses a musical ‘bar,’ 
whether or not this bar line would actually be drawn on music paper” (4). Meter for Schillinger thus has its 
theoretical source in accents generated by interference patterns: “the importance of this procedure lies in the fact that 
… to express a bar before a non-uniform group is offered is to represent the scheme of uniformity with respect to the 
periodicity of accents” (6).  
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permutation and inversion.60 (The first two notes of 4:3 would be represented numerically as 
“3+1,” e.g. a dotted quarter note plus an eighth note, or a dotted half plus a quarter.) Certain 
fragments, he argues, characterize entire families of rhythmic styles:  
European music of the 17th to 19th centuries operates mainly on binomials, 2+1 and 3+1, 
and a trinomial, 2+1+1, with permutations … Today’s American jazz has a Charleston 
foundation, probably imported from the Caribbean. Its binomial is 5+3 and 3+5; its 
trinomial is further fractioning of the same binomial, 3+2+3, with permutations.61  
Regardless of their accuracy, Schillinger’s cultural-historical claims show that general criteria 
such as style-characterizing “binomial” and “trinomial” rhythmic groupings will not likely 
represent Schillinger in Blake except by affinity. This is how I interpret the rhythm Blake uses in 
the first four bars of both the introduction of Dictys and its rising B strain. That rhythm is 3+2+3, 
described above as a “fractioning” of the Charleston binomial.  
 Another suggestion of affinity may be found indirectly, in a convergence between SSMC 
and numerous jazz musicians after World War II. The Berklee School of Music in Boston, which 
catered mainly to jazz musicians, was established in 1945 by the Schillinger student Lawrence 
Berk (who originally called it Schillinger House).62 Other students in Blake’s class under 
Schramm included Walter F. Bishop, Mercer Ellington, and Roger “Ram” Ramirez—and Jimmy 
Heath would later study Schillinger under Schramm as well.63 Charles Mingus casually 
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 Schillinger, Mathematical Basis, 140. “For practical application in art, any binomial or polynomial periodic series 
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references Schillinger in interviews with John F. Goodman.64 And George E. Lewis writes that 
the producer and songwriter Charles Stepney introduced SSMC to the founder of the AACM in 
Chicago, Muhal Richard Abrams, and that Abrams kept the two heavy volumes on hand 
“everywhere he went.”65 According to Lewis, some features of Schillingerian thought that 
appealed to Abrams included an openness toward a multiplicity of individual compositional 
methods and styles (as opposed to “stiflingly hegemonic” rules of harmony, counterpoint, and 
orchestration), an interest in a primitive root shared by all the arts (“the basically synesthetic 
proposition that gestures active in one art form could find … primordial analogues in another”), 
and a tendency “to break things back down into raw material.”66 Abrams seemed to find a deep 
well of inspiration in SSMC, especially in its call to technical adventure: “whatever materials 
were identified by the composer as salient—rhythmic, harmonic, timbral, melodic, dynamic—
became the basis for further generation and transformation.”67 (Schillinger expands this list in the 
second volume of SSMC.68) But Abrams’s unique gains were built upon a prior affinity with the 
stylistic inclusiveness of SSMC and its association with a non-traditional autodidactic education. 
He had resented the formal education of his youth, which only focused on “the music of Glück 
and people like that,” and the rift between his teenage training at music school and the rest of his 
musical life led him to quit the former.69 These descriptions suggest not only a possible Abrams-
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Schillinger symbiosis, but affinities between Schillinger, who himself had quit academic life to 
teach privately, and what amounts to whole communities of people who stood outside the typical 
canons and methods of mainstream classical music education. 
 Frances Schillinger’s memoir about her husband reinforces the above references to 
stylistic individuality, a natural or “unconscious art” undergirding all of the specific arts, and the 
breakdown of music into manipulable “raw material.”70 She includes a fourth point that 
foregrounds the tricky pedagogical ideal of developing an individual style through universal 
concepts while also drawing out the controversial tone of hubris that often accompanies 
Schillinger’s work.71 Namely, her husband claims SSMC makes it possible to compose “more 
quickly and efficiently, with less mental strain.”72 This boils down to his belief that the technical 
side of composing is an engineering problem.73 But it is also the site of another affinity with 
Blake. In a magazine interview, Blake describes his Schillinger studies in terms of efficiency and 
ease: “I used to have to sit down and take time to write. Now I say, ‘What kind of song do you 
want? What mode?’”74 Al Rose reports that Blake’s Schillinger education “was a great help, if 
only for its time-saving advantages in composition.”75 Kimball and Bolcom in Reminiscing with 
Sissle and Blake also emphasize practicality, though in more limited terms, writing that Blake’s 
studies “enabled him to work out his own orchestrations.”76 It may seem that, according to 
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Blake, greater technical facility was just an effect of his link with Schillinger. In one sense this is 
true, and we shall consider other possible consequences of their connection shortly. But the 
picture is incomplete. To start with, there may be two separate effects in evidence here, one a 
concrete property of Blake’s output (“efficiency and ease”), the other an indirect allusion to 
Blake’s attitude toward his studies. Let us continue with just the literal view for now and return 
to the allusion in the next section.  
From an assumption of inscription, the actual stated effect on Blake – the “time-saving 
advantages” – would be of utmost significance for us, perhaps the touchstone scholarly topic 
related to the Blake-Schillinger connection, while any suggestive nuances would be secondary. 
For OOO, though, time-saving facility was a common interest for Blake and SSMC, so we must 
ask whether the practical outcome was a relation-defining dependency or an affinity. Once more, 
the point in the latter case would not be that Schillinger somehow had no impact on Blake by 
introducing new shortcuts to his process. Rather, this one transactional aspect of Schillinger’s 
influence may have been a kind of hook (like a square peg with a square hole): a stabilizing and 
easily paraphrased exchange that gave Blake certain surface-level skills and advantages without 
itself altering the prior reality of his musical life. This hook is only the end of the story if we 
believe it and similar quality-quality symmetries exhausted the Blake-Schillinger connection as 
dependencies. “Symmetrical relations are those in which objects are brought together by shared 
features or interests … [T]he ties are deliberately strong, meant to generate stability rather than 
motion.”77 As I will suggest below, though, I believe we are dealing with affinities rather than 
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dependencies: hooks for an otherwise unstable fusion in which less immediately relevant 
features of Schillinger entered “vague orbit” around Blake.78 
 
III. The Blake-Schillinger Attachment 
I have outlined some stylistic, social, and practical affinities between Blake and Schillinger. 
Their significance from an object-oriented perspective is twofold: (1) affinities by themselves are 
literal, meaning they involve no distinction between objects and qualities, and (2) they stabilize 
the link between their objects (Blake and Schillinger). The question then becomes to what extent 
these ties were dependencies. Specifically, we might ask whether the Blake-Schillinger 
connection was governed by a spirit of “advantage” for Blake (less autonomy, greater efficiency) 
or “adventure” (more autonomy, less stability).79 The former, as mentioned above, refers to 
influence or exchange at a level of commensurable or literal content, as when the primary goal is 
to find shortcuts to common tasks. (Another example: “a cypress is like a juniper.”80) But 
adventure depends on what Harman calls sincerity, a fundamental ingenuousness characterized 
by absorption with an object that is in tension with its qualities.81 As noted in Chapter 1, the 
experience of object-quality tension creates an attachment, which itself is a reality “irreducible 
either to thought, its object, or their reciprocal correlation.”82  
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One indication of sincerity would be Blake’s fascination with an object apart from its 
surface appearance or use. While sincerity as meant here is not necessarily a question of literal 
devotion, Blake did display an enthusiasm for SSMC that went beyond a pragmatic alliance with 
a new streamlining tool, writing in a 1948 letter to a friend that the Schillinger system “just about 
revolutionizes all prevailing systems and theories.”83 It is also hard to ignore a certain pride in 
Blake’s statement cited earlier that he no longer has to “sit down and take time to write.” His 
greater confidence would be a good reason to avoid reading the practical nature of his studies in 
exclusively literal terms. OOO gives special weight to qualitative comments such as these that 
allude to the reality of fascinated attachments apart from their causal origins or structural 
relationships. 
Specific “Schillingerian” content on the quality side of the object-quality gap should also 
be accounted for, though OOO would interpret it not in terms of cultivating or corrupting 
inscription but as hinting at the individual character of Blake plus Schillinger. First I will give a 
sense of that stylistic particularity as it appears in Dictys. Then I will discuss its interaction with 
the programmatic aspect of the piece. To start, consider again the “Charleston trinomial” in the 
introduction and B strain of Dictys. When it appears a third time in the coda, Blake has extended 
the passage and modified it through permutation, from 3+2+3 to 3+3+2. (We know the pattern is 
a variant rather than a new idea because it repeats the scale-like idea of the B strain opening.) 
The first book of SSMC describes variation by permutation in detail.84 There, Schillinger lists 
durations, rests, and accents among the components of rhythm. He also illustrates combining 
resultant rhythms with different textural patterns, which he calls “instrumental forms” (Figure 
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3.4).85 Blake uses this technique, too. He alters the instrumental form in the coda by replacing the 
block chords of the B strain with an arpeggio (Figure 3.5). 
 
Figure 3.4. SSMC, 33, fig. 56.  
 
 
Figure 3.5. Dictys [see Appendix], opening bars of B strain (top) and coda (bottom). 
 
Pitch content provides another sample of Schillingerian flavor. Dictys has been associated with 
the whole-tone scale since at least 1972, when Blake first recorded it on his own label with Carl 
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Seltzer.86 While descriptions of the piece usually give little detail except that Blake wrote Dictys 
as an “exercise” or “thesis paper,” the few technical comments on record consistently point out 
this scale. The pianist Terry Waldo (who learned the piece directly from Blake) tells his audience 
in a 1974 performance that “it’s full of whole-tone scales” and other things he has more trouble 
identifying.87 Blake says in the magazine interview cited earlier that “there are whole-tone scales 
and thirds in the right hand in that piece; I wouldn’t put thirds in the left hand, because that is too 
hard for people.”88 The jacket copy for the Amherst Saxophone Quartet’s arrangement of Dictys 
simply states: “Note the use of the whole-tone scale.”89 Sure enough, the scale does appear 
several times in SSMC under the category of “symmetric scales.” According to Schillinger, 
symmetric scales exploit equal temperament by dividing the octave into two, three, four, or six 
equal segments or “tonics.” He traces these scales to Western historical developments through 
post-Wagnerian opera, Debussy, Ravel, Stravinsky, and “polytonality,” implying they are 
important aspects of a modern sound.90 
But focusing on the whole-tone scale misses as much as it notices.91 There are three 
passages in Dictys with a distinctly “modern” pitch palette (see Appendix): (1) the first four bars 
of the introduction, (2) the bridge into the B strain, and (3) the recurring first phrase of the B 
strain itself (which returns again for the coda in expanded form, and without a V/V pivot). All 
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three passages rely on one distinct Schillingerian technique, yet only two involve whole-tone 
scales and those with caveats. Let us consider the three passages in turn. Each chord at the 
beginning of the piece can be said to imply a whole-tone scale, but conceived in this way the 
music shuttles between two such scales, first by the perfect fifth leaps of the block chords (m. 1, 
repeated m. 3) and then by chromatic voice-leading (m. 2, repeated m. 4).92 As for the bridge 
passage, it does descend by whole steps, but the parallel seventh chords (more precisely, the 
fifths of those chords) exhaust both whole-tone scales simultaneously. Third and finally, the B 
strain responds to the bridge with the same rhythmic pattern and block-chord texture (minus the 
seventh), while reversing direction upward. Yet there is no whole-tone scale. It rises diatonically. 
The pitch resources of this passage are just as peculiar as the previous two, though: its minor 
progression (with a bass “in” B-flat minor) is accompanied entirely by parallel major triads.  
A technique from SSMC called “symmetric coupling” accounts for the shared traits of 
these passages. The first word refers to a concept Schillinger calls symmetric harmony, by which 
he means planning out chord structures separately from root progressions (unlike diatonic 
harmony, where “chord-structures as well as chord-progressions derive from a given scale”).93 
The overall scale thus emerges as an incidental byproduct of the progression, a “consequence of 
chords in motion.”94 The second relevant element is the concept of coupling, in which the 
composer adds a parallel textural padding (such as block chords) above or below a part without 
voice-leading.95 Schillinger gives his own example of a “symmetric coupling” below a melody 
composed from variations on a scale (Figure 3.6). An unchanging vertical structure moves in 
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parallel with the original melody, preserving the intervallic characteristics of both the isolated 
chord structure and the melody while introducing several notes that are alien to the original scale. 
This technique of symmetric coupling marks all three passages above.96   
 
Figure 3.6. SSMC, 1289, fig. 10. Arrows refer to permutations of the rhythm: (3+1+2+2) + 
(1+2+2+3) + … etc. “E1” means the harmony is based on the “first expansion” of the scale, i.e. 
stacked chord of alternating notes from the melody’s implied five-note scale (top). 
 
 
Having gone over Schillingerian stylistic elements in Dictys (rhythmic and textural variations, 
the whole-tone scale, and the “symmetric coupling” technique), we can consider whether they 
were really employed in the literal sense of an exercise or with some indirect relevance to the 
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dictys populating Seventh Avenue. The pianist Max Morath reports on the term: “A ‘dicty,’ 
Eubie tells me, was a ‘swell,’ a dude.”97 Terry Waldo further explains in his recorded 
introduction to the piece: “Dictys means the altar of the elite, the high class [audience giggles], 
before you start laughin’, OK? [audience laughter].”98 His audience’s response, along with an 
alternate spelling of the title as a possessive (“Dicty’s,” perhaps originating in Kimball and 
Bolcom’s Reminiscing with Sissle and Blake), indicates that the term has a limited insider 
meaning tied to a specific time and place. An early written version appeared in 1921, when the 
activist Marcus Garvey gave a speech in New York City on unemployment. His use of the term 
is negative. “There are some Negroes who are too big, who are too aristocratic and too dicty to 
take interest in other Negroes.”99 Langston Hughes in Not Without Laughter refers to a sense of 
embarrassment some wealthier black people felt toward the poor (illustrated with actual family 
members in the novel). The character Harriett says of her sister, “Well, I don’t want to be 
respectable if I have to be stuck up and dicty like Tempy is. … It’s not being black that matters 
with her, though, it’s being poor.”100 
  Evidently, Blake found the figure of the dicty more charming. Blake was drawn to 
people he viewed as slightly snobbish. This was apparently true of his first wife, Ava, who died 
in 1939.101 We may also include his longtime songwriting partner Noble Sissle. Alberta Hunter 
claimed Sissle rejected her from the 1921 Sissle-Blake show Shuffle Along “because he was 
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‘dicty’ (snobbish) and ‘color conscious.’”102 And Kimball and Bolcom have contrasted Sissle, 
who was “something of an elitist,” with Blake, whose “rough-and-tumble upbringing on the 
streets of Baltimore had left him unprepared for the more gentle, sophisticated life.”103 It was not 
necessarily wealth, education, or prestige itself that impressed Blake, but an audacious demand 
to stand apart from unfair racial norms and to extend that demand to others in a halo effect. 
Blake has told admiring stories of Sissle and the bandleader James Reese Europe that turn on this 
very quality. “I never got to high school,” Blake explains, “and I was always thinking, ‘Always 
remember you’re a Negro.’ [Sissle] didn’t have that. So he went to the manager in Baltimore—
Ford’s Theater” to convince them to open its balcony to black audiences.104 Blake distinguishes 
Europe from other successful black musicians on similar grounds:  
Williams and Walker, Ernest Hogan, they—with all their great things that they did, they 
didn’t convince the powers that be that we should be on equality with the white man, 
musically. Although Will Marion Cook went to Leipzig, Coleridge Taylor—I don’t know 
where he went to school—Harry Burleigh, William Grant Still, these are great musicians 
I’m naming. But James Reese Europe was the man that put us Negro musicians on par, as 
far as the powers that be would let us go.105  
The dicty stereotype has musical precedents, in which exaggerated “classical” effects comically 
conflict with the usual language of the jazz band. “Dicty Blues” (1923) by Fletcher Henderson 
uses chimes and an exercise-like scale for its dicty element, cutting out the band’s interplay so 
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that the chimes can file down a major scale in quarter notes. Lil Hardin similarly plays straight 
arpeggios on the piano in Chimes Blues (1923, King Oliver’s Creole Jazz Band). And what of 
Sissle and Blake at the time? In 1923, they were enjoying their biggest success, Shuffle Along, 
and they made an appearance in a sound film by Lee DeForest, where they performed a “high 
society” vaudeville routine.106 Decades later, as the ambiguous public figure of the dicty faded, 
its private charm and even nostalgia for Blake may have made it a fascinating object of 
attachment for him, and thus ripe for aesthetic treatment. He updates the musical image of the 
dicty, fitting the old scale-running maneuver to the exercises of his latest “high class” musical 
environment, the Schillinger classroom. 
 
IV. The Early Life Rule 
We have now seen indications of Eubie Blake’s sincere involvement with SSMC, emergent 
details in Dictys on Seventh Avenue, and the metaphor-like union of a Schillingerian Blake with 
the dicty theme. The question now is whether the Blake-Schillinger attachment was also a 
symbiosis, a true biographical turning-point. Symbiosis is unique among attachments because of 
its relative importance: it defines major stages of the development and mature form of a social 
object. Hence, Harman’s rule: “The key to understanding social objects is to hunt for their 
symbioses.”107 Another rule is that symbioses occur early in an object’s life.108 The early life rule 
would inherently weigh against a symbiotic interpretation of the Blake-Schillinger connection. 
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Yet I believe the rule is unsound by object-oriented standards. In arguing this point, I will also 
begin to develop some expectations for a Blake-Schillinger symbiosis.  
Harman’s own reasoning for the early life rule hinges on how symbiosis fits into the 
normal biographical trajectory of a social object. (See Figure 3.7.) Birth is recognizable as a 
literal event, meaning that an object comes together from compromises, shared interests, and 
other quality-quality dependencies among its components.109 These links do not necessarily 
equip the new entity with an independent path through its environment. In other words, a social 
object at birth may be surrounded by both risks and loose ties with other things, a nursery for 
possible symbioses. “Since every object must try to establish ‘facts on the ground’ in its early 
life-and-death struggles, it follows that most symbioses occur early in the life of an object, with a 
relatively enduring character established toward the end of that early period.”110 The limited role 
for contingency in Harman’s theory appears in these periods of uncertain opportunity 
surrounding new symbiotic stages.111   
 
Figure 3.7. Normal life cycle of a social object according to Harman in Immaterialism.  
 
 
 
Symbiosis selectively strengthens weak ties, rendering the object both more autonomous in its 
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environment and less flexible in its style. (Style should be taken in the widest possible sense, 
connoting “taste,” “form,” “mission,” and even “company culture.”) The object carves out a 
space to thrive while becoming more tied to a characteristic way of going about its business in 
each new stage. Overall, then, symbiosis “will tend to make an object sufficiently path-
dependent that the space of options [for future symbioses] decreases.”112 A mature object no 
longer enters new symbiotic stages. It capitalizes on what it has become. A period of decadence 
or decline then occurs when previous symbiotic bonds become overly literal dependencies and 
thus overly strong. “Strong ties mean dependence, and that means devastation when one of these 
ties is suddenly weakened.”113  
Now, the rule that symbiosis usually occurs early in a social object’s life should come 
with at least three major qualifications, all of which are pertinent to the present discussion:  
(1) The object’s initial form influences the overall rate and style of its symbioses. 
(2) Later stages can meaningfully relate to earlier ones.  
(3) Later stages can meaningfully relate to new circumstances. 
First, it seems obvious that a music career, a jogging club, and a mission to Mars all have 
dramatically different initial trajectories and risks. Less immediately apparent is that the relative 
timing of symbioses may be one such distinctive feature. For example, Harman argues that a 
“suicidal” object driven to its own end, such as a war (his example is the American Civil War), 
“cannot be expected to long outlast its maturity.”114 This suggests that different kinds of social 
objects form their path-defining bonds at different rhythms. In general, then, how an object tends 
to form symbioses is at least partly a topic for knowledge-gathering rather than a deeper 
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principle of symbiosis.  
Second, Harman argues that later symbiotic bonds can relate in some telling way to prior 
intermediate stages rather than to the earliest struggles of the youthful object.115 This would 
certainly be true for any symbiosis involving Schillinger. His students were all adults, many with 
established musical careers and tastes. Schillinger himself insists in a short essay about education 
that “the first prerequisite of true musical abilities is an immunity to and dislike for other 
people’s music,” because that indicates the musician’s “originality of thought and 
conception.”116 Here we find another affinity with Blake. When pressed by Rudolf Schramm in 
class for his opinion of Stravinsky’s music, Blake said he thought it was “lousy.” Schramm was 
disturbed. “He thought I might prejudice [the other students] against modern music. I hope I 
did.”117 Along these lines, a Blake-Schillinger symbiosis would probably transform a different 
level of Blake’s musical life than did the style-influencing bonds of Blake’s youth. 
Third, an unstated but implied rule of symbiosis is that it is motivated by a tense relation 
between the thing and its environment.118 (While OOO holds that an object exists in an 
ontological vacuum of sorts, we saw in Chapter 1 that this does not mean it hums along in a 
literal void, only that other things cannot touch its reality directly in the manner of inscription. It 
“cannot be translated without energy loss into any sort of knowledge, practice, or causal 
relation.”119) A significant change in context may open a new period of uncertainty and new 
possibilities for symbiotic attachment. For instance, the revitalization of an object that has 
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already decayed or even died “on paper,” such as a music career after retirement, implies that the 
object has met a shift in its surroundings. Blake faced such a change in circumstances and a new 
field of opportunity in the nostalgia-driven ragtime revival that quietly started with the 
publication of Rudi Blesh and Harriet Janis’s They All Played Ragtime in 1950 and expanded 
over the next decades.120 
Counterexamples to the early life rule such as the one Harman gives of the American 
Civil War (see the first caveat, above) might simply be interpreted as exceptions that prove the 
rule. But I see enough reason to part with the rule here.121 Its generality comes more plainly into 
question when we see how it interacts with other principles of object-oriented social theory. 
First, I should note that most of the rules in Immaterialism trace back to basic OOO concepts 
such as the autonomous object: social objects cannot be overmined or undermined, for example, 
and they are better known by their boundaries and proximate failures than their relations and 
successes.122 Rules about symbiosis also describe its general ontological structure: it hardens the 
character of the object; it strengthens weak ties into strong ones; it has a similar shape to allure 
(RO-SQ).123 Now consider failed symbiosis. According to Harman, a social object’s proximate 
failures – “failures that were not a foregone conclusion” – teach us more about it than its 
successes. They shed light on a “permanent gap” between the established character of the object 
and the limitations of its context and so “give rise to ‘ghost’ objects that offer fuel for endless 
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counterfactual speculation.”124 The early life rule defangs late life proximate failures (and their 
ghost objects) by treating them as if they were foregone conclusions.  
Certain aspects of the Blake-Schillinger connection become clear from the above 
discussion. For one thing, the possibility that it was a symbiosis should not be dismissed out of 
hand as a result of the early life rule. Second, if it was a symbiosis it likely reshaped prior stages 
in some way rather than drastically reorienting Blake’s basic musical character. Third, the wider 
context in which Blake’s career was situated did reach a meaningful enough turning point mid-
century to expose new uncertain opportunities. Finally, even if we settle against a Blake-
Schillinger symbiosis, a consistent object-oriented viewpoint would remain more committed to 
the gap between the object and its environment as alluded to by counterfactual ghost objects than 
to any rule that would systematically subvert this gap.  
 
V. Conclusion: Counterfactual Symbiosis 
As I have noted, the Blake-Schillinger attachment was soon followed by a period of renewed 
opportunity. Blake did not predict these new circumstances, but he embraced them. He agreed to 
growing numbers of invitations to concerts, festivals, honors, interviews, and recording sessions. 
He adopted the role of “elder statesman of ragtime.”125 However, it does not seem his more 
accommodating situation prompted a new symbiotic adventure (with his SSMC tools or 
otherwise). In the 1950s, Blake’s new creative work was more deflation than renewal. He wrote 
some new songs for an ill-fated 1952 revival of Shuffle Along, and he and Sissle wrote another 
musical in 1958 (Happy Times) that went unproduced. In the 1960s and 1970s, when public 
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interest in Blake surged, his composing output amounted to some one-off songs and a book of 
eight piano waltzes.126 All of this is to say he met his prospects by literalizing past ties. He 
capitalized on his old successes, his association with ragtime and vaudeville, and his well-
established reputation as a skillful and singular entertainer.  
Could the ragtime revival itself have been a new symbiotic stage for Blake? It surely 
affected him very much. Recall, though, that in object-oriented social theory, important moments 
are not defined by their magnitude. As Harman writes, “there is a qualitative difference between 
different events rather than just a quantitative one. The loudest and most dramatic events are not 
always the most crucial ones.”127 Crucial events for OOO are those that alter the underlying 
character of an object. And catalysts for changing the status quo are more often linked with an 
“idiosyncratic vision” than “broader collective properties.”128 I noted in the previous section that 
symbiosis requires the object to be somewhat out of step with its circumstances, so the hunt for 
symbiosis warrants paying special attention to changing contexts, such as we might find in a 
revival. Briefly, Harman has claimed that a related concept found in the media theory of 
Marshall McLuhan, called “retrieval,” is one of the engines of art. Artists convert “clichés into 
archetypes by relating them to the tacit, hidden ground of our time.”129 That is, in retrieval, old 
clichés from an obsolescent medium become a viable wellspring for artists who might bring 
them into productive tension with the current hidden ground.130 Hence, significant changes in the 
environment can challenge artists to engage with it in new ways. A revival can do this, but again, 
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it depends on specific artists facing and responding to a new challenge. In the current case, the 
ragtime revival suspended certain contextual inhibitions on Blake’s success. (If anything, 
symbiosis went in the other direction: a community of aficionados rediscovered and embraced 
Blake as a living carrier of a distant tradition—but that is another topic.) The environment 
became more accommodating to the prior character of Blake’s musical life, enough so that he 
could simply ignore the continued obstacles to his Broadway songwriting career. His life had not 
transformed in such a way that it could be productively out of step with the revival.  
If the Blake-Schillinger connection was no symbiosis, it was not because Schillinger’s 
theory failed to meet external standards set by rival music theorists, or because Blake failed to 
use his new tools, or because Blake’s education in SSMC was not a significant event in his life 
(it appears to have been), but because it did not direct Blake to a new biographical stage. 
Ultimately, Schillinger did little to irreversibly restyle the musical life of Eubie Blake that had 
been shaped decades earlier and that returned when called. Yet a Schillingerian stage might have 
happened, complete with a focus on composition and perhaps a degree of technical adventure. 
We should avoid demoting this possibility in advance to an idle exercise. From an object-
oriented standpoint, the word “speculation” will only raise a red flag if we assume that the 
possible choices are limited to mystique-eliminating knowledge or futile conjectures that license 
ignorance.131 Recall that reality for OOO is withdrawn from direct access. In line with this 
indirect model of causation, Harman argues that valuable discourse often happens at a nonliteral 
level.132 Specifically, the historiography of OOO – with its focus on the ontology of a given 
historical object – opposes the overmining view that would identify the thing “with what actually 
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happened to it.”133 Counterfactuals do indirect labor by alluding to the elusive reality of the 
object apart from its relations.  
As mentioned above, it is only the proximate counterfactuals that concern us. We may 
thus define counterfactual symbiosis as an existing attachment that could have but did not 
become a true irreversible stage. Both actual and counterfactual symbioses must begin as 
midsized rent-to-own attachments: “Any historical moment is populated not just with winners 
and losers, but also with still indeterminate pre-winners and pre-losers.”134 I have attempted to 
identify one such indeterminate merger. Out of some general but by no means definitive stylistic, 
social, and practical affinities, Blake formed an attachment with his Schillinger studies, devoted 
years to it, enthused about the confidence it gave him, and demonstrated that fusion in his 
musical language—without the relationship reducing to literal dependencies. Yet for this fusion 
to have truly been a new symbiotic stage, we would expect to see some tension between the new 
stage and Blake’s changing situation. The Blake-Schillinger object “ought to experience some 
failure prior to its success, since a truly independent object ought to be somewhat out of phase 
with its environment rather than just a flawless spare part that accelerates that environment’s 
efficiency.”135  
Blake’s increased confidence could have led him to more formal experimentation or 
ambition (a famous precedent being George Gershwin’s turn to opera while working with 
Schillinger). Or his return to a classroom setting could have established compelling weak ties 
with other musicians, the strengthening of which might have encouraged Blake to test or even 
transform the limits of his own style. Or these collaborations could have emerged in shared 
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response to the object of their studies. The fact that nothing like this happened indicates the 
extent to which Blake had already “settled” into his musical perspective. More difficult to pin 
down in meaning, but no less important, is the counterfactual version of Blake that would have 
treated the ragtime revival as a provocation or opportunity for reinvention. His festival 
appearances, honors, and new protégés were no doubt a gratifying endorsement of his past 
accomplishments. Where our ghost object is concerned, though, they also would have 
accompanied new challenges and ambitions that were unique to a Blake-Schillinger stage.  
 
* * * 
Let us close this chapter with a brief recapitulation. OOO views not only Eubie Blake at any 
given moment but also his relations with other things and his life as a whole in ontological terms: 
as nouns rather than verbs. In other words, OOO avoids initially seeing relations such as Blake’s 
Schillinger studies in terms of inscription (a direct movement of features that is automatically 
significant to some degree), whether that is understood in the traditional asymmetric sense of an 
influential impact on Blake from the outside or as a mutual agency-constituting event. Instead, 
the Blake-Schillinger connection may have been an object in partial separation from its 
expressed qualities that helped to define the reality of Blake’s life. Consequently, the object-
oriented approach puts more emphasis on two things: the compound objects that formed much of 
the substance of Blake’s musical life, i.e. his attachments with other things, and 
counterfactuals, which allude to unexpressed aspects of Blake’s reality. This chapter considered 
both, starting with attachments. 
Blake himself pre-existed his various interactions and was irreducible to them. But at the 
same time, his involvement with the world was executant, belonging to his life and no other. His 
attachments thus provide important indirect clues to his reality. That is, the question of whether 
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Schillinger cultivated or corrupted Blake or of how Blake was entangled with larger systems is 
less interesting for OOO than what he was through these selective attachments. And for Harman, 
symbioses – sporadic attachments that irreversibly shape the course of an object’s life – are 
crucial in understanding that life. Symbiosis and attachment in general are like metaphor in being 
irreducible to a literal exchange of features. And like metaphor, they occupy a middle ground 
between two sides. First, the Blake-Schillinger union had a “minimal plausibility,” an inessential 
fitness at the level of their qualities. These weak ties or affinities would not be of much interest 
to a literalist, yet they are important for OOO because they “provide[d] an alibi for a 
significantly more farfetched but also more beautiful merger,” a fusion of the real object (Blake) 
with “more exotic qualities” from Schillinger.136 This other side of attachment, the tense fusion, 
is also lost on a literalist who would not find value in oblique suggestions of Blake’s sincere or 
aesthetic fascination with his Schillinger studies. Along similar lines, I argued that the “evidence 
of influence” found in Blake’s rag Dictys on Seventh Avenue is best understood not as verifying 
dependencies but as alluding to the singular and unparaphrasable style that suffuses the work. I 
called this its Schillingerian flavor, though surely it is Blake’s Schillingerian flavor.  
Having argued that the Blake-Schillinger connection was an attachment, I set out to 
determine whether it was also a life-changing symbiosis. To clarify what this would entail, 
though, I first had to consider Harman’s rule that symbiosis happens early in the life of an object, 
which inherently opposes the possibility of a Blake-Schillinger symbiosis. I suggested that the 
early life rule can be qualified by certain factors: the initial form of the object, the bearing of 
later symbiotic stages on earlier ones, and the relation of the object to its environment. This 
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limits its significance to a knowledge-oriented “rule of thumb.” But if we want to read the rule in 
the same spirit as other principles of object-oriented social theory, then we look in vain for a 
deeper formal reason that the later life of an object will not be populated with both symbioses 
and “near misses” of candidate symbioses, the latter of which OOO otherwise finds so important 
for alluding to the evolving boundary between the object and its situation. 
The Blake-Schillinger connection provides a constructive counterexample to the early life 
rule without merely contradicting it. Blake capitalized on the immediate prospects that the 
ragtime revival offered while his composing work largely fell by the wayside. But the ragtime 
revival was also a possible site of tension and a new transformative stage. The fact that Blake 
blended into his role of “elder statesman” was not a foregone conclusion. A version of Blake 
with a newly altered outlook on the objects of his creative work would not have fit in so cleanly 
with his circumstances. His attachment to his Schillinger studies was a good candidate for just 
this sort of transformation. This counterfactual Blake might have continued to experiment with 
the unusual resources of his recent education by analogy with Muhal Richard Adams, or he 
might have tried his hand at ambitious new forms by analogy with George Gershwin’s work with 
(and after) Schillinger or Scott Joplin’s Treemonisha (an opera that Blake is on record for 
admiring a great deal).137 Taking a step back, a background argument of this chapter has been 
that while symbioses are important from the standpoint of OOO, so too are counterfactual 
symbioses, attachments that could have but did not change the course of the object’s life.  
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VI. Appendix 
Score, from Max Morath’s Giants of Ragtime (Edward B. Marks, 1971). 
 
  
  
139 
 
 
  
  
140 
 
  
  
  
141 
 
 
 
  
  
142 
 
  
  
143 
Chapter 4. Object-Oriented Music Criticism: On Louis Andriessen’s De Staat 
In an article for The Guardian, the music critic Tom Service frames his profile of Louis 
Andriessen (b. 1939) with big questions:  
A conundrum for every conscientious 20th- and 21st-century composer has been how 
music relates to politics: what’s the possible relationship between the music you write 
and what you think about the world? How does one connect with, and even change, the 
other? And if you’re a composer who’s dissatisfied with the way the world works – or 
even the way the musical world works – what can your music do to comment on it, 
criticize it, protest against it and possibly transform it?1 
According to the article, Andriessen has commented on, protested against, and transformed his 
world. Starting in the 1960s, he and other like-minded Dutch musicians defied traditional layouts 
of ensembles and concert programs. He quickly became a central figure in a new “de facto music 
establishment in Holland.” His concert work De Staat (1976) is a microcosm of the music-and-
society theme that Service raises. Four female voices, accompanied by a band of electric guitars 
and basses, brass, oboes, harps, pianos, and violas, sing from Plato’s famous Politeia, or the 
Republic. (Andriessen’s title is the Dutch translation.) There, Socrates asks what justice is in the 
human soul. He expands the question to cover an entire hypothetical polis – including its 
handling of music in passages selected by the composer – and draws on the theme of self-
sufficiency along the way. De Staat represents the “solar plexus” of Andriessen’s career 
“because it brings together the spectrum of his musical and political thinking.”2  
 
1
 Tom Service, “A Guide to Louis Andriessen’s Music,” The Guardian, October 15, 2012.  
2
 Ibid. De Staat brought its composer official acclaim, as well, winning the UNESCO and Matthijs Vermeulen 
Prizes in 1977. Andriessen became the Holland Festival’s first resident composer in 1981. 
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 It is remarkable, then, that Service leaves a wide berth between the sonic and conceptual 
aspects of De Staat. He limits his comments about its socio-political content to Andriessen’s own 
notes to the score.3 And, having stated that De Staat brings together the diversity of Andriessen’s 
thought, he goes on to praise only “the sounds that it makes.” (It entices with “moments of 
gigantic tension and explosive release” and intrigues with “waves of strange repeated chords … a 
weirdly disturbing noise that’s both static yet full of energy.”) Service is hardly alone in 
separating the sounds from everything else. Anthony Tommasini does exactly that in a New York 
Times concert review.4 He indicates at first that “Mr. Andriessen alternately evokes and combats 
Plato’s text” and “attempt[s] to do what Plato deems dangerous: use music to alter the state, in a 
sense, by shaking up the emotions of listeners.” But how? Tommasini skips the question and 
gives a purely sonic report, touching on the overall sound (“bright and steely”), stylistic aspects, 
and some more specific recollections (“brassy blasts, pummeling pianos, every-which-way 
counterpoint”). Leo Chadburn in a 2009 article for The New Statesman leaves out conceptual 
commentary entirely. He believes De Staat is influential because it “sounds thrilling and 
extraordinarily fresh.”5 Earlier spectators – perhaps not so assured of De Staat’s historical 
importance – were more inclined to foreground the sound/concept gap. The critic J. Reichenfeld 
found the “rhetorical fury” of the music thrilling yet distinct from the effect of the text.6 And an 
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otherwise positive review of the premiere by R. N. Degens dismissed what Degens called the 
“extra-musical pretensions” of the work.7  
 The above critics all differ over how they evaluate De Staat, yet their views seem to be 
shaped by similar unstated beliefs about what constitutes the proper interior of the musical 
object. That is, they make ontological assumptions which, as many of them acknowledge, De 
Staat at least implicitly challenges. Other authors, especially in academic quarters, have more 
reflexively taken up this challenge. For them, De Staat participates in a wider movement seeking 
to bend away from a “purely aesthetic” conception of music into a more “social” one. Yayoi 
Everett, for instance, asserts in her book about Andriessen that he represents a new trend of 
music that “crosses stylistic and ideological boundaries” and “comments on political or 
philosophical concepts … as a social ritual and as an arena for controversy and provocation.”8 
Graham Harman has noticed a similar border-crossing movement in philosophy, though his tone 
is skeptical rather than celebratory:  
According to one familiar narrative … philosophers used to be naïve realists who 
believed in real things outside their social or linguistic contexts; these things were 
ascribed timeless essences that were not politically innocent, since they subjugated 
various groups by pigeonholing each of them as oriental, feminine, pre-Enlightenment, or 
some other such tag. According to this view, we have luckily come to realize that 
essences must be replaced with events and performances, that the notion of a reality that 
is not a reality for someone is dubious, that flux is prior to stasis, that things must be seen 
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Schoute, “’Staat’ verdooft,” Het Parool, November 29, 1976, which complains that De Staat does not truly engage 
with its text; and Dominic Gill, “Textual Triptych,” Financial Times, January 15, 1983, which claims the Plato text 
is incidental. 
8
 Yayoi Everett, The Music of Louis Andriessen (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1-2. 
  
  
146 
as differences rather than solid units, and as complex feedback networks rather than 
integers.9 
In this Whig history, “the notion of autonomous substances seems to evoke a world of stagnant 
subjugation, while the dynamism of relational and materialist ontologies seems to open up a vast 
panorama of political and intellectual breakthrough.”10 Harman’s implication is that this 
narrative has been productive but teaches the wrong lesson in the end, and an alternative 
viewpoint waits just around the corner.   
 Harman focuses on literary criticism in the article just cited. But whatever the topic may 
be, his method is always to lay out and address ontological assumptions from the perspective of 
OOO, which maintains that all things in the world face the same basic structure of reality and are 
autonomous in the sense of being irreducible to their parts and relations. Using De Staat as an 
example, I will offer a similar critique of music criticism that has participated in the ideological 
turn away from the self-contained artwork, arguing that a degree of scrutiny from an object-
oriented standpoint exposes underlying shortcomings in these commentaries and that OOO’s 
response to the context-oriented critics leads to unique consequences for the interpretation and 
evaluation of De Staat. The first section describes contextual interpretations of De Staat (typified 
by the author Robert Adlington) and the ontological background that informs them. The next 
section draws on OOO to critique this background. The third and final section more fully 
describes OOO’s interpretive stance, which could be described as a new twist on formalism in 
which social and other “contextual” elements can be understood as occupying the interior of the 
autonomous work through their aesthetic handling.  
 
 
9
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I. The Context-Oriented Approach 
De Staat has received much attention from authors who would emphasize its context. The most 
prominent example is a monograph about De Staat by Robert Adlington.11 Other authors such as 
Yayoi Everett, Rokus de Groot, Elmer Schönberger, and David Wright also take up the context-
oriented viewpoint. As a basis for discussion, I will first offer some brief observations about the 
structure and style of De Staat. (References to the score use rehearsal numbers, e.g., r. 12.) I will 
then outline how Adlington and others have interpreted the piece.  
 De Staat is a big work, impressing (or confronting) the listener over the course of 35 
minutes with a fully amplified ensemble split into two equal groups. The score asks most of them 
to stand, and they often play at full volume. Although this is an unusual presentation, much about 
the sound and structure is familiar. When it comes to style, Adlington and Andriessen have 
referred to several influences, such as Luciano Berio, Hans Eisler, Charles Ives, jazz, Medieval 
hockets, gamelan…12 But the American minimalists and Igor Stravinsky seem to be the most 
important.13 As one might expect from these sources of inspiration, De Staat includes plenty of 
repetition, sharp sectional contrasts,14 motivic recurrences and transformations, and progressively 
climactic growth patterns.  
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 Robert Adlington, Louis Andriessen: De Staat (Ashgate, 2004). 
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and Maja Trochimczyk, “Dialog 1,” in Maja Trochimczyk, ed., The Music of Louis Andriessen (Routledge, 2002). 
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Online; and David Wright, “Louis Andriessen: Polity, Time, Speed, Substance,” Tempo (New) 187 (1993): 7-13. See 
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 Three choral sections in ancient Greek frame the action. Andriessen has called these 
selections from the Republic (translated in the concert program) the “caryatids” or pillars of the 
piece.15 The first and last choruses are quite short. In the first one, Socrates praises stylistic 
uniformity. In the last, he asserts that change in musical style is risky because it leads to change 
in the polis. The much longer middle chorus takes on nearly the whole of 398-99 in the Republic. 
Here, Socrates makes detailed proclamations about which harmoniai (or “modes”) and 
instruments to keep, and which to ban. A translated text to all three is provided in an Appendix. 
 
Intro – Chorus 1 – (long) interlude – Chorus 2 – interlude – Chorus 3 – Finale 
 
The growth patterns and teleological implications are displayed in many ways, including regular 
crescendos, increasingly dense textures, an accretion of pitch sets from small and diatonic in the 
early bars to large and chromatic in the later ones, an evolving network of related motives, 
widening melodies (e.g. r. 43), and progressively complex melodic interactions based on canon 
or hocket.16 Tuttis recur periodically for punctuated contrasts or climaxes (r. 12). When the two 
ensembles break off from each other, they interact with complementary material (e.g. the 
duplet/triplet interaction starting r. 46). The two symmetrically staged ensembles are further 
separated by registral contrasts, hockets (e.g. r. 40–41), stereo amplification, and antiphonal play. 
The overall sound supports the unique, cutting rhetorical character of De Staat that has so 
enthralled and provoked audiences. The question is, to what end is this style directed?  
 
15
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 The answer hinges on how De Staat stages a conflict with its text. Many critics believe 
the conceptual aspirations of the work undercut its possible status as a self-enclosed aesthetic 
object. Robert Adlington’s reading is both meticulous and typical of this “context-oriented” 
view. He sees continuity between Andriessen’s earlier work on Bertolt Brecht’s agitational 
Lehrstücke (Lesson Plays) and the composer’s reactions to Plato in De Staat.17 An interpretive 
dilemma illustrates his point. In the final chorus near the end of the piece (r. 45), the ensemble 
overpowers the start of every syllable, rendering the words less coherent. What is so didactic 
about an inaudible chorus? Surely this setting ignores Brecht’s principle that the audience must 
be able to understand the text.18 Adlington recognizes this issue and calls on Brecht’s anti-
Wagnerian idea of the “separation of the elements.” When different parts of the work come into 
dramatic conflict with one another as independent components, unity itself becomes a problem of 
consequence for the audience. “Compromising the intelligibility of the text … remains an 
effectively direct way of declaring one’s opposition to it.”19 And Brechtian clarity does not itself 
vanish when the ensemble refutes the words, because the unobstructed words must be provided 
to the audience in writing (as per the score instructions).20 Other choices call unity into question 
even without the involvement of the singers. For instance, unisons between the two halves of the 
ensemble frequently derail (Figure 4.1). Not until the very end, after the final chorus, does a 
pseudo-canonic duet reach a more lasting unison (Figures 4.2a, b).21  
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et al. (Methuen, 1997), 234. 
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20
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declarative effect,” while the harmonic dissonance opposes Plato's words (Music of Louis Andriessen, 84). In the 
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Figure 4.1. “Failed” unison, r. 31. 
 
 
Figure 4.2a. Final duet, beginning, r. 46. 
 
 
Figure 4.2b. Final duet, end, r. 47. 
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For Adlington, the sonic fury “is at least in part directed specifically towards the Plato text.”22 As 
his note to the score illustrates, Andriessen believes Plato's “Stalinist” ideas about the function of 
music qualifies the text for its particular musical treatment. The composer applauds Plato’s view 
that music has tremendous socio-political power, but disagrees: “If only it were true that musical 
innovation could change the laws of the state!”23 Leaving aside for now this ambivalence about 
the “extra-musical” power of music, we can see that Adlington’s interpretation depends on a 
particular rendition of the text: 
Thus the instrumental drama enacted in De Staat serves to underline Andriessen’s 
critical, Brechtian view of Plato’s text. The struggle to achieve and maintain musical 
unanimity is one waged against the divisive sentiments of the text – popular solidarity 
being the necessary response to the quashing of musical freedom [in the text]. The unison 
achieved at the very end of the piece is too briefly glimpsed to allow any complacency 
about the ‘victory’ of the music over the text. But it follows that … the need for everyone 
to act identically is a means rather than an end [as it is in the text].24 
And Adlington is not alone. Elmer Schönberger calls De Staat’s unison melodies and block 
chords a “structural expression of equality and collaboration,” but finds a Brechtian negative 
model in Plato's text and so shares a common interpretive basis with Adlington.25 Yayoi Everett 
has a similar assessment.26 And David Wright agrees that the conflict between Plato and 
Andriessen forms a thematic core: “De Staat is about the contradiction between Plato's 
philosophical view of music in the Republic (attributing to it an intrinsic power which in the 
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wrong hands poses a threat to good order), and the actuality (experienced by Andriessen), which 
is that music is impotent to achieve anything like the sort of radical upheaval Plato envisaged.”27 
 To be sure, these authors do differ over many aspects of their interpretations. For 
example, Everett claims De Staat “transcends the influences of Stravinsky and minimalist 
precursors” after the second chorus because of a “symbolic moment” (r. 37) that reminds her of 
“shouting a slogan repeatedly in a political demonstration.”28 The piece reconfigures its 
influences into a protest against the ideas of the text. On the other hand, Wright claims the same 
moment embodies Platonic tyranny in its “overall oppressiveness,” thus “transcending the 
immediacy of the composer’s own situation and political preferences.”29 The two authors differ 
over how De Staat interlaces its sonic qualities with a critique of the text—whether as a dramatic 
dialogue (Everett) or as a more “immanent” dialectic (Wright). But we must not lose sight of 
their deeper agreement. For one thing, if De Staat is positive, it is a positive defiance against 
Plato, and if it is negative, it negatively expresses Plato's oppressive words. Either way, Plato is 
the antagonist.  
 More importantly, these critics agree that the text by Plato is an occasion for De Staat to 
engage in non-aesthetic polemic with content outside its sonic form. Consider Everett. Her 
assertion that the socio-political ramifications of the piece propel it beyond its stylistic precursors 
is not an isolated claim about the symbolic moment at r. 37. She repeats this same opinion 
elsewhere about the entire work: “Andriessen’s compositional approach follows in Stravinsky’s 
footsteps, yet elevates its significance to another level by embedding the stylized elements within 
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a dialectical framework to confront a political or metaphysical question.”30 As for Wright, when 
he claims that De Staat “transcends” the composer’s situation, he hardly means the piece is 
detached from its environment the same way a thing-in-itself transcends appearances for Kant 
(or is distinguished from any relations whatsoever for OOO). Rather, De Staat transcends local 
commentary quantitatively, surpassing it with a “more universal … warning against 
totalitarianism.”31 Its textual commentary makes it relevant to even more context. 
An ontological stance informs these reactions. To shine some light on it, let us consider 
how Adlington introduces his study of De Staat. He begins with the reputation of Holland in the 
English-speaking world. During the 1960s and 1970s, the quaint and old-fashioned European 
nation transformed into “the most apparently forward-looking of societies,” populated in a 
typical twenty-first-century beer advertisement by “roller-blading bondage fetishists; newly-wed 
male couples; body-pierced hippies.” De Staat fits right in. Its “noisy lack of refinement” is 
anything but old-fashioned, and it “bears witness to the milieu of protest and activism from 
which it sprang.” Its impact on musicians has also been “significant and long lasting.”32 Hence, 
much of the interest of De Staat is due to it marking an important (music-)historical turning 
point. Socio-political context informed Andriessen’s own goals, too. “During this period, his 
music was explicitly aimed at reflecting the circumstances of its performance,” which included 
not only its immediate performance conditions but also the political “protests and struggle for 
cultural renewal that characterized the Netherlands in the sixties and seventies.”33 
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 Instead of stating that he will bear in mind Andriessen’s role as “agitator for cultural 
change,” though, Adlington shifts into an ontological register: “This book proceeds on the basis 
that De Staat, likewise, is not properly understood by approaching it as an autonomous, self-
standing artwork, and that a full grasp of the ideological and musical context from which it 
sprang is essential if it is to make its fullest impact.”34 The negative thrust of the statement is 
even clearer when simplified: “De Staat is not an autonomous, self-standing artwork.” 
Accordingly, it would be wrong to say that De Staat has an autonomous reality apart from its 
causal origins (the “context from which it sprang”), or even that a bounded De Staat pre-exists 
its effects. For the very concept of a self-standing artwork is mired in an ideological illusion of 
boundedness, of “apparent autonomy from potentially corrupting social meaning.”35 This is not a 
descriptive scenario in which some artworks appear “more autonomous” than others, but one in 
which some artworks foreground the reality of their context-orientation and others mask it by 
appealing to a tedious (and politically suspect) dogma of self-enclosed aesthetic purity. 
 
II. Flat Ontology: A Critique of the Critics 
Now we can consider the object-oriented response. A methodological premise of OOO is that 
ontological categories must be general enough to apply to all kinds and scales of things. (See 
Chapter 1.) One who subscribes to a flat ontology “initially treats all objects in the same way … 
without prematurely eliminating some of these or impatiently ranking them from more to less 
real.”36 The doctrine of flat ontology makes no claims about the literal nature of things (it does 
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not mean “everything is the same”). Rather, it is a starting point, an attempt to avoid the 
assumption that “any ontological distinction must be embodied in specific kinds of entities.”37 In 
Chapter 2, for example, this principle suggested that real musical hearing and unreal abstraction 
cannot be embodied in historical and modern musical paradigms. Similarly, we avoided 
embodying the distinction between literalized schemata (bundled events) and nonliteral schema 
objects in a taxonomy of sketched exercises and fully notated musical works. 
 Harman’s remarks on the American literary critic Cleanth Brooks help to illustrate the 
point for the present situation.38 Brooks believes poems can neither be paraphrased as true-or-
false literal propositions nor adequately explained by their biographical and social circumstances. 
At one level, then, he sees “an absolute gulf between literalized prose sense and the nonprose 
sense that it paraphrases and translates.”39 This view that our access to a poem is separate from 
the poem itself fits well with OOO. But Brooks conflates the distinction between paraphrasable 
knowledge and poetry with a taxonomy of different kinds of intellectual pursuits, putting poetry 
(and presumably the other arts) on one side and philosophy and science on the other, “a division 
of labor in which philosophy and science would be responsible for literal truths, while literature 
would handle all the irony and paradox.”40 In other words, Brooks tends to ascribe an aesthetic 
object’s autonomy to a specific kind of content.41 That is precisely the sort of move flat ontology 
is meant to combat. Again, Harman does not claim we ought to ignore meaningful differences 
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between poetry, philosophy, and science. He targets the taxonomic fallacy, or initial assumption 
that those distinctions are ontologically fundamental.42 
 Accordingly, critics who draw on a distinction between autonomous and context-oriented 
artworks risk the taxonomic fallacy when they allot these structures to specific kinds of works or 
contexts. For an isolated example, recall Everett’s claim that Andriessen elevates Stravinskian 
aspects of his style through his conceptual aspirations. Everett does not just observe two 
composers dealing with different ideas and social structures; she maps those specific differences 
onto a deeper division between superficial, unreal aesthetic forms (Stravinsky) and true-to-reality 
context orientation (Andriessen). By contrast, Adlington manages to avoid the taxonomic trap 
when he compares De Staat with the concert culture of the 1970s. He claims De Staat subverts 
the stratified, government-sponsored “‘official’ mainstream of the concert hall and symphony 
orchestra.”43 As we have seen, though, he believes the autonomy of mainstream art music is only 
apparent.44 The same ontology applies to both. 
 Yet Adlington – together with the other context-oriented critics – does fall into the 
taxonomic fallacy in his handling of the fundamental distinction between autonomous musical 
form and the context of a work’s origins and relations. He sees a gap between abstract form and 
reality-granting context embodied in a taxonomy of (a) sonic structures and (b) social factors 
involved in the genesis and reception of a piece (e.g. authorial intentions, socio-political 
environment). To start with, he argues that De Staat is so “integrally bound up with” its political, 
cultural, and historical context that it would seem to have a “coarseness,” “formal ‘rudeness’” or 
lack of coherence when otherwise held up to “the value systems that ordinarily underpin 
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assessments of the functioning of musical works,” by which he means an appraisal of “formal 
design, of harmonic and rhythmic elements, or of textural strategies.” And on the same page, he 
pits “the abstraction of avant-garde compositional styles” against “a conviction in the social 
embeddedness of all musical activity.”45 And it bears repeating that Adlington incorporates the 
falseness of the “cozy realm of ‘pure music’” into his ontology of autonomous form and 
context.46 A belief in pure music is little more than an “ideological affirmation” of the 
bourgeoisie’s “official musical culture.”47 With the release of De Staat, Andriessen opposed the 
“cherished belief that serious contemporary music … should function on a purely aesthetic 
level,” even as his “interest in cultural and philosophical ideas” went unappreciated by critics 
such as Arnold Whittall, who preferred Elliott Carter and Peter Maxwell Davies.48  
As the above references to aesthetic function imply, even the bourgeois avant-garde 
supporter of pure music portrayed by Adlington would concede that humans must show up to 
appreciate the artwork. But “pure music” and “purely aesthetic level” suggest that this aesthetic 
functioning is rooted in a strict division of labor between a self-contained sonic entity and a 
human subject that rises to the occasion. Adlington disputes the reality of pure music and with it, 
“the autonomy claimed by much formalist art.”49 But his ontology of music, like the ideology of 
pure music he rejects, conflates the distinction between aesthetic form and relational situation 
with a taxonomy of two different kinds of content: sonic forms (avant-garde abstractions), and 
human relations to those forms. That is, Adlington’s response to the ontology he rejects is to 
invert it. The sonic unit itself becomes a neutral carrier of social content, the latter of which is the 
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sole realm of explanatory truth. Hence, by calling De Staat “intrinsically anti-aesthetic,” 
Adlington intends the highest praise.50 De Staat engages in critical dialectic with the “aesthetic” 
elements of the concert hall’s socio-political environment.51 As Harman writes about the New 
Historicist literary critic Stephen Greenblatt, the implication is that “relations are always 
liberating and nonrelational realities always reactionary.”52 
It should be noted that when Adlington does mention the “satisfactions and appeal” of 
“music’s nuts and bolts,” he is reporting on the composer’s own historically conditioned 
opinions.53 Adlington draws his explicit rationale for discussing the sonic structure of De Staat 
from the fact that Andriessen himself invokes music’s nuts and bolts.54 Adlington is not alone in 
his deference to the composer’s history, goals, and milieu. Both the sonic-structural and social 
implications that Everett studies are tied to what the composer “envisions” in his scoring, his 
“motivation for writing De Staat,” and his interpretation of Plato.55 Similarly, when Wright 
reproaches listeners who find the music “sufficient and exciting enough on its own terms,” it is 
because they “trivialize the intentions behind these ‘concept’ works which have occupied 
Andriessen in the last twenty years.”56  
 A striking illustration of the taxonomic approach to form and context may be seen in how 
these critics routinely endorse the composer’s interpretation of Plato. When Adlington focuses 
on the Republic, he, like Tom Service at the beginning of this chapter, only reports on 
Andriessen’s reading. (Once more: Plato purportedly has an authoritarian view of the ideal polis 
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and assigns great socio-political power to music.) I have found no examples of other critics going 
into more depth. Let us call what Plato wrote the original and the version communicated by 
Andriessen in De Staat the translation.57 Technically, in object-oriented terms, Andriessen 
himself only ever encountered a sensual “translation” of the original, but I want to focus here on 
the object that, at least for these critics, best represents his reading of Plato (namely, De Staat).  
Now, according to OOO, a reader may engage with the “real meaning” of the original 
indirectly through what Harman calls theory (SO-RQ), and thus enter some rightness of fit with 
it (see Chapter 1). There cannot be a single master reading, given the lack of direct access, but 
interpretations are also not arbitrary and unlimited. As Harman writes, “every reality supports 
multiple types of knowledge, but not an infinite number. More concretely, there may be five or 
six different ways to interpret a medical condition, and a similar half-dozen or so ways to 
approach a political dilemma, interpret Hamlet, or follow Immanuel Kant with a new philosophy 
of one’s own.”58 For the context-oriented critics, though, the De Staat translation is so adequate 
that no gap of understanding seems to separate it from the original. The only tension between the 
original and the translation is one of critique. Wright neatly conveys the lesson: “For as this 
music expresses it, History has produced too many unspeakable illustrations of the subjective 
manipulation of a society for its own good.”59 Yet it might be asked why these critics do not 
want to test the commensurability of the translation with the original. I would suggest they tacitly 
accept Andriessen’s authority because of a breakdown in their context orientation. The composer 
and his environment are isolated as the primary context; the original is only relevant as a 
correlate of Andriessen’s interaction with it. In other words, we should accept the reading of 
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Plato in De Staat (the translation) as-is because the composer ascribed such importance to it, 
even referring to the three choruses as the pillars of the piece. But this silence about the context 
of the original begins to look more in keeping with something a champion of De Staat’s 
autonomy would claim: it “absorbs certain forces and influences from its environment while 
remaining completely insensitive to others.”60  
 One response from a context-oriented perspective would be to push the contextual 
approach a little further and maintain the principle of flat ontology. Doing so could provoke a 
more critical reassessment of Andriessen’s aims with respect to Plato. A defining aspect of 
Andriessen’s persona as a composer in the 1970s was his strong commitment to political 
agitation.61 De Staat tops off a series of concept works on absolute power, such as Il Principe 
(1974, after Machiavelli). Everett explains that “Andriessen’s political ideology centered on 
collective solidarity,” inspired by Marxism.62 The Netherlands in the 1970s was desegregating its 
political and cultural institutions, its so-called “pillars.” Their word for this process was 
ontzuiling or depillarization. Andriessen enthusiastically participated in this trend. He associated 
himself with left-leaning ensembles, studios, protest concerts, new performance practices, and 
other alternatives to conventional concert life. Hence, his characterization of the Plato quotations 
as the piece’s structural caryatids (Greek pillars shaped like women) brings attention to its 
political side: presumably, the music “depillarizes” the stratified social order represented by the 
lyrics. This puts De Staat in the proud company of other artworks that have linked up with socio-
political circumstances. We might think of protest songs like the Chilean “El pueblo unido jamas 
sera vencido!” from the 1970s and its art music counterpart, an ambitious set of piano variations 
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on the same song (The People United Will Never Be Defeated!) by Frederic Rzewski (1975). 
Graham Harman has referred to Picasso’s Guernica as another exemplary case.63 There is no 
question for Harman and certainly not for these critics that music can get entangled with contexts 
outside the “music world.” At issue is the nature of those entanglements. 
 Now consider the textual context surrounding the passage used for the first chorus of De 
Staat (397b–c), where Plato claims to prefer a uniform style (lexis). The passage takes place 
during a thought experiment comparing the division of the human soul with that of an imaginary 
city-state, Kallipolis. The founding rules of Kallipolis (and the basic assumptions of the thought 
experiment) are meant to protect the self-sufficiency of each citizen and to preserve the 
polis/soul metaphor by rigorously assigning just one role to each person or part of the soul. Does 
Socrates mainly want to extoll literal group conformity in Athens when he calls for an 
“unmixed” lexis? Is his larger goal to impose a practical measure on young citizens to keep their 
attention fixed on the indoctrinating message?64 In the context of the Republic before and after 
the first chorus of De Staat, this is doubtful, or at least a misleading account of the full story. 
Plato argues that a Kallipolis educator narrates in his own voice and curtails mimesis (in the 
sense of “doing voices,” emulating birds, etc.) because imitation divides one character into 
many, and a changeable character would weaken the educator’s self-sufficiency and endanger 
that of the student (394e-397a).65 The stylistic uniformity praised in the first chorus is a 
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constraint on such character-destroying imitations. Socrates admits right after Andriessen cuts 
him off (397d) that a more mixed style of storytelling is undeniably pleasing to hear, but that “it 
would not harmonize with [the founding principle of] our politeia, where no one is a double or a 
multiple man, since each person does one thing.”66 The term politeia, besides being the title of 
Plato's book, refers to the conditions of citizenship – the logical consequences of the city's 
founding – which, for the exercise to be of any use, Socrates must rigorously follow. 
Furthermore, the citizens of Kallipolis are in mutual agreement about their positions in the polis. 
This wider context – the role of education in leading citizens of an imagined city-state to become 
true to themselves (and ultimately, to the good), as well as the role of Kallipolis itself in relation 
to the human soul within the Republic – is well known in Plato scholarship, and has served to 
bolster defenses of the philosopher from the uniquely twentieth-century charge of 
totalitarianism.67 
 Going just a little further with the contextual strategy, we might mention Plato’s explicit 
rejection of imposed power (405a-c). This contrasts with the implicit authoritarian arbitrariness 
of the rules in the De Staat translation. And if we reflect on Plato’s own cultural context, then its 
alien distance from ours brings the expanded contextual view we are currently testing into 
friction with the critics’ exclusive focus on the translation. For example, music was an important 
feature of Greek education. Along with the mathematical study of attunement, musico-poetic 
storytelling was a mnemonic tool in an oral culture. Eric A. Havelock has observed that Plato 
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habitually avoids what we might think of as an aesthetic description of the arts. This is less 
surprising when we consider the practical functions of metered verse in his society.68 (In the 
modern world, by contrast, “poetic performance has become divorced from the day's 
business.”69) With the second chorus, the banishing of certain instruments and harmoniai 
(“modes” or structures of attunement, each associated with its own lexis) does refer to a danger 
posed by new musical materials to the polis as a whole, but not specifically a danger to sovereign 
authority. In Plato’s context, the purge would amplify an underlying function of poetry and song. 
Namely, the character of educational songs should accord with the desired character of the 
citizen and help guide the future leaders of Kallipolis to philosophical truth. 
 A possible response to my extension of context to the Republic would be to claim that it 
threatens a slippery slope. What is to stop any distant link from joining the defining context of 
De Staat? Instead, one might argue, the interpretive goal should be to preserve the boundary 
between the translation and the original while still acknowledging some yet-to-be-determined 
relation between them. In other words, the argument goes, De Staat does not express or respond 
to Plato qua Plato. It uses aspects of the Republic in its own selective way without managing to 
directly interact with the fundamental content of the Republic. Yet this is precisely the claim of 
OOO! De Staat translates the original in a way that both depends on it and alerts us to a gap 
between them. The lyrics retain their own partial autonomy not only in the sense that they do not 
directly access their source material, but also in the sense that they do not holistically integrate 
into the composer’s vision. This latter idea is especially pertinent here. Harman argues the same 
point about poetry: “Just as a poem absorbs and consolidates discrete influences from its context, 
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without being holistically penetrated by the whole of that context, the same partial autonomy 
must hold for discrete elements within the poem.”70  
 Notice that the question of how to interpret the translation in connection with the original 
remains open. Right now, the object-oriented position is that insofar as the Republic enters the 
orbit of De Staat, the philosophical work and the musical work are neither entirely closed off 
from each other nor directly commensurable. On several occasions, Harman has argued against 
an all-or-nothing approach to the link between an object and its translation: “The choice is not 
just between speaking of something or not speaking of it. We all know a way of speaking of a 
thing without quite speaking of it: namely, we allude to it.”71  
     
III. The Object-Oriented Approach 
For a clue about what indirect discourse might mean as far as De Staat is concerned, consider 
how the above critics have dealt with its sonic aspects. The critics are generally context-oriented 
when it comes to socio-political factors (especially those related to biography of the composer), 
but the sonic world of De Staat brings out their object-oriented side. Take De Staat’s stylistic 
influences. Andriessen himself has painted a rich picture of how he first came into contact with 
minimalist music (starting with a recording of Terry Riley’s In C that Frederick Rzewski brought 
to Holland in 1970).72 But notably, he takes only certain qualities from the minimalists, such as 
phased repetitions and gradual build-ups of texture and pitch sets, even while defamiliarizing 
them by incorporating “rude” chromatic dissonance and using oscillating minimalist textures to 
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accompany melody (r. 5–r. 11). Where Stravinsky is concerned, Andriessen selectively borrows 
the idea of a “montage” of contrasting fragments, as well as syncopated group ostinatos. 
 And what about ancient Greek elements—the harmoniai, for instance? Adlington knows 
of the composer’s casual selectivity with the sonic features of his Greek theme. He responds that 
“De Staat engages with too wide a range of preoccupations for it to confine itself to evocations 
of ancient musical practices or representations of Plato's characterization of those practices.”73 
Those preoccupations are of course contemporary ones. Yet De Staat is not totally lacking in 
references to the old practices. The composer has said that the prominent oboe in the opening 
section “was my symbol for Greek music,” a modern nod to the ancient double-reeded aulos.74 
There are tetrachords and other plays on the number four, visual and aural symmetry, Javanese 
scales that, as Adlington and Andriessen both put it, are “more Greek than the Greeks,”75 and an 
all-woman choir winking back at the misogyny of Plato's culture. Andriessen thus avoids a literal 
approach to the musical context of Plato’s Republic. He alludes to that environment without 
trying to embody it. 
 Along similar lines, these critics avoid portraying the sonic style of De Staat as just 
Stravinsky-kitsch plus minimalism or even as a kind of holistic aggregate of the composer’s 
sundry influences. For them, De Staat produces a new emergent sound world, distinct from its 
borrowed qualities. Hence, Wright refers to a single “cumulative effect” that “generates a 
striking image.”76 Everett largely agrees: she finds structural unity beneath the “otherwise 
discontinuous textural shifts,” thanks to the composer’s “enormous capacity to synthesize 
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existing models.”77 The lineage of indirectly synthesized influences “ultimately led Andriessen 
to found his own musical forms of expression that rely less on literal quotations and collage” 
than some of his earlier music, such as Souvenirs d’enfance (1966) and Anachronie I (1967).78 
 It is possible that these authors are, on some level, simply accepting the composer’s own 
documented (if infrequent) approval of what is sometimes called aesthetic formalism, the 
“conviction that musical material does not possess anything other than purely musical meaning,” 
as opposed to meanings that spring from habits and circumstances.79 Formalism is not entirely 
alien to OOO, as Harman notes: “the view that art has an internal reality uncontaminated by its 
socio-political context or the biography of the artist … seems to make OOO a natural adherent of 
formalism.”80 But Harman is careful to explain that the principle of flat ontology is incompatible 
with the formalist agenda. In his analysis, the deepest flaw of formalist art criticism is that it 
assigns the distinction between nonrelational form and relational context to a taxonomy of non-
human entities (e.g. sonic structures) and social relations (e.g. conceptual or emotional 
discourse).81 Yet from the critique of taxonomy it may be noted that no kind of content should 
receive special ontological handling in OOO: 
If we imagine a parallel universe where American slavery never existed, in which Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin was written as a piece of pure speculative fiction, we can see how different 
this work would be from the real Uncle Tom’s Cabin of our planet Earth. OOO holds no 
grudge against the socio-political interpretation or effectiveness of art, but simply insists 
that not all of the elements of the context of an artwork are relevant to that work, and that 
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an artwork either admits or forbids its surroundings to enter through a fairly rigorous 
process of selection.82 
That process of selection broadly follows the indirect path indicated above. For OOO, the view 
that the value of De Staat must be found in its socio-political commentary is wrong, but not 
because it prefers what Adlington would consider a rarified “pure music.” Rather, OOO argues 
that socio-political elements no less than sonic patterns are admitted into the musical work by 
their aesthetic handling. That is, conceptual elements become truly relevant to De Staat by 
contributing to its autonomy, its fundamental resistance to paraphrase in terms of its genesis and 
environment. It would be an empty exercise from the standpoint of OOO to argue that De Staat 
gets Plato right or wrong except insofar as that rightness or wrongness plays a part in De Staat’s 
objecthood, its tense interplay with its influences and environment. For instance, a context-
oriented defender of De Staat might cite Karl Popper’s famous book, The Open Society and Its 
Enemies (1945). Popper minces no words when he calls Plato a “totalitarian party-politician.”83 
And prefiguring Adlington, he argues that Plato’s output is an offshoot of “the sociological 
domain” rather than a self-standing philosophy.84 However, the issue of whether Popper is right 
or wrong is less important for the object-oriented music critic than the fact that his reading is so 
deeply embedded in the milieu of post-war controversies about politics, society, and philosophy. 
Popper’s interpretation was historically anomalous, and his scholarship was not broadly 
accepted.85 This nesting of De Staat in its intellectual context certainly has value as part of a 
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historical study, but for OOO it also makes championing its unique significance as a musical 
work more difficult rather than a fait accompli.  
 OOO thus questions the wisdom of setting out to appreciate De Staat by dissolving it into 
the relations around and within it. Knowledge about its source environment, sonic properties, or 
rendition of Plato may be useful for the connoisseur or music critic, but for OOO such 
knowledge cannot be her ultimate focus. Indeed, Harman argues it is in a preoccupation with 
conceptual correctness where critics most risk losing focus on what counts. The literal-minded 
critic is unable to “weigh the quality of thoughts or statements except by agreeing or disagreeing 
with them.” Yet reality itself resists direct discursive accessibility. Against the idea that “truth is 
legible on the surface of the world,” OOO holds that “reality is too real to be translated without 
remainder into any sentence, perception, practical action, or anything else.” A musical 
experience that engages with the real, whether stylistic, psychological, socio-political, historical, 
or philosophical – as well as criticism that hopes to capture something of that experience – “is 
obliged to become an art of allusion or indirect speech, a metaphorical bond with a reality that 
cannot possibly be made present.”86 Aesthetic experience is key here, and the tension between 
surface content and autonomous reality is its source. To claim that De Staat is partly autonomous 
means to draw attention to the individual “style” of De Staat’s use of the Republic over and 
above paraphrasable arguments about Plato. 
 Without going into too much detail, I will summarize again how this works in OOO. 
Literal experience is context-oriented, meaning that the object reduces to its genetic conditions 
(its parts) and its relations with its environment (its effects). But as critics have implied about De 
 
and J. Cropsey (University of Chicago Press, 1987), 33-89. For perspective on the controversy, see Melissa Lane, 
“Plato, Popper, Strauss, and Utopianism: Open Secrets?” History of Philosophy Quarterly 16/2 (1999): 119-42. 
86
 Harman, Weird Realism, 16. 
  
  
169 
Staat’s sonic world, another kind of experience makes us aware of an object’s reality, an interior 
life which is emergent over the contributions of its parts and unified beneath the plurality of its 
actual and possible interactions. For Harman, these aesthetic moments of allure happen when the 
encountered object splits from its own qualities and thereby becomes “at issue.” In metaphor, for 
instance, the comparison between two things does not quite work on a literal level but there is 
just enough of a plausible connection between them to yield a single fascinating thing (see 
Chapter 1). The “wine-dark sea” image often used by Homer is not just a dark liquid; it carries a 
host of associations that are difficult to parse with the grounding object, the sea. When the sea 
withdraws in this way, my own reality becomes the mimetic ground of its wine qualities. I am a 
“theatrical” ingredient of the aesthetic object, an involved method actor drawn in by a hidden 
reality rather than a distant observer of surface features.87 In sum, the superficial plausibility of 
wine and sea both being liquids helps to make me a real accomplice of their strange fictional 
union. Yet I can lose this attachment when the poetic device becomes a literal puzzle in need of 
solving: did the ancient Greeks not see “blue”?88  
 With this analysis of aesthetic experience in mind, let us consider the broad approach an 
object-oriented critic could take to De Staat’s handling of the Republic. Andriessen might well 
have turned Plato into a bizarre Popperian mask or puppet. The question is whether he brings the 
puppet to life by splitting it from its qualities, just as he seems to do with his sonic allusions and 
influences. In other words, we seek signs of object-oriented autonomy, of a unique, irreplaceable 
version of Plato. Now, recall that the object-quality tension of allure has a “theatrical” aspect 
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involving the spectator. De Staat would be alluring in its critical handling of Plato to the extent 
that it enables us to become partly complicit with its antagonist. What helps listeners wear the 
disturbing mask? Canonical examples from theater and film include Shakespeare’s villains, who 
often express themselves with more vividness and wit than their adversaries. Or take the careerist 
(and historically inaccurate) Salieri in the film, Amadeus. His otherwise petty jealousy of Mozart 
is matched by both a fervent appreciation for Mozart’s music and a justified irritation at the 
upstart’s indifference to colleagues, family, and himself. 
 I suggested earlier that a totalitarian interpretation of Plato dates De Staat by embedding 
it in the context of mid-twentieth century intellectual trends, in line with Karl Popper’s polemic 
defense of the open society. Affirmative object-oriented interpretations would have to work 
against this entanglement. Here are a couple gestures in that direction. First, consider the sound-
text relationship. Even without lyrics, musical elements might be said to conflict with the 
oppressive ideas that the composer finds in the text. This still allows us to read antagonism 
between certain aspects of the sound and text without assuming from the start that one is 
“merely” or “purely” aesthetic and the other purely or merely conceptual. In any case, an object-
oriented critic would agree with Wright that the text is not just external to the music (see pp. 
158-59). But OOO differs from him in an important way. The musical expression of the words 
must work like metaphor, not a lesson. Just as the sea in “wine-dark sea” adopts the style of 
wine, the textual Plato-object adopts the style of its musical figuration. Instead of the music 
exhibiting the severity of the text as if to paraphrase it, sonic qualities enter a tense nonliteral 
fusion with the text-object. Descriptions of that fusion can only hint indirectly at its specific 
character. For instance, Wright is surely on to something when he claims that the rhythmic 
unison after the middle choral section (r. 37) is the “harshest musical comment.” But instead of a 
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straightforward “jackboot stomp,” I hear a more ambivalent collective musical agony.89 The 
aesthetic success of this section, where the listener lives its qualities, is what makes its 
irresolvable disorder so disturbing and enthralling. We need only imagine a more recognizably 
fascistic march at r. 37 to ruin the effect. 
 Before that, in the first chorus, De Staat introduces an important (if partial) thematic 
sympathy with Plato. The first chorus in its original context is about constraining imitated 
“voices” in educational sung poetry to make it more like diegesis or narrating in one’s own 
voice, and it touches on Plato’s views about education, justice, and the good. The excerpt in 
isolation, though, is simply about harmonious uniformity. Critics have noticed this latter theme at 
work in Andriessen’s music, too. Wright argues that “on a musico-philosophical level, 
Andriessen views the achievement of an eventual musical accord … as representing something 
of an idealized state.”90 And both Adlington and Everett associate musical unity in Andriessen’s 
music with political solidarity.91 The composer regards the final “hard won” unison at the end of 
the piece as a “major subject of the work.”92 For OOO, this or any other point of contact between 
Andriessen and Plato is more than just an invitation to dialectical discourse.93 The partial 
thematic affinity between De Staat and the Republic is, in Harman’s words, “an alibi for a 
significantly more farfetched but also more beautiful merger.”94 One way to ruin this strange 
partial alignment with Plato would be to deemphasize the theme of unity in the first chorus’s 
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lyrics, such as by contextualizing them with earlier text about mimesis and diegesis. Another way 
to ruin De Staat’s passing affinity with the Republic would be for the early lyrics to dominate the 
entire work. The dramatically achieved unity of the sonic structure, along with the (often) violent 
sonic choices, would too broadly satirize Plato’s own call for uniformity. 
 The final comment in the composer’s note to the score has drawn great interest from 
critics: “If only it were true that musical innovation could change the laws of the state.” This can 
be seen as a disagreement at the heart of the composition: Plato insists on the dangerous power 
of music over society and Andriessen denies that view.95 Yet to the extent De Staat succeeds as 
musical rhetoric, it alludes to Andriessen’s straining effort to prove Plato right about what music 
can do. Viewed this way, Plato’s detailed rules against musical excess in the Republic seem more 
like a specific fictional character’s agitated hyperbole than a sarcastic reference to proto-Stalinist 
cultural policy. For OOO, the saving grace of Andriessen’s polemic would have to be his own 
aesthetic attachment to the text.   
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IV. Appendix 
Extracts from Plato's Republic used in De Staat. Based on Andrew Barker’s translation (1984).  
 
 
Chorus 1. 397b-c. 
 “[…] and if one adds to the diction [lexis] an appropriate harmonia and rhythm, it may be 
correctly uttered in virtually the same manner throughout – in one harmonia, that is, since the 
changes are slight, and in a rhythm that is similarly uniform?” 
 “That is certainly so,” he said. 
 
Chorus 2. 398d-399a. 
 “Song is put together out of three things, words, harmonia, and rhythm.” 
 “Yes,” he said. “I can say that, at least.” 
 “So far as its words are concerned, they surely don't differ from words that are not sung, 
in that they must be uttered in the same mold and in the same manner as we said just now.” 
 “True,” he said. 
 “And harmonia and rhythm must follow the words.” 
 “Certainly.” 
 “But we said that in the words there was no need for mourning and lamenting.” 
 “No.” 
 “Then which are the mournful harmoniai? Tell me: you know about music.” 
 “The Mixolydian,” he said, “and the Syntonolydian, and some others of that kind.” 
 “Mustn’t they be got rid of, then? They are useless even for women who are to be of 
good character, let alone men.” 
 “Certainly.” 
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 “Again, drunkenness is a most unsuitable thing for our guardians, as are softness and 
idleness.” 
 “Of course.” 
 “Then which of the harmoniai are the soft and convivial ones?” 
 “The Iastian and some of the Lydian harmoniai are called ‘slack,’” he said. 
 “Will there be any use for these, then, my friend, among men who are warriors?” 
 “Not at all,” he said. “But you seem to be left with just the Dorian and the Phrygian.” 
 
 […] 399c-e 
  
 “In that case,” I said, “we shall have no need of a multiplicity of strings or an assemblage 
of all the harmoniai in our songs and melodies.” 
 “I think not,” he said. 
 “Then we shall not bring up craftsmen to make trigonoi or pektides or any of the 
instruments that have many strings and all harmoniai.” 
 “Apparently not.” 
 “Well, will you admit makers or players of the aulos into the city? Or isn’t it the most 
numerous-noted of all, and aren’t the ‘panharmonic’ instruments themselves simply an imitation 
of the aulos?” 
 “Obviously,” he said. 
 “Then you are left with the lyra,” I said, “and the kithara, as things useful in the city; and 
in the countryside the herdsmen might have some sort of syrinx.” 
 “Yes, that is what the argument suggests,” he said. 
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 “After all,” I said, “it’s nothing new that we are doing, judging Apollo and his 
instruments to be superior to Marsyas and his.” 
 “No indeed,” he said, “I don't think it is.” 
 “And look here,” I said. “Without noticing it we have been repurifying the city which we 
said just now was growing over-luxurious.” 
 “Well, that was sensible of us,” he said. 
 
Chorus 3. 424c. 
 “People should beware of change to new forms of music, for they are risking change in 
the whole. Styles of music are nowhere altered without change in the greatest laws of the polis.” 
 
  
  
  
176 
Concluding Summary 
Given the breadth of musical topics and ideas related to OOO that I have discussed, it may be 
useful to review some aspects of the path taken. I will organize this summary around the 
question: What critical and constructive tools can OOO contribute to musicology? On the 
critical side, we have seen its anti-reductionism, which usually takes the unique form of a 
critique of duomining. Recall that duomining means reducing an object to its inward parts and 
outward relations (under- and overmining), or more generally, to literal knowledge. The critique 
of duomining will loom over any object-oriented venture into musicological discourse, whether 
the topic is Aristoxenus’s concept of “pitch” (Chapter 1), the interpretation of phrase-level galant 
conventions (Chapter 2), the significance of Eubie Blake’s late-life education (Chapter 3), or the 
distinction between interior form and exterior context in music criticism (Chapter 4).  
On the constructive side, we have seen that reality bears on a musical experience in three 
ways: music has elusive real qualities that become at issue in moments of theoretical difficulty 
(SO-RQ), its surface profiles fuse to a withdrawn reality in moments of allure (RO-SQ), and the 
beholder unites with the music to form a new real object, called an attachment. To get at the real, 
Harman urges the use of indirect, nonliteral methods. We will review how these played out in the 
applied chapters before stepping back to consider again the basic attitude to expect from an 
object-oriented musicology. Now, I noted in the introduction that an object is autonomous vis-à-
vis (a) its relations, (b) its parts, and (c) its qualities. Could we map these three senses of 
autonomy onto the three applied chapters? I believe so, though in a different order.  
Chapter 2, on galant schema theory, could have been subtitled “Objects vs. Qualities.” 
Theorists have ascribed general significance to the schema: it can house many kinds of features, 
apply to many genres and levels of scale, and mediate the transmission of musical paradigms 
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such as the galant style. OOO accepts the ambition of schema theory while seeking to preserve 
the irreducibility of schemata to duomining. This entails a shift in emphasis. Whereas theorists 
have focused on the role of schemata in producing literal expertise and the analytical problem of 
identifying schema content in musical works, OOO attends to the indirect relations between 
schemata and musical paradigms and the aesthetic interpretation of schema objects in musical 
works. Of particular interest here is how schemata relate to their features. Within a theoretical 
context, a schema is less than its specific profiles—not necessarily in the practical sense of an 
empty scaffold awaiting elaboration (though this is often the case), but in the ontological sense of 
an object that is less than the many qualities encrusting it. Within the aesthetic context of a 
musical experience, the schema is more than the Quiescenza or Prinner that we recognize. To 
explain this point, I drew on Robert Gjerdingen’s glancing distinction between stages and events. 
Portions of musical passages (stages) contain characteristic features attributed to the schema 
(events). What is important here are not the events, though theoretical labor can certainly test 
what we know about them, but the stages. The stage concept alerts us to form, meaning the 
grounding musical object and its parts, or stages, which are themselves forms. The interpretive 
question is how form relates to content. Sometimes the link seems literal or banal (SO-SQ), 
sometimes nonliteral or alluring (RO-SQ). Using illustrations from Mozart, I argued that a 
schema object can participate in no less than four basic flavors of alluring tension: it may be 
either “cubistic” or “allusive” (against under- or overmining), and a cubistic or allusive schema 
may appear either in the object position or quality position. 
Chapter 3 could have been subtitled “Objects vs. Relations” for its take on music history. 
Strictly speaking, Harman distinguishes between history and ontology, but his basic point is to 
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contrast a literalist approach to history with an object-oriented one.1 The former tends to be 
information-dense and attentive to relational effects, such as by focusing on the impact of events 
on historical objects. It assumes that change occurs through inscription, meaning the direct 
movement of properties from one location to another. But history for Harman is more like 
biography or archaeology in its focused concern for what is relevant to the reality of the object.2 I 
identified two ramifications here, one about the object-oriented nature of historical change and 
the other about the gap between the object and how it is expressed in relations. These can be 
summed up by the ideas of symbiosis and counterfactuals. (1) First, the musical life of Eubie 
Blake had an essence that only rarely transformed, and then not in a constant, smooth, 
cumulative manner. The concept of symbiosis indicates that a genuine turning point in an 
object’s life occurs when it strengthens its loose ties (affinities) with another entity and adopts 
surprising new features. And the concept of attachment provides a crucial intermediate step 
between irreversible symbiotic influences and passing accidents. (2) Second, since our topic was 
a possible turning point in Eubie Blake’s musical life, our primary focus had to be on that entity 
itself rather than its repercussions for other things. For OOO, one way to allude to the 
unarticulated being of an object’s life is to attend to what might have happened (as opposed to 
what actually happened) through counterfactuals, including counterfactual symbioses.  
Chapter 4 might have been subtitled “Objects vs. Parts” in that it revolved around the 
question of what belongs to the interior of Louis Andriessen’s concert work De Staat (e.g. its 
sonic form, its historical conditions, the composer’s motivations) and how the music critic may 
treat that interior. This chapter drew on Harman’s unique critique of formalism and, more 
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relevantly, his parallel critique of the ingrained contemporary reflex against formalism, which I 
called context orientation. The crux of the matter is his twin commitment to both “flat ontology” 
and an aesthetic (rather than conceptual or political) appraisal of the object. The principle of flat 
ontology follows from Harman’s anti-reductionism. It insists that philosophy should initially be 
agnostic about what is real and, by analogy, that the critic should initially be agnostic about what 
belongs to the musical form. Musical objects incorporate different kinds of content. However – 
and this is the second principle – De Staat only works if it deals with this content by aesthetic 
means. That is, the object-oriented critic enters a sincere involvement with De Staat insofar as 
the piece takes a nonliteral approach to Plato, totalitarianism, concert hall politics, stylistic 
elements from Stravinsky and the American minimalists, and so on. 
To the above summary of the critical and constructive elements of OOO as they appear in 
the previous chapters, we may add a final consideration about the larger ideological slant that 
OOO brings to the table. For OOO, musicology is irreducible to the people who practice it and 
the information they collect and produce, such as scores, historical documents, analyses, facts, 
and narratives. Furthermore, the goal is not to progressively demystify one’s subject matter. 
While it is surely a worthy aim to add detail to the historical record, clarify conceptual 
ambiguities, rectify mistakes, and interrogate structures of power and subversion, OOO has more 
of an aesthetic sensibility. This means first that musicology is composed not of information or 
people but of objects: those units formed by the attachments of musicologists to the unmasterable 
topics that fascinate them and around which their investigations revolve. And second, it means 
one proceeds by focusing on the tense relation between the object of study and the information 
collected about it, with the goal of drawing out its weirdness and individuality.  
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Glossary of OOO Terminology 
Except where noted, terms are introduced in Chapter 1 and originate with Graham Harman. 
 
affinities. My term in Chapter 3 for inessential similarities that characterize weak ties between 
objects. Affinities act as hooks (“pretexts” in Harman’s words) for attachments and 
symbioses, in which loose affiliations become stronger. (For example, shared traits 
between the two parts of a metaphor are affinities.) Compare: dependencies.  
 
allure. The active term for space (RO-SQ). When an object’s sensual features do not literally fit  
with it or when a group of objects seem to assemble around a veiled unifying principle, 
the accessible elements affix to an inaccessible real object. Since RO is withdrawn, the 
experiencing entity (or “beholder”) theatrically enacts this fusion. 
 
attachment. The coupling of a real object (or “beholder”) with a sensual object through allure.  
An attachment is itself a real object that is neither reducible to the beholder in isolation 
nor paraphrasable in literal terms.  
 
banal. A term for literal experience, connoting the normal absence of tension in a relation. 
 
causation. The active term for essence (RO-RQ). Harman implies that causation occurs when 
an object changes through symbiosis or forms in the first place. The twofold structure of 
space (RO-SQ) proposed in Chapter 2 raises the possibility of a similar pairing for 
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causation: (1) one object confronts another via allure or theory; (2) a group of objects 
form or transform a system with one another via the mediation of a separate real object. 
 
counterfactual. Possible but non-actual occurrences that allude to the reality of an object apart  
from its relations. Counterfactuals oppose the overmining attitude that prioritizes actual 
events at the exclusion of the object itself and its many possible futures and origins. Two 
variants not explicitly outlined here include the hyperbolic method, which imagines a 
“triumphant” object without circumstantial obstacles (see also eidos), and ruination, 
which imagines an alluring object in either a more literal or more implausible form.    
 
dependencies. My term in Chapter 3 for similarities, common interests, and other literal quality- 
quality bonds between objects that characterize their strong ties. Harman argues that 
dependencies increase efficiency at the cost of autonomy. (For example, shared traits 
between the two parts of an analogy are dependencies.) Compare: affinities. 
 
duomining. The combination of undermining and overmining, which systematically reduce  
objects to their parts or effects. One typically supplements the other. 
 
eidos. The tension between a sensual object and its real qualities (SO-RQ), as indicated by the  
obstruction of SO. Eidos is inspired by Edmund Husserl’s method of “eidetic variation,” 
in which the imagination strips inessential qualities from an object. The production of this 
tension is also called theory. 
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essence. The tension between a real object and its real qualities (RO-RQ). Since both poles are  
real, essence cannot be known or experienced directly. The production of this tension is 
also called causation. See also symbiosis.   
 
execution; executant. The lived reality of an object, drawn from the philosopher José Ortega y  
Gasset. The concept is not volitional, but existential: a headache is an executant headache 
for the person experiencing it. 
 
fission. The production of object-quality tension involving a sensual object. It stems from the  
notion that SO has a pre-existing bond with its features that must be disturbed for tension 
to take place. I suggest in this dissertation that fission may be relevant to SO-RQ but not 
SO-SQ if the latter is interpreted as minimally tense (banal). See also fusion. 
 
flat ontology. The idea, associated most prominently with Manuel DeLanda, that fundamental  
ontological categories are not based on differences between kinds of things (e.g. human 
thought vs. non-human things). See also taxonomic fallacy. 
 
fusion. The production of object-quality tension involving a real object. It derives from the  
notion that RO, being withdrawn, does not have a pre-existing bond with its features, so 
the two poles must be brought together into tense relation. See also fission. 
 
inscription. My term for (anti-object-oriented) attempts to model a direct transfer of properties  
from one location to another, by contrast with attachment and symbiosis. See Chapter 3. 
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literal. A literal object is fully identified with its accessible traits. Harman has sometimes used  
the term banal as a synonym. A point of ambiguity in OOO is whether time (SO-SQ) is 
literal, given the object’s unbroken mediation of its qualities.  
 
overmining. A method of explanation that assumes an object is nothing more than its relational  
effects; the reduction of an object to its appearance. Overmining denies surplus to the 
object and is thus unable to account for change. Harman associates overmining with the 
goal of achieving certainty. See also duomining and undermining. 
 
paradigm. The real qualities of an object that are relevant to its relations with other things. A  
listener’s paradigm, for example, involves tacit background assumptions and expertise 
that inform how she engages with musical objects. This is not to be confused with the 
“sociological” interpretation of paradigms as (possibly arbitrary) shared opinions and 
models of behavior, as is sometimes associated with Thomas Kuhn’s concept.  
 
real object (RO). An autonomous entity that is irreducible to its components and relational  
effects. A real object is withdrawn, meaning not accessible as such. 
 
real qualities (RQ). Qualities that a real or sensual object needs in order to be what it is (its 
“thisness”). RQ, like RO, are withdrawn. An unstated implication when RQ are assigned 
to SO is that these RQ may in fact belong to the larger attachment, itself a real object.  
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sensual object (SO). A correlate of a real object’s encounter with something else (the  
“intentional object” of phenomenology). All relations produce sensual objects.  
 
sensual qualities (SQ). Relational (encountered) features linked to a real or sensual object, and  
the typical basis for knowledge claims. The “accidents” or “adumbrations” of an object.  
 
simulation. A rarely used active term for time (SO-SQ). Inspired by Edmund Husserl, Harman  
argues that a sensual object is prior to its features, persisting through its “adumbrations” 
or shifting profiles. This contrasts with the empiricist model of directly encountered 
qualities on which a mind separately imposes objecthood. 
 
sincerity. Term drawn from Levinas for the execution of an object’s reality in its attachments.  
 
space. The tension between a real object and sensual qualities (RO-SQ), as indicated by an 
object’s nonliteral bond with incongruous sensual qualities. Harman associates RO-SQ 
with aesthetic experience. The production of RO-SQ is also called allure. In Chapter 2, I 
argue that space can be (1) “allusive,” through an object’s independence from its features 
or (2) “cubistic,” through an object’s independence from its parts.  
 
symbiosis. The transformation of an object’s real qualities via a special kind of attachment.  
Only irreversible attachments are symbioses. Harman claims an entity will endure just a 
handful of symbioses before the indeterminacies with respect to its character are 
resolved. See Chapter 3. See also inscription and essence. 
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taxonomic fallacy. The violation of the principle of flat ontology by conflating general  
ontological categories with specific kinds of things. 
 
tension. A rift between an object and its qualities, contrary to the literal. (But see time on a  
possible ambiguity.) Harman describes four tensions, divided into two fissions (SO-SQ 
and SO-RQ) and two fusions (RO-SQ and RO-RQ). A synonym used by Harman for 
tension in the broad sense of an object/quality gap is “weirdness.”  
 
theatrical. A characteristic of the experience of space (RO-SQ). The affected entity (or  
“beholder”) steps in for an inaccessible real object to enact its nonliteral fusion with its 
features, thus establishing an attachment. Harman likens the process to method acting. A 
similar process takes place in theory (SO-RQ). Here, though, the beholder fills in their 
RQ for the destabilized form of an object: an attachment thus becomes more volatile.  
 
theory. The active term for eidos (SO-RQ). When a sensual object as such is obfuscated, the 
experiencing entity (or “beholder”) attends to features the object needs to be what it is. 
Since real qualities are inaccessible, the beholder brings their own RQ into tension with 
SO, thus causing the form of the attachment to become at issue.  
 
time. The tension between a sensual object and its sensual qualities (SO-SQ), as indicated in  
experience by the shifting profiles of an object. According to Harman, the only place for 
continuum in OOO is in this one tension (the constant connection between SO and its 
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features). The unbroken mediation of SQ by SO raises the question of whether time may 
be called literal (see Chapter 2). The production of SO-SQ is also called simulation. 
 
translation. The idea that objects do not directly touch the reality of other things but instead  
distort or interpret them in their own terms, as sensual objects. See also withdrawal. 
 
undermining. A method of explanation that assumes an object is reducible to a more basic  
substrate (its parts, atoms, “matter,” etc.). Undermining is unable to account for 
emergence, or the individuality of an object over the contributions of its parts. See also 
duomining and overmining. 
 
withdrawal. The impossibility of any object entering direct (immediate, undistorted) contact  
with real objects and qualities. Even a thing’s own real faculties are not directly present 
to it. In the case of humans, for example, only the object of thought rather than the power 
of thought itself is immediately present. 
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